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CONTENTS

	Page
Terracotta Figurines from Shahabad—by K. N. Dikshit, National Museum, New Delhi	261
Hero Stones of Tamilnadu—by R. Nagaswamy, Director of Archaeology, Madras ..	265
Naga Hills Boundary Disputes 1842-1872—by S. K. Barpujari, M.A., Ph.D. ..	271
Execution of Guru Arjan—by B. S. Nijjar, M.A., Ph.D., Director of Archives, Panjab	281
Some Epithets of Brahmana Donees in South Indian Charters—by D. C. Sircar, M.A., Ph.D., Calcutta ..	289
Mudra Dharana—by N. Jagadeesan, M.A., Ph.D., Tagore Arts College, Pondicherry ..	293
The System of Cartazes—by B. S. Shastry, P. G. Centre, Panjim-Goa ..	297
A Note on the Gudnapur Inscription of Kadamba Ravivarman—by G. S. Gai, Chief Epigraphist, Mysore ..	301
Content-Analysis of the Tamil Brahmi Inscriptions—by N. Subrahmanian, M.A., Ph.D., & R. Rajalakshmi ..	303
Are the Caves at Dharasiva Buddhist or Jaina?—by V. V. Mirashi ..	315
Status of Hill Tippera as a "Native" State—by B. P. Barua, P. G. Government College, Aijal ..	329
A Note on Husain Shah's Assam Expedition—by S. K. Das Jadavpur, Calcutta ..	337
A Note on Apratirathah—by V. C. Pandey, Panjab University, Chandigarh ..	345
The Impact of Ultra-Leftism on the Communist Party of India 1928-36—by Conrad Wood ..	349
Indian National Congress—The Formative Years—by P. N. Chopra, Editor (Gazetteers)—Ministry of Education, New Delhi ..	395
Travancore and the Paramount Power—A Study in Wartime Relationship—by P. G. Edwin, Professor, University College, Trivandrum ..	407
The Problem of Two Besnagar Garuda Pillar Inscriptions—by B. C. Sinha, Department of Ancient Indian History and Archaeology, Gurukula, Kangri Hardwar ..	421

(Continued on last page)

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CONTENTS

TERRACOTTA FIGURINES FROM SHAHABAD — by K. N. Dikshit, National Museum, New Delhi .. 261

HERO STONES OF TAMILNADU — by R. Nagaswamy, Director of Archaeology, Madras .. 265

NAGA HILLS BOUNDARY DISPUTES 1842-1872 — by S. K. Barpujari, M.A., Ph.D. .. 271

EXECUTION OF GURU ARJAN — by B. S. Nijjar, M.A., Ph.D., Director of Archives, Panjab .. 281

SOME EPITHETS OF BRAHMANA DONEES IN SOUTH INDIAN CHARTERS — by D. C. Sircar, M.A., Ph.D., Calcutta .. 289

MUDRA DHARANA — by N. Jagadeesan, M.A., Ph.D., Tagore Arts College, Pondicherry .. 293

THE SYSTEM OF CARTAZES — by B. S. Shastry, P. G. Centre, Panjim-Goa .. 297

A NOTE ON THE GUDNAPUR INSCRIPTION OF KADAMBA RAVIVARMAN — by G. S. Gai, Chief Epigraphist, Mysore .. 301

CONTENT-ANALYSIS OF THE TAMIL BRAHMI INSCRIPTIONS — by N. Subrahmanian, M.A., Ph.D. & R. Rajalakshmi .. 303

ARE THE CAVES AT DHARASIVA BUDDHIST OR JAINA? — by V. V. Mirashi .. 315

STATUS OF HILL TIPPERA AS A "NATIVE" STATE — by B. P. Barua, P. G. Government College, Aijal .. 329

A NOTE ON HUSAIN SHAH'S ASSAM EXPEDITION — by S. K. Das, Jadavpur, Calcutta .. 337

A NOTE ON APRATIRATHAH — by V. C. Pandey, Panjab University, Chandigarh .. 345

THE IMPACT OF ULTRA-LEFTISM ON THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF INDIA 1928-36 — by Conrad Wood .. 349

INDIAN NATIONAL CONGRESS—THE FORMATIVE YEARS — by P. N. Chopra. Editor (Gazetteers)—Ministry of Education, New Delhi .. 395

TRAVANCORE AND THE PARAMOUNT POWER — A STUDY IN WARTIME RELATIONSHIP — by P. G. Edwin, Professor, University College, Trivandrum .. 407

THE PROBLEM OF TWO BESNAGAR GARUDA PILLAR INSCRIPTIONS — by B. C. Sinha, Department of Ancient Indian History and Archaeology, Gurukula, Kangri Hardwar .. 421

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OUR EXCHANGES .. 461

Terracotta Figurines from Shahabad

BY

K. N. Dikshit

The Discovery

Situated about 30 kms. south-east from Shahjahanpur, the town of Shahabad, Hardoi District, Uttar Pradesh, has a series of connected mounds on its south-eastern side. The archaeological wealth of the site was noticed first by Dr. Jagdish Gupta[1] of Allahabad University who picked up ochre-coloured ware, copper-hoard implements, terracotta figurines and coins from this place. Later on Dr. V. N. Misra[2] of Deccan College, Poona, further explored the area in a systematic way. In exploration these mounds yielded Painted Grey and Northern Black Polished Wares, Gupta terracotta figurines and a mediaeval copper coin.

These two terracotta figurines from Shahabad were purchased by the Art Purchase Committee of the National Museum, New Delhi from Dr. Jagdish Gupta in 1971. They are now with the Department of the Prehistoric Archaeology of the museum.

Description

1. *Terracotta Male Head and Bust* (*Acc. No.* 71.230)

The terracotta figurine (Plate I) which is partly worn out, is 2.5 cms. in height. The traces of black slip can be also seen. It is of dark-brown colour and is inadequately fired. The face which is quite crude in execution slightly tilts towards left. It has no forehead and is flat at the top. The front half portion of the skull seems to be shaven, whereas on both the ends of occipital part two locks are falling on the shoulder. This is a peculiar feature. The

1. Dr. Jagdish Gupta, Department of Hindi, Allahabad University, Private Communication.
2. *Indian Archaeology—A Review* 1965-66 (in the press).

prominent eye-brows have assimilated even the eyes. The wide mouth has assymetrical thick lips. The bust has traces of transparent drapery. It is handmade and the back is also unfinished.

This terracotta is important as it recalls the profile and execution of the famous dancing girl and priest from Mohenjodaro and a terracotta head from Kalibangan.[3] Stylistically it has an echo of Harappan art tradition.

2. *Terracotta Male Figurine* (*Acc. No.* 207)

The figure (Pl. II) which is 8.00 cm. high has one arm akimpo, whereas the other one is missing. The lower portion is also broken. It is ill-fired as is evident from the black core of the broken arm. It is treated with a wash. The execution is extremely crude and primitive. The face which is 2.5 cms. long has only the idea of nose and mouth whereas eyes are quite worn out. The top is slightly broken. It is round at the back. The figure which is archaic in character has absolutely no detailed treatment and also lacks in the portrayal of the anatomical features.

Stylistically the figure, which is not of any high technical skill and also devoid of intricacies of the art, has no connection with the former example, although it bears some similarity in profile. Possibly the artist has followed the tradition of the grotesque figurines found at Mohenjodaro and other Harappan sites.

Discussion

The importance of these terracottas is, that, they have been reported from a region which is not in direct contact with Harappa culture. The eastern-most station of Harappa culture is Manpur in Bulandshahr District. Between Manpur and Shahabad, a number of stations of the ochre-coloured ware and copper-hoard objects have been noticed in the Districts of Etah, Itawa and Shahjahanpur. As Shahabad has yielded typical copper-hoard objects (now displayed in the National Museum) and also the ochre-coloured ware, it is not unlikely that the terracotta figurines in question may have been manufactured by these indigeneous people who came in contact

3. *Indian Archaeology—A Review* 1960-61, p. 32.

with the Harappans of Sutlej–Yamuna region somewhere around the middle of the 2nd millennium B.C. while moving towards upper Ganga–Yamuna doab.[4] In a recent excavation at Lal Qila,[5] Bulandshahr District, female terracotta figurines have been reported from the ochre–coloured ware horizon, whereas from Ambkheri,[6] Saharanpur District, only fragmentary animal figurines like humped bull were encountered. However, it is needless to say that the site requires a scientific digging for the confirmation of the above contact which in itself is a wellknown lacunae in Indian archaeology.

4. Dikshit, K. N., Harappa Culture in Western Uttar Pradesh, in *Bulletin of the National Museum*, No. 2, New Delhi, 1970, p. 28.

5. R. C. Gaur, Department of History, Aligarh Muslim University, Private Communication. See also *Indian Archaeology—A Review* 1970-71 (in the press).

6. *Indian Archaeology—A Review*, 1963-64, p. 56.

PLATE I. Terracotta Figurines from Shahabad



PLATE II. Terracotta Figurines from Shahabad

Hero Stones of Tamilnadu

BY

R. NAGASWAMY

A number of hero-stones, ranging from 4th century A.D. to the present time have been found all over Tamiḻnāḍu. Recently the Tamiḻnāḍu State Department of Archaeology has copied about sixty hero-stones from the Chengam Taluk of North Arcot District. They range from the 6th century A.D. to the 10th century A.D. The recent survey has thrown new light on the nature of these hero-stones. The hero-stones are called *Vīra kallu* in the Kannada country, but in Tamil literature, they are invariably called *Naḍukal.*

The Tamil works, the Tolkāppiyam, the Puranānūru, and the Purapporuḷ Venbāmālai, are the main works which throw valuable light on Naḍukals. References are also met with in the Ahanānūru, the Ainguṛunūru, and the twin epics the Śilappatikāram and the Maṇimēkhalai.

The Tamil classification of life into Aham and Puram are well-known. Since the external activities of man are dealt with in Puram, details regarding the erection of hero-stones are found in the chapter on *Purattinai* of Tolkāppiyam.

The Tinais and Cattle-lifting

Four broad rubries, namely cattle-lifting, fort, territorial expansion and enmity, are recognised as causes of war in Tamil literature, each having its offensive and defensive aspects. On each occasion, a particular flower garland is worn by the hero. These are called *Vetci tinai, Karandai tinai* etc. Besides the hero, the weapons, and war drums are also said to be adorned with the particular flowers (Nedunalvadai, line 176). The Tolkāppiyam deals with the erection of Naḍukals immediately after the cattle-lifting operations, while the Purapporul Venbāmālai places it after dealing with all aspects of war.

According to Tamil traditions, cattle-lifting is a defensive expedition. War generally is wrought with indiscriminate killing. It was therefore necessary to protect the weaker sections of the society, like children, women, old, Andaṇar and cattle. It is for this reason cattle were first removed to safety by the invader (Puram 9). When the cattle were thus lifted, it is an indication of the impending invasion. Ilampūranar, the celebrated commentator on Tolkāppiyam states that, it was a habit among people of hilly tract, (*Kuruñji nilam*) to steal the cattle of nearby countries.

When erected?

Nadukals were erected to commemorate the death of heroes in any aspect of battles. Naḍukals were also erected for other heroic forms of death. The Chola king, Kopperuncōla died by *Vadakkiruttal* i.e. fasting. A Naḍukal was erected over his remains (Puram, 221). The chaste wife who committed Sati, (immolation) with the body of her husband was also honoured with a Naḍukal. Naḍukals were erected for those whose bodies were cremated. It is seen from the Puranānūru, the bodies of most of the kings and Veḷir chieftains were cremated and Naḍukals were erected to propitiate their souls. When Atiyamān Neḍumān Añji died in the battle, his body was cremated (Puram, 231) and a Naḍukal was erected and bali offered to him (Puram, 232). The Purapporuḷ Venbāmālai, speaks of a particular turai called *Pānpāttu*. In this, the Pāṇar are said to cremate the body of soldiers who died in the battlefield. Naḍukals ought to have been erected for such soldiers as well. However it is not known whether Naḍukals were erected for those whose bodies were interned in an urn burial. Most likely stones were erected on such occasions as well.

Where?

As mentioned earlier, besides the literary references, the hero-stones that have survived, are our main sources. The recent survey shows that Naḍukals were erected, a little away from the residential areas. In almost all cases the Naḍukals are found outside the residential parts of the villages. There are instances where two or three hero-stones are found in the same place devoted to

FIG. 1. A hero stone relating to the death of two heroes in a battle in the reign of Simhavishnu, Koraiyaru, Dharmapuri District



FIG. 2. A hero stone relating to the death of a hero during the reign of Mahendravarman, Se. Kudalur, North Arcot District

FIG. 4. A hero stone relating to the death of a hero while fighting with a tiger, Kīlmuttugur



FIG. 2A. A hero stone relating to the death of a hero during the reign of Simhavishnu, Narasinganallur, North Arcot District



FIG. 3. A hero stone relating to the death of a hero during the reign of Kampavarman, Chinayyanpettai, North Arcot District



FIG. 5. நடுகல் (வேட்டுவன் கோயில்) வடிவுள்ளமங்கலம், கோவை மாவட்டம்

A dolmenoid hero stone of the reign of Rajendra Chola, Vadivullamangalam, Coimbatore District

heroes who fell in the same battle. There are also instances where the figures of two heroes are portryed in one stone (Fig. 1), recording the death of them in the same battle. In some instances Naḍukals relating to the reign of various kings and even various dynasties are found in the same place. For example at Sattanūr, Naḍukals relating to the reign of Pallava Mahēndra, Narasimha and of the reign of Parāntaka-Cola are found planted side by side. This suggests that the place served for erecting Naḍukals like a cemetery, for few centuries. Naḍukals are also found on the lake bunds (Fig. 2) in some cases. There are also instances when heroes fell in two different villages during the same battle and Naḍukals were erected in the respective villages. There are some Naḍukals in the interior forests, far away from any habitation (Fig. 2A). It is likely that these Naḍukals were erected in the very same place where the heroes fell.

Names

These Naḍukals continue to receive worship with great reverence even to this day. In most part they are called Veḍiyappan in North Arcot, Dharmapuri and Salem Districts. They are also called by other names as Vedarkoil, Kṛṣṇārappan, Mīnārappan and Sanniyāsiappan. In some places they are called Aiyyanārappan or Añjanēyar, an obvious confusion with these well-known deities. Besides the common name Veḍiyappan, they are also given some special names which suggest the reminiscence of heroism and their funerary associations. Thus in one case the Naḍukal is referred to as *Siraimīttān* i.e., rescuer of captives and in another *Sāvumettu* veḍiyappan (Fig. 3) i.e., the deity of the death mound.

The Nature of Naḍukals

The Naḍukals generally carry the figure of a hero—in most cases idealised—with a bow in one hand and arrow, sword or dagger in the other. In some cases the figure is shown carrying a shield and a sword. Usually the heroes are shown wearing a short lower garment, and bare-bodied above. Some form of cap with a protruding knob at the top is seen on the head. In most cases two vessels, one in the form of spouted *kuṇḍika* and the other like that of a relic casket are portrayed on either side of the legs. In some,

mirror with a handle is also shown. Some Naḍukals bear the figures of cattle relating to the encounter. Another common encounter seems to be with tigers. Two hero-stones have come to light wherein, while fighting a tiger the hero is said to have died (Fig. 4). In such cases, the figure of the hero is portrayed fighting with a tiger. The inscription giving the name and the details about the hero, the nature of the encounter in which he died and the name and regnal year of the ruler, are inscribed in the same face, above, below or on the sides of the figure. There are a number of stones which do not bear any figure or epigraph but are planted by the side of these Naḍukals. Probably they also were Naḍukals erected to fulfil the ritual needs of those who didn't have enough means. There are also a number of Naḍukals bearing figures of heroes, but with no inscriptions. A number of hero-stones belonging to the Vijayanagar period (14th to 17th century A.D.) are found with the figure of the hero accompanied by one or more of his consorts, but without inscriptions. It is not known whether the consorts figured committed sati on the death of the hero. The Naḍukals of the early period, 4th to 8th century, are figured in thin flat slabs of moderate height. The figures are cut in low relief but are shown in animated actions. Naḍukals erected in the reign of Pallava Mahēndravarman are singularly beautiful. The Naḍukals of the later period are carved in thick slabs, the figures are in high relief, but are stiff, conventional and lack elegance.

Dolmenoid Naḍukals

It is of interest to see that a majority of them are single slabs, standing erect. A few Naḍukals have survived, in their original form. These in the form of dolmens consist of three upright slabs topped by a cap slab. The figure is portrayed at the back slab with the inscription. In one case inscription is also found on the side slab (Fig. 5). Such dolmenoid hero-stones suggest that originally all such Naḍukals were erected as dolmens. This also fits in with the mode of erecting Naḍukals as described in Tamil literature.

From the Tolkāppiyam and Purapporuḷ Venbāmālai and other citations we understand the following process of erection.

The first stage, *Kātci,* is the selection of stone. The leader of the tribe accompanied by others goes to the nearby forest for making a selection of stone; invokes the god, burns incense, offers flowers and selects the stone. The second stage *Kālkōl,* is the removal of stone; flowers and water are sprinkled on the stone; incense is burned, the bell and *parai* are played; the stone is praised and then removed. The third stage *Nīrpaḍai,* is placing it in water for some period to counter the effects of weathering due to sun's rays. It is praised, cleaned, anointed with fragrant liquids and either placed inside a pond or, a special tub. The fourth stage, is the erection of the Naḍukal, the stone is garlanded, bell is rung, toddy is sprinkled, peacock's feather is tied, the hero's name and fame are inscribed and in the presence of all the stone is planted. In the fifth stage, *Perumpadai,* the dead hero is invoked in the stone and thenceforth considered a divine being. The sixth stage, *Vāltal* is the erection of an abode of worship and offering to the weapons.

All these six parts are *angas* of the same Naḍukal ceremony. It may be seen from the last stage called, *Vāḷtal,* i.e., adoration in Toḷkāppiyam, and *il kondu puhudal* in Purapporuḷ venbāmālai, Naḍukal had become temples of the dead and received worship. The erection of dolmenoid Naḍukal, fulfils the need of a temple. In the case of some Cōḷa kings actual temples were erected where the kings' remains were interred and such temples were called *Paḷḷippaḍai*

Worship and beliefs

As mentioned earlier, these Naḍukals, receive regular worship even to this day. Annual festivals are held with great pomp. In front of the stone, swords and tridents are planted. They are also anointed, garlanded and offered worship. The worship of these weapons is mentioned in early literature as well. The Purapporuḷ venbāmālai (Verse 253) refers to the offering of food to the sword of Naḍukal.

Besides these weapons, huge terracotta horses are placed in front of them. Terracotta figures of cattle, men, women and children are also placed in front. These votive offerings are placed in fulfilment of their vows and prayers. Animal sacrifice particularly that of ram and cock are also offered during annual

festivals. Offering of liquor, to the Naḍukals is an ancient custom mentioned in Sangam literature. Avvai speaks of the offering of liquor to the Naḍukal of Atiyamān Nedumān Añji (Puram, 232). The representation of spouted *kuṇḍika* in all the Naḍukals, probably had some connection with this rite.

An important belief among the people is that, the worship of Naḍukals, brings forth rains and fertility to the soil and prosperity to the clan and people. Even now, the local people offer special worship to these Naḍukals, when rain fails, or in times of drought. This belief again seems to have been held from hoary past. A verse (263) in Puram refers to this belief. In the epic, Śilappatikāram, the Kuravar of the hilly region, exhorted their folkmen to worship Pattini, (who ascended heaven) so that there may be plenty of rain and fertility.

The reverence with which these Naḍukals are worshipped, even to-day bespeaks of this great tradiiton.

Naga Hills Boundary Disputes (1842-1872)

BY

S. K. Barpujari

Ever since the birth of Nagaland in December, 1963, roughly a 200–mile stretch of boundary has become the bone of contention between this state and Assam. Despite negotiations at different levels, the boundary question between the two is yet to be settled. In the meanwhile, charges and counter–charges of aggression and encroachments hurled by the one against the other has been straining the relations between them. The dispute arises out of the conflicting interpretations of the 1925 notification which defined the southern boundary between Assam and the Naga Hills District which was then a part of the province of Assam. Assam Government accepts the notification as unambiguous, but Nagaland considers this as imaginary. The latter wants New Delhi to appoint a Boundary Commission to go into the whole question. The Government of Assam, on the other hand, is opposed to it: in its opinion the boundary between the two states had been clearly defined by the notification referred to above.

On the resumption of Upper Assam from ex–Raja Purandar Singh in 1838, the British Government inherited a legacy of hostile relationship with the Eastern Nagas who inhabited the hills south of the district of Sibsagar. Nevertheless, the British Indian Government succeeded in winning over these Nagas by abolishing the heavy duties on salt and illegal extortions made by the former Government. On the other side of the frontier, the annexation of Cachar in 1832, brought the British into close proximity of the Angami, the most warlike of the Western Nagas.[1] This was soon followed by Angami incursions into villages held by British and Manipur Governments, disturbing thereby the peace and security of the North East Frontier. The task of controlling the Angamis was at first left to Manipur, which was then supposed to have exercised some sort of authority over the Southern portion of the

1. Owen, John, *Naga Tribes* (1844), pp. 88 cf.

Naga Hills.[2] Manipur failed in its task; thereupon, in 1839–40 expeditions had to be sent against the raiders. For two years the Angamis suspended their raids into British territories, but continued to harry the villages under Manipur's jurisdiction.[3]

For the protection of the Manipuris, Captain Gordon, political Agent in Manipur proposed the assumption of direct management of the Angami Hills. To implement the same, he suggested the construction of a military-road through the hills with a line of posts all along its strategic points and the gradual subjugation of the Angamis living on both sides of the road in the course of its undertaking.[4] The proposal did not find favour with Lieutenant Bigge, Principal Assistant, Nowgong who thought that the root cause of aggressions was the boundary disputes between the Angamis and the Manipuris, and that the same should be settled peacefully by a mission specially deputed for the purpose. The Government of India being averse to coercive measures readily accorded their approval to the proposal. Later in his successful 'peace mission',[5] Bigge met several Angami Chiefs who entered into agreement with him promising to recognise the river Dhansiri as the boundary between their hills and the British territory and assured not to violate it except for friendly intercourse with the people of the plains.

In the cold season of 1842, Bigge met Gordon at Manipur and after careful consideration jointly reported:

> We are of opinion that commencing from the upper part of the Jeree river, the Western frontier of Munnipore, the line of boundary formed firstly by the Dootighor mountain or that range of hills in which the Mookroo river takes its rise east on to the Barak river upto where it is joined by the Typhanee river, which flows along the eastern base of the Papolongmai hill; thirdly by the Typhanee river, upto its source in the Barail range of mountains; and fourthly by the summit or water-pent of the Barail range on to the source of the Mow

2. *Bengal Judicial Proceedings*, 1835, Nov. 17, No. 48.
3. *Foreign Political Proceedings*, 1840, May 25, No. 118.
4. *Foreign Political Proceedings*, 1840, Aug. 3, No. 93.
5. See Barpujari, S. K., "Early Peace Missions in the Naga Hills", (vide *Proceedings volume, Indian History Congress*, 1969, Varanasi, p. 369).

river, flowing north from that point towards Assam, ... is the best boundary between Munnipore and the Angami country.[6]

Hitherto, the great central ridge or 'water-pent' formed 'the generally received line of boundary seperating Assam from Munnipore.' Bigge and Gordon's line defined only the Western and North–western boundaries of Manipur excluding from it the Angami country proper, but including the Maos 'allied to the Angamis by race and customs'. This virtually seperated all the Angamis from the Naga clans in obedience to Manipur and its Raja had lost control or authority North of the new line. Bigge and Gordon's boundary was confirmed by the Government of India, but instructions actually issued to the political Agent in Manipur, were not known. Subsequent events, however, showed that neither the Government of India took the settlement seriously, nor did the Raja of Manipur ever accept it.[7]

To the utter disappointment of the Government, Bigge and Gordon's line did not put a stop to Angami raids into the territories held by the British and Manipur. As a matter of fact, until 1850, as many as eight expeditions had to be sent out against them, but none was attended with success. Being 'utterly sick of Naga affairs', at last in 1851, the Government of India decided on a policy of absolute non–interference in regard to the Nagas.[8] British troops were withdrawn from the hills and to protect its possessions an English officer was deputed to Asaloo in North Cachar (1853). During this period, the Manipuris being not satisfied with the boundary settlement not only encouraged but directly helped the pro–Manipuri Nagas against the British. Such intrigue and active interference on their part adversely affected the British position in the Angami Hills.[9]

6. *Foreign Political Proceedings,* 1842, Jan. 24, No. 71.

7. In reply to an order of the Government asking the Political Agent, Manipur and the Principal Assistant, Nowgong to undertake annual visits to the Angami Hills, the former official wrote "in the absence of a post at Papolongami, and in the absence of an intermediate post between that place and Munipore, and while no settlement of boundary has been made with the Munipore Government, I forsee obstacles in the way of a British officer paying visits to the Angami country from Munipore".

8. *Foreign Political Proceedings,* 1851, Feb.7, No. 206.

9. *Foreign Political Proceedings,* 1851, June 13, No. 110.

The experiment of non-interference simply resulted in repeated Angami raids even into British territories and this called for definite action. Accordingly in 1866, the formation of a new district with headquarters at Samaguting was announced by the Government of India and Lieutenant John Gregory took charge of it as Deputy Commissioner. The district comprised of that part of Nowgong lying on the right bank of the Dhansiri, the Naga Hills and the country lying on both banks of the river Doyang. Its southern boundary was defined to run along the crest of the Barail range, from the sources of the Rengma or Doyang river to the small Western feeder of the sources of the Dhansiri river.[10]

From the middle of the last century, European speculators had taken more interest in tea-plantation and exploitation of minerals and forest products in Upper Assam extending to the foot of the Naga Hills. As a result a good number of tea-gardens had sprung up in the area south of Ladoigarh,[11] which was supposed to be the boundary between Naga Hills and Sibsagar District. An official report of 1871 states that there existed five grants south of the Ladoigarh and of the Athkhel and Geleki mouzahs, and also 'a cluster of gardens' at the point of intersection of the Ladoigarh with the Dhodur Ali which ran along the whole length of the Sibsagar District.[12] The planters who opened their gardens in these areas entered into agreements of different nature with the Naga chiefs under the firm belief that the lands belonged to the latter and not to the Government.

Consequent upon the rapid extension of tea-plantations into the areas claimed by the Nagas as their own and to the reluctance of the local authorities 'to recognise any frontier between the settled districts and the lands of the independent Nagas' the relation between the Nagas and the planters vis-a-vis the Government of India took a different turn. In 1864, Mr. Vanquilin, a planter in the Sibsagar district had a dispute with a Naga chief regarding a salt-spring situated in the country of the Joboka Nagas. With reference to this case Colonel Hopkinson, Commissioner of Assam,

10. *Bengal Judicial Proceedings*, 1866, Oct. 29, Nos. 61-2.

11. The Ahom Kings had raised an earthen embankment "Ladoigurh" at the foot hills of the Naga areas to prevent raids by the Naga tribes into the plains.

12. *Bengal Judicial Proceedings*, 1871, Sept. Nos. 31-45.

held the view that the southern boundary of Assam had always been held to be coterminous with the northern boundaries of Burma and Manipur along the centre of the Patkai range of hills. The tribes bordering Lakhimpur and Sibsagar Districts were within British boundaries, but the Government did not exact any revenue from them. Apprehending troubles, in view of planters taking lands from the Nagas by paying revenue to them, the Commissioner urged the Government to issue orders as to whether a formally demarcated Naga boundary should be recognised or whether the Patkai range should be preserved as the Southern boundary of Assam. He further stressed the necessity of proper demarcation of the boundary after regular survey and that acquisition of lands by settlers, European or native, should not be allowed on the Naga side of it.[13]

Frequent disputes also arose between the Deputy Commissioner, Naga Hills and the Government of Manipur regarding some villages situated east of the Rengma and north of the Barail range. Manipur administration contended that the assertion of the Bigge and Gordon line had prevented it from protecting its own subjects but the Nagas were left free to raid villages under Manipur at will. In February, 1867, in reply to a query, the Lieutenant Governor of Bengal informed Colonel McCulloch, Political Agent, Manipur that 'in as much as a British Officer has now assumed direct administration of the Angami Naga Hills, all differences and disputes between the subjects of Munnipore and the Angami Nagas residing within our territories, should be referred to the Deputy Commissioner, Naga Hills, and that Munnipoorees should be restrained from making incursions into any part of the jurisdiction of the Deputy Commissioner'. 'Any outrage committed in Munnipore by Nagas from our side of the frontier', he added "should be reported at once to the Deputy Commissioner, who in concert with Munnipore Government, and the political Agent at Munnipore would take steps to punish the offenders".[14] The Lieutenant Governor further desired that Lt. Gregory and Dr. Brown (Political Agent, Manipur) should meet early and settle the boundary of that state with the Naga Hills, the former officer representing the Nagas.

13. *Bengal Judicial Proceedings*, 1871, Sept. (Vol. 186, see disputes between planters and Nagas).

14. *Bengal Judicial Proceedings*, 1871, Sept. (Vol. 186, see the Assam policy).

Towards the close of 1867, an outrage was committed by some Nagas on the Geleki guard-house and this was followed in March 1869 by the abduction of three labourers of the towkok tea-garden. These were considered by the Deputy Commissioners concerned as mere acts of reprisals by the Nagas for encroachment of their boundary. On receipt of these reports, the Lieutenant Governor directed the Commissioner of Assam to specifically state what were the practically recognised limits of the criminal and civil jurisdiction of the Deputy Commissioner of Sibsagar towards the Naga frontier. Captain Campbell, Deputy Commissioner, Sibsagar was not definite as to the limits of his civil and criminal jurisdiction, admitting, however, that tea-grants had been made south of the Ladoigurh Road. He brought home to the Government of Bengal the necessity of making definite arrangements regarding the boundary between his district and Naga Hills.[15]

In September, 1869, the Government of Bengal deputed Captain Butler who had in the meantime succeeded Gregory as Deputy Commissioner of Naga Hills, to meet Dr. Brown, Political Agent in Manipur for settling the Naga Hills-Manipur boundary question. Both these officers were instructed to confine themselves to clearly ascertaining and pointing out the Bigge and Gordon line and "to guard against the introduction of disturbing causes such as Munnipore Government has always proved to be on that frontier". On the question of proper boundary between Assam and the Angami Nagas on one side and Manipur on the other, the Government of Bengal observed:

> It is really so far as the Government is concerned a matter of no importance where the boundary should run except on the one cardinal point of having the best boundary which circumstances will allow, with a view to the defence and security of the Assam border. Bearing this important matter in mind, the more the British Government restrict themselves to the plains, and leave the Angami Nagas to themselves, the better.[16]

15. *Bengal Judicial Proceedings*, 1871, Sept. (Vol. 186, see Disputes between Planters and Nagas).

16. *Bengal Judicial Proceedings*, 1871, Sept. (Vol. 186, see The Boundary Dispute).

The recrudescence of dispute convinced the Government of India the inexpediency of allowing extension of tea-gardens beyond the recognised limits of British jurisdiction. In August 1869, Hopkinson was directed not to make any new grants south of the Ladoigarh road pending final orders of the Government. This prohibition was soon extended to lands in any part of Assam beyond the limits of the recognised revenue jurisdiction.[17] Notwithstanding this, when the disputes between planters and the Eastern Nagas on so-called encroachments continued, the Government of India became convinced of the necessity of demarcating the boundaries of the two districts. In September, 1869, it was proposed to send a topographical survey party to the entire frontier, both north-east in Assam as well as east in Manipur. In view of the probable risks and difficulties attending the operations, Sir George Campbell, Lieutenant Governor of Bengal recommended merely "a reconnoissance" instead of a full-scale survey of the areas concerned.[18] When it was later made known that some tea-grants had been made outside the limits of the revenue settlement of Sibsagar inspite of the standing orders of the Government of India, the Commissioner was directed in September 1870 that instead of confining the survey strictly to the limits of the revenue paying mouzas it might be so far extended to take in any grants south of the Ladoigarh care being taken to avoid raising the suspicion of the Nagas. It was also suggested that any claim made by the Nagas to these lands might be bought up by paying moderate compensations.[19]

In pursuance of the orders of the Govt. of India, Butler and Brown commenced their survey of the Naga Hills-Manipur boundary as laid down by Bigge and Gordon in 1842. They found no difficulty in identifying it until they reached its extreme eastern end which Bigge and Gordon described as the Barail range as far as the source of the Mow river. Butler identified Sijoo with Mow; Brown was also emphatic in saying that the only Mow in existence was the western branch called Zullo by Butler. If Butler's views were to be accepted then several villages over which

17. *Bengal Judicial Proceedings*, 1869, Oct. No. 73; *Bengal Judicial Proceedings*, 1869, Nov. No. 138
18. *Bengal Judicial Proceedings*, 1869.
19. *Foreign Political Proceedings*, 1873, July, No. 469.

Manipur had been exercising control would have to be included in the Naga Hills District. Although the two officers were partly successful in tracing the Bigge-Gordon line, they could not come to any definite agreement. Consequently in November 1870, the Government of India appointed a Boundary Commissioner in the person of J.F. Browne, Civil and sessions Judge of Chittagong whose decision in the matter would be final. He was directed firstly to determine the actual boundary line as laid down by Bigge and Gordon. Secondly, if for political and other reasons, he considered that the line should be deviated from, and that Naga villages which were excluded from Manipur in 1842, should now be included within that state, he should indicate on the survey map how the boundary of 1842 would have to be deviated upon. The Government of Bengal directed the Deputy Commissioner, Naga Hills and Political Agent, Manipur to accompany the Boundary Commissioner and furnish him with all relevant papers and necessary information.[20]

Browne (Boundary Commissioner) found that the main question at issue between Manipur and the Government of India was the recognition or otherwise of the claim now made by Manipur to extend its jurisdiction not only to the north of 1842 line, but to the east and north-east of its terminal point and across the natural boundary of Assam towards the settled district of Sibsagar. He rejected the claim of Manipur to a group of five villages north of the Sijoo, known as Sopvomah, and proposed to take them from Manipur in lieu of a compensation of Rs. 400 per annum which being the revenue derived by that state from these villages.[21] After long-drawn arguments and counter-arguments Browne settled the disputed boundary between Manipur and Naga Hills

In the new settlement, the line of 1842 was maintained in all essentials so far as it was identified A few villages on the dividing range of the water-pent over which Manipur has acquired supremacy were demarcated as belonging to that state; and from the termination of the line of 1842 at a point called the Telizo peak eastward of the water-shed of the main line of hills which divide the affluents of the Brahmaputra from that of the Irrawady as far

20. *Bengal Judicial Proceedings*, Nov. No. 192.

21. *Bengal Judicial Proceedings*, 1871, Sept., (Vol. 186, see Boundary Disputes).

as the Patkai pass was declared to be the limit of Manipur on its northern frontier. The Naga Hills District was advanced to march with the boundary of Manipur as now determined The Kuki colonies lying between the Naga Hills and Manipur were brought under jurisdiction of the former district.[22] This settlement deprived Manipur of a considerable part of the hills which had been actually under its control. Manipur objected to the settlement but these were overruled by the Government of India.

In March 1871, following a quarrel between Mr. Eades, a tea-planter and the Changoni Nagas, the boundary question again came to the forefront. Campbell (D. C. Sibsagar) urged the Government to define the boundary of his district and to specify distinctly what Government would protect and what it would not. Hopkinson, opposed as he was to the notion of a fixed boundary rejected the proposal. He favoured a military or effective occupation of Naga territory as well as of the Naga Hills District. In other words, he desired to bring all the territories not included in Bhutan, Manipur or Burma directly under British subjection.[23] Sir George Campbell, Lieutenant Governor of Bengal expressed the view that the whole of the Naga Hills so far as known might be considered as British territory subject to British control. But he considered it inexpedient for the present to introduce its jurisdiction into any semi-independent Naga territories wherein he wanted to exercise only political control which would succeed in keeping peace in the country between Manipur and Assam and in settling Sibsagar frontier.[24]

Soon afterwards, a massacre perpetrated upon a party of Borlangee Nagas by the Kamsingia tribe within two miles of a tea-estate convinced Sir George Campbell that time had come for laying down the boundary to determine British jurisdiction in Sibsagar as well as in the other districts of Assam. He desired that the same should be laid down on the principles to be applied to the north of Kamrup or in the mode of demarcating to be pursued along the line of Tibetan, Bhutia, Aka and Dafala fron-

22. *Bengal Judicial Proceedings*, 1872, July, No. 243.
23. *Bengal Judicial Proceedings*, 1871, (Vol. 186, see Disputes between Planters and Nagas).
24. *Bengal Judicial Proceedings*, 1871, Oct., No. 207.

tier; and with reference to any specially valuable forests, India-rubber, opium lands, or other lands which for sufficient cogent reasons it might be desirable to include within the line of ordinary civil jurisdiction.[25] Already occupation of tribal lands for tea-plantation and exploitation of mines, and forests for elephants and India-rubber led to serious complications with the Nagas and other hill tribes. To prohibit the entry of strangers to tracts where adequate control could not be exercised, the Government of India enacted the Innerline Regulations in 1873.[26] The Deputy Commissioner of Sibsagar was instructed not to allow European planters or businessmen to accept any grant beyond the innerline or under a tenure from any chief or tribe. Beyond this line, the tribes were left to manage their own affairs with only such interference on the part of the frontier officers in their political capacity as might be desirable with a view of establishing a personal influence for good among the chiefs or the tribes.[27]

From what has been discussed above, it will be evident that the boundary disputes of the Naga Hills remained un-settled till 1874 when Assam was formed into a separate province and the administration of the Nagas came under the direct responsibility of the newly appointed Chief Commissioner. One should also take note of the growing tendency on the part of the local authorities of refusing to recognise any boundary between the Nagas and the settled districts of the plains, while pursuing at the same time more or less a hard and fast boundary between Manipur and the Naga Hills. The Inner line indicated in no way the territorial frontier, but only the limits of the administered areas, nor did it decide the sovereignty of the territories beyond. It set at rest the attempt of the local authorities to bring the country between the settled districts of British India and Burma under direct administration. Subsequent history showed that even this line was made to move according to the convenience or otherwise of the local authorities. No wonder, therefore, boundary disputes between Naga Hills and adjoining territories continued with occasional breaks till our own times.

25. *Foreign Political Proceedings*, 1873, July, No. 469.

26. *Foreign Political Proceedings*, 1872, Feb., No. 131, *Account of the Province of Assam*, Shillong, 1903, p. 156.

27. *Ibid.*

Execution of Guru Arjan

BY

Bakhshish Singh Nijjar

Execution of the 5th Sikh Guru Arjan Dev (1563–1605 A.D.) has gathered much controversy among the scholars of Panjab History. One group among them is of the opinion that Guru Arjan Dev was ordered by the emperor Jahangir to be executed on account of his increasing religious influence amongst the Hindus and the Muslims. Therefore, he was for years thinking of either putting an end to his religious preachings, which the emperor contemptuously called "false traffic", or making Musalman of him.

The other group does not agree with this opinion and it says that the execution of Guru Arjan was purely a political one. This group holds the view that the Guru helped the rebel Prince, against the monarch of the time and thus the Guru could not escape from the wrath of the king, who awarded condign punishments to all the political offenders. However, a detailed study of the facts and circumstances can throw light on the whole episode.

Circumstances Leading to the Execution

Prince Khusrau was the eldest son of Jahangir, born to his queen Man Bai, daughter of Raja Bhagwan Das of Amber, on August 6, 1587 The Prince was a young boy of seventeen years, of eminently handsome countenance, agreeable manners and irreproachable character at the death of his grand-father, Akbar, who had directed his training himself. At one time, Akbar had nominated him as his successor, which created a deep jealousy between Jahangir and his son Khusrau. After the death of Akbar, the crevice of jealousy had all the more widened between the father and the son. Mirza Aziz Koka, the most powerful noble of Akbar's Darbar, had married his daughter to Khusrau, and had every reason to long for Khusrau's accession to the throne, after Akbar. Khusrau himself was no less desirous of the throne.

Apprehending all these consequences, Jahangir imprisoned Khusrau in the fort of Agra.

Joannes De Laet, the Flemish Geographer, a contemporary traveller, has narrated the incident in these words:—

"In the year 1605 A.D., the first year of Jahangir, the king being in doubt concerning the loyalty of his son Khusrau asked the most prominent of the Umera, Mirza Sharif Khan[1] for advice as to what he should do with his son. Mirza advised the king to put the Prince's eyes out. The king hesitated and delayed, where upon Khusrau, who had taken alarm and had gained some inkling of what was intended, plotted to escape and wrote to his old friend, Hasan Beg Khan Badakhshi. Akbar had appointed Hasan Beg, as the Governor of Kabul. The fort of Rohtas was also in his fief. Thus Hasan Beg had a strong hold over the north-west frontier province of India. Khusrau sent a message to expedite his return and come to Khusrau's assistance with all the troops he could gather; for he himself was planning secretly to leave Agra with the most faithful and brave of his followers, and to repair to Lahore."

Hasan Beg Badakhshi, in accordance with the Prince's request, hastened to meet him (from Kabul) as rapidly as possible. When he had reached Akbarpur, only 24 Kos from Agra, the Prince, who had been informed of his approach, stole out of the fort of Agra at evening time with a body of picked troops. The Kotwal and commander of the imperial guard, whose name was Khwaja Malik Ali[2] had not yet left the guard house, but did not dare to stop the Prince. The fugitives extinguished the lights wherever they went, looted a few shops, and then left the city as swiftly as possible. Khusrau paid his respects on the way to the tomb of his grand-father (Akbar), and at dawn arrived in Akbarpur with 500 troops, mostly mere lads. Hasan Beg was awaiting him there with about 3000 cavalry. Khusarau proceeded with these as quickly as possible to Lahore.

On learning of the Prince's flight the King ordered the Kotwal Khwaja Malik Ali to give chase with the cavalry under his com-

1. The Grand Wazir.

2. The Kotwal was I'timad Khan. When Shaikh Farid was sent in pursuit of the Prince, the Kotwal was made scout and intelligence officer.

mand. He started at dead of night with 300 men. The same night Murtaza Khan was despatched in support with 1500 cavalry. By the advice of Mirza Amir Ali, the King himself followed at dawn with the swiftest elephants and several Amirs. In order to expedite his march he took no baggage at all.

The Prince was at the most 10 Kos ahead of Khwaja, 10 or 12 Kos more ahead of Murtaza Khan, and about as much again ahead of Jahangir. He looted all the villages on the way, carried off the royal horses from the post-stations, and compelled all the travellers and traders whom he met on the road to accompany him. Having in this fashion collected by no means contemptible a force, Khusrau reached Lahore on the ninth day of his flight. However, Ibrahim Khan, a Pathan, whom the King had shortly before despatched to Lahore, with the authority of governor, hearing of the Prince's flight, prepared with the utmost speed to intercept him, and fortified the citadel of Lahore against him.

Another unforeseen mischance happened to the fugitive. Said Khan[3] on his way to Kashmir, had just encamped with his force only three Kos from the city. The Prince invited him in a friendly fashion to join hands with himself, but Said Khan, did not at first reject the proposal. However, on reaching the bank of the river Ravi in company with the Prince's soldiers he cleverly gave them the slip, and caused his boatmen to land him at the fort. Meanwhile, Mir Jamalu-d-din Hussain, whom the king had sent ahead to catch up with Khusrau, announced to the Prince that the King had handed over to him Kabul and Bangash, and bade him, leave Lahore and repair to those provinces. However, Khusrau demanded for himself the whole district of Sirhind and laid seige to Lahore.

Eight days later, on learning that the King had crossed the river Beas which flows by Sultanpur and that Murtaza Khan was about to cross the river Nakodar, Khusrau resolved to risk a battle, collected all his stragglers, and advanced against his father's army with 20,000 cavalry. After marching 30 Kos he came face to face with Murtaza Khan, who on learning of the Prince's advance had

3. *Tuzuk-i-Jahangiri*, Vol. 1, Rogers & Beveridge, p. 62.

drawn up his forces to oppose him. The weather was rainy, and a storm was raging.

The battle began, with a skirmish between the Prince's troops and the royal cavalry, which scarcely numbered 300. The latter were caught as if in a net. Saiyad Jalal, their commander, was killed, and they were being rapidly driven off the field when Khwaja Malik Ali came up in the nick of time, with the main body of the royal army. He cried out that the King himself was close at hand, and thus inspired his own men and at the same time dismayed those of the Prince that Abdul Rahim flung away the Prince's standard. On this Khusrau's troops, imagining that their master had been killed, were so terrified that they took to flight, and dispersed in all directions. Many were killed or captured by the peasants for the sake of their horses and camels. The rest of the spoil came into the hands of royal forces, who thus gained a notable victory.

When the King came up, he named the place of the battle Fatehpur.[4] The Prince fled to Lahore with Hasan Beg Khan Badakhshi, and Abdul Rahim. The last named stayed back but the Prince crossed the Ravi with Badakhshi on his way to the fortress of Rohtas. He succeeded in reaching the river Chenab and entered a boat to cross it. However, the boatmen had received instructions from the sons of Qasim Khan Namkin who were in command of the garrison of Rohtas. They ran the boat upon a sand bank in the middle of the river, and leaving the Prince swam away to the bank. Thus the poor wretch, together with Hasan Beg Khan, was captured by the Kings' forces, and was conducted to the King, who had already crossed the river Ravi, the river of Lahore.

On his return with his captives to Lahore where Abdul Rahim had also been discovered and dragged from his hiding place, the King ordered the peasants to cut down the trees and to fix sharp stakes on either side of the road.

4. Fatehpur. The place was called Bhairowal. It was bestowed to Shaikh Farid who was henceforth to be styled Murtaza Khan. Farid named it Faridabad. Bhairowal is on the right bank of the Beas on the road from Jullundur to Amritsar.

Jahangir, who had established himself in Mirza Kamran's garden at Lahore,[5] was delighted at the tidings and despatched Sharif to fetch the captives. On May 1, the latter were brought to the city. The populace and the court alike were deeply stirred and waited in anxious suspense to know the fate reserved for the Prince. Jahangir himself was over–whelmed with sorrow and retired to a private room to weep out his feelings. He burst into tears at the thought of the strife within his family. Then becoming recollected he convened a darbar. The officers and courtiers stationed themselves, each in his place with the gentry and the commonalty at a distance. The emperor remained seated on the throne. They ushered in Prince Khusrau, handcuffed and enchained, trembling and weeping, with Hasan Beg on his right and Abdur Rahim on his left. The scene melted the hearts of all. Khusrau attempted to prostrate himself before His Majesty, but was sternly told to stand in his place. Hasan Beg attempted to clear himself but was commanded to keep silent. Jahangir bitterly reproached Khusrau and ordered him into confinement.[6]

Barbarous punishments were meted out to the Prince's followers. Hasan Beg was sewn in the fresh skin of an ox, with horns obtruding and Abdul Rahim in that of an ass. Seated on the asses with their faces turned towards the tail, they were paraded through the streets of Lahore. Hasan Beg was suffocated to death within twelve hours, but Abdur Rahim's situation was stealthily eased by his powerful courtier–friends. After an intense suffering of twenty–four hours he was pardoned and restored to his old dignities.[7] A few days later a long line of gibbets appeared on each side of the road leading from Mirza Kamran's garden to the city of Lahore. On each gibbet appeared a prisoner impaled on the stake, writhing in agony. To complete the tale of barbarity, Prince Khusrau was led on an elephant through the ranks and was asked, in inhuman mockery, to receive the homage of his followers. The Prince's gentle soul was pierced with grief, sharp

5. *Tuzuk-i-Jahangiri,* Vol. I, p. 68; *Iqbalnama-i-Jahangiri,* Mutamid Khan, p. 13; Maasir-ul-Umera, Shah Nawaz Khan, p. 524.

6. *Tuzuk-i-Jahangiri,* Vol. I, p. 68; *Iqbalnama-i-Jahangiri,* Mutamid Khan, p. 16.; *Muntakhab-ul-Lubab,* Vol. I, Khafi Khan, p. 253.

7. *Tuzuk-i-Jahangiri,* Vol. I, pp. 68-69; *Iqbalnama-i-Jahangiri,* Vol. I, Mutamid Khan, p. 253.

and well-neigh unbearable. He passed several days weeping in anguish.

Milder punishments were inflicted on two of his followers who had, taking advantage of his revolt plundered the people of Lahore. Amba was let off with a fine of Rs. 15,000, which was distributed in charity, while his associate Raju was put to death.[8]

Causes of Jahangir's Displeasure

It was under these circumstances, that Khusrau met Guru Arjan at Goindwal, on the way to Lahore. The whole dispute on the execution of Guru Arjan arose on the basis of his rebel son Khusrau's meeting with the Guru. Historians are almost unanimous in their view that the rebel Prince was blessed, financially helped and treated kindly by the Guru. About the monetary help, Jahangir himself wrote: "At last when Khusrau passed along this road, this insignificant low fellow made up his mind to wait upon him. Khusrau happened to halt at the place where he was. He (Arjan) came and saw, and conveyed some preconceived things to him and made on his fore-head a finger-mark in saffron, which in Hindu terminology is called *Qashqa* (*Tika*) and is considered propitious. When this reached my ears, and I fully know his heresies, I ordered that he should be brought into my presence, and having handed over his houses, dwelling places and children to Murtaza Khan and having confiscated his property, I ordered that he should be put to death with tortures".[9]

The author of Dābistān-i-Mazāhib, a contemporary of Guru Har Gobind, writes: "His Majesty the late Nur-ud-Din Mohammad Jahangir, after the arrest of Khusrau, arrested and fined Guru Arjan Mal for the reason that he had prayed for the welfare of Prince Khusrau, the late Emperor's (Jahangir) son, who had rebelled against the father".[10] Gyani Gyan Singh writes: "Guru Arjan gave one lac of rupees and also made on his forehead

8. *Tuzuk-i-Jahangiri*, Vol. I, pp. 69, 73; *Iqbalnama-i-Jahangiri*, Vol. I, p. 253.

9. *Tuzuk-i-Jahangiri*, Vol. I, p. 72.

10. *Dabistan-i-Mazahib*, Muhsini-Fani, p.

a finger mark in saffron, a symbol of sovereignty".[11] These views have further been corroborated by Bhai Santokh Singh: "Guru Arjan gave five lacs of Rupees as monetary assistance to Prince Khusrau".[12] Finch, a contemporary European traveller, wrote that the Guru gave three thousand ducats as monetary help to the rebel Prince. According to Mehma Parkash, "Chandu Shah accused the Guru that he helped Khusrau, with money".[13] "Guru Arjan financially helped Khusrau" writes Ganesh Das Wadhera.[14] "This was clearly not a case of religious persecution, but merely the customary punishment of a political offender".[15]

However, along with all the above-mentioned views we shall take into consideration Jahangir's own statement which he recorded in his Memoirs. "In Goindwal, which is situated on the bank of the river Biyah (Beas), there was a Hindu named Arjun, in the garb of a Pir or Shaikh, so much so that having captivated many simple-hearted Hindus, nay even foolish and stupid Muslims, by his ways and manners, he had poised himself about as a religious and worldly leader. They called him Guru, and from all directions fools and fool-worshippers were attracted towards him and expressed full faith in him. For three or four generations they had kept this warm. For years the thought had been presenting itself to me that either I should put an end to this false traffic or he should be brought into the fold of Islam."[16]

According to G. C. Narang, Jahangir himself accuses Guru Arjan as a political offender: "Jahangir summoning the Guru before him, is represented as saying, 'Thou art a great saint, a great teacher and holy man, thou lookest on rich and poor alike.' It was, therefore, not proper for thee to give money to my enemy, Khusrau."[17]

Keeping in view the divergent views expressed, it might be stated that during Prince Khusrau's flight through the Panjab, he

11. *Panth Parkash*, Gyani Gyan Singh, p. 96.
12. *Gur Partap Suraj Granth*, Ras 4, Ank 29, Santokh Singh p. 2343.
13. *Mehma Parkash*, Sarup Das Bhalla, MS/792, p. 472.
14. *Char Bhag-i-Punjab*, Ganesh Das Wadhera, p. 107.
15. *History of Aurangzeb*, Vol. III, Jadunath Sarkar, p. 309.
16. *Tuzuk-i-Jahangiri*, Niwal Kishore Press, p. 35.
17. *Transformation of Sikhism*, G. C. Narang, pp. 31-41.

met the Guru on the way at Goindwal who congratulated him, put a saffron mark on his forehead, and gave him his blessings and financial help.[18] One author has gone to the extent of saying that the Guru gave fighting men also.

Contemporary as well as the later historians have categorically stated that the Guru helped the rebel Prince. It seems to me that Jahangir wrote these lines, "I should put an end to this false traffic or he (Arjan) should be brought into the fold of Islam," in a fit of anger, when the enemies of the Guru, out of their malice brought forth so many false and baseless reports. Guru Arjan Dev was to pay a heavy fine of two lacs of rupees; in case of his failure to comply with it, he should be tortured to death. Jahangir did not bother at all to stop the false traffic of "a Hindu shop." He never put any more Hindus to death on account of religious fanaticism. Jahangir lived 22 years more after this incident but we do not hear any instance where he persecuted the Hindus in this manner.

Guru Hargobind, son of the martyred Guru, was a close friend of Jahangir, who went about with a personal guard of sixty match-lock men and a mounted troop of three hundred horsemen in attendance. He founded Akal Takht at Amritsar, the future seat of the Sikh sovereignty. The sixth Guru had issued an encyclical letter to the *Masands* to the effect that he would be pleased with those of his followers who would in future bring offerings of arms and horses instead of money. His retinue included a number of drummers, dogs of the finest breed, and some tame leopards. A regular cantonment was established during Jahangir's reign at Amritsar, but the Mughal emperor never thought of "closing the shop" of the Hindu religion.

18. *Tuzuk-i-Jahangiri*, Vol. I, pp. 52-59; *Iqbalnama-i-Jahangiri*, Text, pp. 9, 10; *History of India*, Vol. VI, Elliot & Dowson, p. 448.

Some Epithets of Brahmana Donees in South Indian Charters

BY

D. C. SIRCAR

The expression *gṛhīta-sāhasra* is some times found in South Indian records in the description of the Brāhmaṇa donees of copper-plate charters. In the Bandora (Goa) plates[1] of the 29th regnal year of the Maurya king Anirjitavarman (6th or 7th century A.D.) the donee of the grant, the Brāhmaṇa Hastyārya of the Hārita-gotra, is described as *gṛhīta-sāhasra* which was explained by Dr. G. S. Gai, the editor of the epigraph, as 'a person learned in the *Sāmaveda* which is supposed to have a thousand branches'. While entering the word in our *Indian Epigraphical Glossary*,[2] we did not consider the above interpretation satisfactory and thought that the correct meaning of the expression may be 'one from whom one thousand coins have been realised' at the time of creating the rent-free holding in his favour. It should, however, be admitted that the amount often realised by the State for the creation of a rent-free holding was very rarely mentioned in clear forms in ancient Indian documents.[3]. In any case, we have recently come across evidence which suggests a different meaning of the epithet.

The Marutura grant,[4] which was probably discovered in the old Hyderabad State, was issued in the 8th regnal year of the Cālukya king Satyāśraya Pṛthvīvallabha-mahārāja (Pulakeśin II, c. 610-42 A.D.). The grant was made in favour of the following Brāhmaṇas: (1-2) Jyeṣṭhakoṇḍa and Bhīmasvāmin who belonged to the Vāsiṣṭha-gotra and were experts in all the four Vedas (*Caturvedavid*), (3-4) Jannasvāmin and [Pa]ṇḍaraṅgasvāmin

1. *Ep. Ind.*, Vol. XXXIII, pp. 293 ff.
2. *Op. cit.*, p. 122.
3. See Sircar, *Ind. Ep.*, pp. 115 ff.
4. *Andhra Pradesh Government Archaeological Series*, Hyderabad, No. 6, pp. 11-39; *P. B. Desai Felicitation Volume*, Dharwar, 1971, pp. 63 ff.

of the Bhāradvāja-gotra, who were also experts in the four Vedas, (5-7) Divākarasvāmin of the Gautama-gotra, Bhonusvāmin of the Agniveśya-gotra and Revasvāmin of the Kāśyapa-gotra, all of them described as *Aśīti-tarkaka,* (8) Jannasvāmin of the Bhāradvāja-gotra, described as *Gṛhīta-sāhasra,* (9-10) Ādityasvāmin of the Kauśika-gotra and Viṣṇusvāmin of the Bhāradvāja-gotra, both described as *Sahasra-tarkaka,* (11) .... svāmin of Vāsiṣṭha-gotra, and (12) Gopasvāmin of the Kāśyapa-gotra, called Varṇa-traya-nivṛtta. While editing the Marutura grant, Dr. S. Sankaranarayana observes, "the king gifted away the village of Maruṭūra together with Natavāṭa and Vattiparu (line 31) in favour of some eleven Brāhmaṇas and also to an individual who seems to have been described as a member not belonging to the first three castes, viz., Brāhmaṇa, Kṣatriya and Vaiśyā (*varṃa-traya-nivṛtta*) (lines 21-31). The names, *gotras* and educational achievements of all the twelve are given. Of the Brāhmaṇa donees, some were well versed in the four Vedas, some had mastered eighty *tarkas* (logics) and some others, thousand *tarkas*."[5] We are inclined to disagree with some of the above views.

Gopasvāmin is called *Varṇa-traya-nivṛtta* probably meaning that he had dealings only with the Brāhmaṇas and not with any of the other three *varṇas.* It seems that he did not speak to and even avoided seeing non-Brāhmaṇas for fear of losing his holiness.

It will be seen that *Gṛhīta-sāhasra,* like *Caturvedavid, Aśīti-karkaka* and *Varṇa-traya-nivṛtta,* indicated a qualification of a suitable Brāhmaṇa for the purpose of making donation, either for learning or for holiness. *Gṛhīta-sāhasra,* if taken to indicate the learning of the Brāhmaṇas, would suggest that the persons in question accepted or appropriated or adopted an aggregate of one thousand objects (*sāhasra*). This seems to be explainable in two different ways.

In early times, especially in South India, the learning of a Vedic scholar was tested by a sort of lottery. A large number of small passages quoted from the Vedic literature on slips were

5. *P. B. Desai Felicitation* Vol., p. 64. The Vāsiṣṭha-gotra Brāhmaṇa, whose name is damaged in line 30, possibly had no descriptive epithet.

kept in a *ghaṭikā* or *kumbha* (jar); the scholar had to take one of the slips out of the jar at a time and had to explain all questions relating to the passage.[6] Suppose, one scholar succeeded in explaining one thousand such slips at one sitting, he could probably be called *Gṛhīta–sāhasra* (*gṛhītaṁ sāhasraṁ yena*).

The *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa*[7] and *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad*[8] give us an interesting story about testing the learning of a Brāhmaṇa at the royal court. It is said that king Janaka of Videha performed a sacrifice in which he bestowed huge largesses upon the Brāhmaṇas of the Kuru–Pāñcāla country. In order to satisfy his curiosity as to which of the Brāhmaṇas was the most well–read, Janaka collected a thousand kine and tied ten *pādes* (quarters of the standard measure) of gold to every single horn of each cow and proclaimed that they should be taken away by him alone, who was the best cognisant with *Brahman*. The story goes that only Yājñavalkya had the courage of claiming them and succeeded in silencing, by his superior knowledge, all the disputants who challenged him. Now, if a scholar succeeded in defeating all disputants by satisfactorily replying to their queries and obtained one thousand cows or coins, he may also be called a *Gṛhīta sāhasra*.

Likewise, the epithets *Aśīti–tarkaka* and *Sahasra–tarkaka* also relate to the learning of the Brāhmaṇas. The word *tarkaka* meaning 'one who reasons', in the above expressions, may suggest a disputant who succeeds in defeating eighty or one thousand rivals who challenge him and put questions to him. This possibility reminds us of the Śarayantrin, i.e. one who became successful in the *Śarayantra* test of Mithilā. This was a test of scholarship of one who was prepared to answer and succeeded in answering any question on any *śāstra* put to him by any other scholar or by the common people.[9]

6. *JAIH*, Vol. V, pp. 256 ff.

7. Kāṇḍa XIV.

8. I. 1 ff.

9. Sircar, *Ind. Ep. Gloss.*, p. 301; *Proc. AIOC*, Benaras, 1943; Kane, *Hist. Dharm.*, Vol. III, p. 1005.

Compared to the above ways of testing one's knowledge, the present system of examination at our school, colleges and universities is no doubt a mere farce. In the universities of the West, sometimes questions typed on small slips are kept in a tray, and an examinee is called and asked to take up any of the slips and reply to the question it contains. He has to answer about three questions in the said fashion.[10] This is also a poor test of merit compared to the systems prevalent in ancient India.

10. *JAIH*, Vol. V, p. 259, note 20.

Mudra Dharana

BY

N. JAGADEESAN

The *Mudrā Dhāraṇa* is the first of the *Pañca Samskāras* (the Five Sacraments) and consists of branding on the right and left upper arms of the initiate, the two chief symbols of Lord Viṣṇu, the disc and the conch respectively.[1] The branding instruments are made of copper, brass or silver and are heated to a temperature sufficient to singe the skin and leave a deep black mark on it. "For purposes of branding the sticks are heated in a fire in which the *sudarśana hōmam* is performed. If the Ācarya is a *gṛhasta* (married man) he heats the sticks after himself doing the *hōmam* and brands the initiate. If on the other hand the *Ācarya* happens to be a *sanyāsi* he requests a *gṛhasta* to do the *sudarśana hōmaṁ* and then receives the heated rods bearing the emblems from him and does the branding. The *sanyāsis* of the Vaḍakalai persuasion cannot touch any metal under any circumstances. So the heated rods are not directly touched. They are covered with betel or plantain or mango leaves ...... The branding is then done. Some Ācaryas such as those of the Ahōbilam Mutt and a few Tenkalai Ācaryas do not consider the *sudarśana hōmam* as necessary and so they dispense with it."[2] These brandings are done chiefly at holy places, like Dvāraka, Brindāvan and Uḍki.[3]

This seems to be an ancient practice at least as old as Periāḷvār.[4] W. Crooke is of the view that "the original custom of branding the pilgrim with the sacred symbol of the God as a proof that he performed the pilgrimage is now often superseded by a mark made with moistened clay. But in South India, among the

1. "Preparatory discipline for *mantric* initiation requires the mark of the disc (*chakra*) or of the five weapons of Viṣṇu (*viz. cakra, śaṅkha, gada, khaḍga* and *chāpa*) being stamped on the several parts of the body with appropriate *mantras*": A. Govindacharya: *Life of Rāmānuja*, p. 66.
2. K. Rangachari, *Śrī Vaishṇava Brāhmans*, p. 35.
3. *Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics*, Vol. XI, p. 331.
4. *Periāḷvār Tiruppallāṇḍu*, St. 7; *Periāḷvār Tirumoḻi* 5:4:1.

Śrī Vaiṣṇavas and Mādhvas, the visitor to the monastery (*maṭha*) is branded on both shoulders."[5] M. Monier-Williams says, "The pilgrims are often branded on their arms with a mark (*chāp*) of the *śaṅkha, gada, padma, kirīṭa, dhanus,* to serve as an evidence of their having accomplished a particular pilgrimage. At Dvāraka nearly 5000 persons are annually branded."[6] But, it is also possible to suppose that this sacrament is just a symbol of allegiance to one religious discipline.[7] It would seem to indicate ownership or a mark of identification as in the case of branding of horses etc. It might be the affixture of the Lord's seal on the devotees who belong to him. But the *Āgamas* have taken this rite to a religious plane. Another view regarding the significance of this ritual is that it signifies 'that the soul has been wedded to God as the wearing of bangles etc., by a dame signifies that she is joined in all faith to her husband."[8] The devotee is initiated into his appropriate status by the first chanting of the *Aṣṭākṣara* (the eight letters of the Lord's name: *Ōm Namō Nārāyaṇāya*) after he is ritually branded and the branding *guru* is the *mantrapratama* to be distinguished from the *mantrārttapratama,* the *guru* who explains the meaning of the supreme *mantra.*

Vēdānta Dēśika has suggested that the branding is efficacious for the following reasons: (1) The *sudarśana* (disc) and the *pāñcajanya* (conch) are the marks of the *Arca* of God which if the devotees carried on their person, will symbolise their love and affection for God. (2) The marks remind their receiver of the ideal of detachment from *samsāra* and attachment to God. (3) The marks are necessary for Śrī Vaiṣṇava duties like the worship of Viṣṇu in Śrī Vaiṣṇava shrines . (4) They are conducive to some unseen good. (5) They add internally and externally merit to the spirit of religion. (6) There is a spontaneous urge for them in the hearts of the people. (7) They come like spiritual inheri–

5. *Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics,* Vol. X, p. 26; E Thurston, *Ethnographic Notes in South India,* Madras, 1906, p. 403 ff.

6. M. Monier-Williams, *Hinduism,* p. 171, *footnote* No. 1.

7. Though the Vaiṣṇavas are famous for this sacrament, it is not as if the Śaivites have no corresponding rite. The bull and the trident used to correspond to the conch and the disc (*Periya Purāṇam; Tirunāvukkarasu Nāyanār Purāṇam,* St. 152). But the Smārtas do not seem to have anything to do with the practice of branding.

8. A. Govindacharya, *Life of Rāmānuja,* p. 66.

tance from the ancient seers. (8) They distinguish a Śrī Vaiṣṇava from a non-Śrī Vaiṣṇava. (9) They suggest the ideal intrepidity even in the face of death and deadly torture. (10) They remind a Śrī Vaiṣṇava of the ideal peace and goodwill and final release.[9] Satyavrata Singh suggests that the disc and the conch branding 'may be looked upon as *kaiṅkarya* (service) sign suggestive of the Śrī Vaiṣṇava ideal of selfless service to God and man."[10]

This procedure is called *Samāśrayaṇam,* that is, taking refuge in an Ācārya (strictly speaking *Āśiriyar*) and through him worshipping the Lord. Some Vaiṣṇavas treat this rite as possessing *adhṛṣṭārtha,* i.e. unseen meaning. This complex of rites is also known as *Pañca Samskāras.*

Śrī Vaiṣṇava Ācāryas rarely bestow *Mudrā Dhāraṇa* to castes like Ruṅgaru and Jotyphanad though *upadēśa* is offered.[11] "The Pāñcālas (Pāñcālaru who are carpenters, smiths, masons etc.) who worship Vishṇu are called Bagōṭa. They have among them a family dedicated to religion. The eldest son of this family succeeds his father to the dignity of guru. The guru is named 'Vipūr Vēṅcaṭy Ācārya': Vipūr is his name (*sic*) and Vēṅcaṭy Ācārya his title (*sic*). He travels about among his followers receiving their contributions and bestowing *upadēśa* and *mudrā-dhāraṇa*."[12] "Branding for religious purposes is confined to Śrī Vaiṣṇavas and Mādhavas. Śrī Vaiṣṇava Brahmans are expected to undergo this ordeal at least once during their life-time, whereas Mādhva Brahmans have to submit to it as often as they visit their *guru* (head of mutt). Of men of other castes, those who become followers of a Vaiṣṇava or Mādhva Ācārya (*guru*) or mutt are expected to present themselves before the guru for the purpose of being branded. But the ceremony is optional and not compulsory as in the case of the Brahmans. Among Śrī Vaiṣṇavas the privilege of branding is confined to elderly members of the family, *sanyāsis* (ascetics) and the heads of various mutts. All individuals, male and female, must be branded, after the *upanayanam* in the case of males and

9. Satyavrata Singh, *Vēdānta Dēśika,* pp. 418-419.
10. *Ibid.,* p. 420.
11. F. Buchanan, *A Journey from Madras through the Countries of Mysore, Canara and Malabar,* Vol. I, p. 252.
12. *Ibid.,* p. 251.

after marriage in the case of females. The disciples after a purificatory bath and worship of their gods, proceed to the residence of the Ācārya or the muti, where they are initiated into their religion, and branded with the *chakra* on the right shoulder and the *chaṅk* on the left .... A person who has not been initiated thus is regarded unfit to take part in the ceremonies which have to be performed by Brahmans. Even close relations, if orthodox, will refuse to take food prepared or touched by the uninitiated."[13] "The fee is not fixed in the case of Śrī Vaiṣṇavas whereas Mādhvas are expected to pay from one to three months' income for being branded."[14]

H. H. Wilson recounts the efficacy of these marks. "We are told in the *Kāśi Khāṇḍ* that Yama directs his ministers to avoid such as bear them and that no sin can exist in the individuals who make use of them, be they of whatever caste."[15]

It is usual for certain scholars to draw a parallel between the rituals of one religion and those of others, with a view perhaps to suggest that one practice was influenced by another. But usually the truth is that most of the religious practices have independent origin. For religious instincts among ancient men, wherever they might be, tend to be similar. But it is interesting to note the similarities. Referring to the Ājīvikas, D. R. Bhandarkar says, "Again, as first pointed out by Prof. Bühler, they branded the hands of their novice with a heated ball."[16] M. Yamunacharya says: " 'He shall baptize you with the Holy Ghost and with fire' (Mathew 3:11). The parallel to this is the *tapa* sacrament which is the impressing of the symbols of *charka* and *śaṅkha*, the symbols of Vishṇu, by means of heated metal on the ' shoulders of Vaiṣṇavas."[17]

13. E. Thurston; *Castes and Tribes of Southern India*, Vol. I, p. 370.
14. E. Thurston; *Castes and Tribes of Southern India*, Vol. I, p. 372.
15. H. H. Wilson, *Essays and Lectures on the Religions of the Hindus*, Vol. I, p. 41, *footnote* No. 2.
16. D. R. Bhandarkar, *Ājīvikas, Indian Antiquary*, Vol. XLI, p. 289.
17. M. Yamunacharya, *Christian Sacraments, Hindu Saṃskāras and the Rationale of Ritualism, Proceedings and Transactions of the Eighth All India Oriental Conference*, p. 404.

The System of Cartazes

BY

B. S. Shastry

In the Archives of Goa there are a series of volumes entitled the *Livro de Cartazes* or the *Book of Cartazes*. The volumes contain manuscripts of *cartazes* or navigation permits issued by Portuguese authorities to native vessels. There are eight such volumes, covering the period from 1704 to 1817. Most of them are in good condition.

The volumes are of considerable significance for a study of the system by which the Portuguese tried to control the native sea-trade. Right from the beginning of their coming to India the Portuguese regarded themselves lords of the seas. They argued, therefore, that others could navigate the seas only with their permission which could be secured by obeying them and paying them tribute. They threatened to punish those who did not go by their institute. As Vasco da Gama, discoverer of the sea-route to India, put it, the King of Portugal was "the lord of the sea of the whole world, as also of all this coast (of Western India); by reason of which all the rivers and ports, which have navigation, ought to obey him, and pay tribute to his men who moved about in his fleets."[1] *Cartazes* were issued for no other reason, but to "conserve the right which the King of Portugal ...... acquired from the domination of the seas, conceding the liberty of navigation to the vessels of those persons who obtain cartazes for them."[2]

In keeping with this poilcy, a native who wished to put a vessel to sea for trade had to secure a *cartaz*[3] from the Portuguese authorities. Such a *cartaz* was usually valid for one year. A fee

1. Correa Gasper, *Lendas da Inlia*, tomo I, parte, I, p. 290.

2. Pereira, A. B. de Bragança: *Arguivo Português Oriental*, tomo I, vol. III, parte IV, p. 126.

3. See the Appendix for the usual form and content of a *cartaz*.

had to be paid for it. The fee was in proportion to the capacity of the vessel. Some times, however, it was issued without any payment. In such cases it was generally in consideration for certain reciprocal concession from the recipient of the *cartaz.* Every *cartaz* specified the capacity of the vessel for which it was issued. This information is of importance to those who wish to study the ship-building activities in India in the last few centuries.

The *cartaz* usually mentioned the name of the vessel, its owner, his native place, the persons on board, and the defence personnel and equipment aboard. It also specified the ports to which the vessel was allowed to go and those to which she was forbidden to sail. Besides, it enumerated the articles which she was prohibited to carry. She was made subject to confiscation if any of the provisions of the *cartaz* were violated. In fact, one comes across many cases of confiscation by the Portuguese in the 16th century and thereafter until their power was completely curbed in the 19th century.

Cartazes were issued either at Goa, headquarters of Portuguese India, or at any other Portuguese fort or factory along the coasts of India, depending upon the intended destination of the vessel. A vessel going across the Arabian Sea or the Bay of Bengal had to secure its *cartaz* at Goa. *Cartazes* issued at a Portuguese fort or factory were sufficient for vessels navigating along the coasts of India. Such *cartazes* were compulsory even for those vessels which sailed to Goa from any other port of India with a view to obtain *cartazes* for voyages abroad.[4]

The Portuguese maintained the fiction of their over-lordship over the seas even after the 16th century when their power was challenged by their European rivals, particularly the Dutch and the English. To be sure, they could not lord it over the Europeans. However, they continued to attempt to dominate the native sea-trade until the beginnings of the 19th century. Of course, they were not always successful. Powerful native chiefs rarely obeyed them.

4. Biker, J. F. J., *Collecção de tratados e concertos de pazes*, vol. IV, p. 208.

APPENDIX

(A specimen cartaz: Portuguese original)

Cartaz a Abdula

Manoel de Saldanha etc. Faço saber aos que este Cartaz virem que tendo atenção a Abdula mouro morador em Mascate haver mandado pedir Cartaz p.ª huma Terrada invocada Salamu Sovãy deq hé senhorio Caliani Mulgi, e de porte de cem candins de Surrate e p' lhe fazer honra e mercé por esta vez somente. Hey p bem de conceder Licença e seguro a dita Terrada q' leva p.ª a sua lotação dous cananes, dezanove marinheiros, duas ancoras de ferro, e duas de pedra e p.ª a sua defença seis sipais, tres pessas de Artilheria e seis espingardas, p.ª poder navegar a q.es quer Portos dos am.os deste Estado neste verão, e não hirá a Porto algum dos Principes ou dos Levantados com quem o Estado estiver em guerra, nem poderá levar, nem trazer Turcos, Abexins, e Rumes, nem carregará ferro, asso, inxofre, salitre, cobre, madeira e bambas machos, nem poderá levar Portuguez, nem trará cavalos sem minha Licença, e só se lhe permite poder lever escravos, e escravas somente de sua nasção, e havendo suspeita ou informação, que algum delles hé Christão, ou filho de Christão, se fará com elle o exame declarado no Consilio Provincial, ainda que os taes filhos não sejão baptizados, e fazendo o contrario, não valerá este Cartaz, e hindo aos Portos prohibidos e trazendo fazenda vedada, e sendo a dita Terrada de lotação, e porte de mais de cem candins será reprezada p.ª a faz.ª Real, e pagou de direitos da entrada e sahida desta Cidade vinte x.s dos ditos cem candins de carga, e não das fazendas. Notefico-o assim aos Generaes, e Cap.es mores, mais Cap.es a pessoas a q' pertencer assim o cumprão, e guardem, e deixẽ fazer viagem a dita Terrada da hida e volta sem impedimento algum, e passado hum anno não valerá este Cartaz, q' hé o terceiro q' se passou neste verão, e será selado com o Sello das Armas Reaes da Coroa de Portugal. Nicolao Francisco de Sá o fez em Goa a sinco de Dezembro de 1764 o Secretario B.or Sozé Vas de Carvalho o fez escrever. Conde da Ega.

—Livro de Cartazes, I, 1704–1766, fls. 206–7.

(TRANSLATION)

Cartaz to Abdulla

Manoel de Saldanha etc.ª I make it known to those who may see this Cartaz that Abdulla, Muslim resident of Maskat has sought

for this time only the honour and favour of a Cartaz for a galley named Salamu Sovay, owned by Caliani Mulji, and of the capacity of one hundred *khandis* of Surat. I resolve to grant the licence and security to the said galley to enable her to navigate during this summer to any of the ports of the friends of this State. She carries on board by allocation two men of small stature,[b] nineteen mariners, two anchors of iron and two of stone, and for her defence six soldiers, three pieces of artillery and six guns. She shall not go to the port of any of the princes or rebels with whom the State is at war. She shall not carry or bring Turks, Abyssinians and Egyptians. She shall not take on board iron, albino, sulphur, saltpetre, copper, wood and thick canes of bamboo. She shall not have any Portuguese on board. She shall not bring horses without my licence. Abdulla is permitted to take male and female slaves of his country only. If there is suspicion or information that any of them is a Christian or son of a Christian, an examination shall be held in accordance with the resolution of the Provincial Council, even though such sons are not baptized. This Cartaz shall not be valid if anything is done contrary to its provisions. The galley shall be confiscated to the Royal property if she goes to the forbidden ports or brings the prohibited goods or her capacity is more than one hundred *khandis*. Abdulla has paid twenty *ashrafis* as the duties of the entrance to and the exit from this City on account of the said (capacity of) one hundred *khandis* of cargo, and not of the goods (actually on board). I notify that the Generals, Captain-majors, Captains and other persons, to whomsoever it may concern, shall fulfil and guarantee this (Cartaz), and allow the said galley to perform a return voyage without any impediment. This Cartaz shall cease to be valid on the expiry of one year. This is the third (Cartaz) to be issued this summer. It shall be sealed with the Royal Seal of Arms of the Crown of Portugal. Nicolau Francisco de Sá prepared this at Goa on the fifth of December, 1764. Baltazar Sozé Vas de Carvalho, Secretary, wrote it out Count of Ega.

The Book of Cartazes, I, 1704–1766, folios 206–7.

(a) Count of Ega, of the Council of His Majesty, Viceroy and Captain General of India.

(b) The word *canane* literally means persons of small stature. However, I am not quite sure of the meaning in the present context.

A Note on the Gudnapur Inscription of Kadamba Ravivarman

BY

G. S. GAI

A brief note about the importance and contents of this inscription was published by me in the *Hindu* dated 3-6-1971. Recently, the record has been edited by Dr. B. R. Gopal in the Felicitation Volume of Prof. S. Srikantha Sastri called *Śrīkanṭhikā*, pp. 61 ff. with facsimiles. But the facsimiles are not quite satisfactory so that it is not possible to verify the readings of the published text, accompanying his article. While discussing the contents of the epigraph, Dr. Gopal states that the object of the inscription was to register some grants made for the worship and maintenance of Kāma-Jinālaya and that this Kāma-Jinālaya stands for the temple of Bāhubali since the Jaina Gommaṭēśvara Bāhubali was also known as Kāma or Manmatha.[1] This statement is based on his reading of the passage in line 17 of the text as *Ath=āsya Kāma-Jinālayasya pūjā-saṁskār-ārtham=asau Mahārāja-śrī-Ravivarmmā*, etc. We are sorry that we do not agree with the reading and interpretation of the passage in question as given by Dr. Gopal. The letter which has been read as *ji* in *Kāma-Jinālaya* should be read as a defectively engraved *dē* with an unnecessary *ā mātrā* as well as an *i mātrā*.[2] The engraver of this record, though he is entitled to our appreciation in carrying out his job quite satisfactorily has, nonetheless, committed a few mistakes. Thus, in lines 19 and 22, while writing the word *brahmadēya*, he has added an unnecessary *ā* sign to the letter *dē* so that it looks like *dō* and also unnecessary *u* and *i* signs to the letter *v* with the result that one can't really read this letter. Similarly, the engraver has committed a mistake in carving the letter *dē* in *Kāmadēvālaya*, by adding unnecessarily *ā* and *i mātrās*. We can also notice the box-

1. Cf. *Śrikanthikā*, pp. 66-67.
2. Compare the accompanying facsimile.

head (scooped out variety) in this letter which is a characteristic feature of the letters in this record. Therefore, this letter should be read as *dē* only. The next letter, which has been read as *nā* by Gopal is *vā* and not *nā*, though the joint at the base is not very clear. But, if we examine the reverse side of the impression, this joint can be seen. There is also a faint trace of the dent in this joining stroke, showing thereby that the letter is *v* only. In the formation of the letter *n* in this epigraph, we find that a sharp hook is formed to the left of the right hand stroke while in the case of *v* this hook has a broader shape. For example, we may compare the letters *n* in *anēna nayan–abhirāma* occurring in the previous line i.e. line 16.[3] Therefore, the two letters in this expression have to be read as *dēvā* and not *jinā* so that the word is Kāmadēvālaya and not Kāma–Jinālaya as has been read by the editor of the record. In our brief note published in the *Hindu* referred to above, we have stated that the epigraph refers to the construction of the temple of the God of Love and to the donation made to this temple, reading the concerned expression as Kāmadēvālaya only. There is absolutely no indication anywhere else in the record that the temple constructed by Ravivarman was a Jaina one. In line 26 also, the temple is referred to as Kāmadēvālaya only (cf. *Kāma-dēvālayasya pūjā–saṁskār–ārthaṁ*, etc.). Thus, the expressions *vesma–Manmathasy=ēdaṁ* (line 12), *Chitta–janmanō lōka–nayan–āravind–ōtsavō* (line 14), *bhagavatō Madanasya niryyāṇē* (line 15) and *Chētō–bhavasya gṛhaṁ* (line 16) occurring in the epigraph refer to Kāma or God of Love and not to Bāhubali, as thought of by the editor of the inscription.

3. Cf. the accompanying facsimile.

Content-Analysis of the Tamil Brahmi Inscriptions

BY

N. Subrahmanian & R. Rajalaksmi

The source material for the history of the Tamils for the early centuries of the Christian era is mainly literary consisting of a local literature and some statements emanating from foreign observers. This is supplemented to some extent by statements in non-Tamil literature as well as later references in medieval epigraphy and literature. Now much of this information is helpful to enlighten areas of social life rather than to construct political geneologies or to provide us with a framework of chronology. All this has been worked up and a mass of disjointed material dug out of the sources. Plausible social histories and passable political stories have been patched up and this is what the history of the Śaṅgam age is, so far as we can manage to create one from the aforesaid sources. This has been largely the work of the historian no doubt assisted by the labours of the literary man.

The archaeologist however is not satisfied with this performance or achievement. Material remains either dumb or vocal alone satisfy him. Certain remains like the megalithic stone implements, funerary furniture, skeletal remains and so on are made to yield not conclusions but inferences based on comparative study. Epigraphs like lithic inscriptions no doubt speak but what do they convey? Much has been made of what they convey; and enthusiastic archaeologists, one is afraid, read more than what their sources say.

There are just two kinds of epigraphs for the history of the Tamils of that period: 1. Those that are situated outside the Tamil country like Aśoka's edicts, Khāravela's inscription and the Pallava copper plate grants of the earlier period and 2. Inscriptions found within the Tamil country. Leaving for the moment the former aside and considering only the latter we shall be left with nearly eighty epigraphic pieces which are collectively called the Tamil-

Brāhmi inscriptions. It shall be our endeavour in this paper to content-analyse these pieces.

On rocks and on potsherds we have a number of inscriptions—some running to three or four lines, some just half a broken line, some constituting complete sentences, some making no sense at all but just indicating a syllable here or there. In them we have a certain quantum of information which we shall try to determine and see what precisely is the historical value of these bits of epigraphy. This kind of 'Content-analysis' is necessary to place history and archaeology in their due places which is an urgent need today.

We take for consideration in this paper 78 Tamil-Brāhmi inscriptions of which 76 were discovered in the natural caverns in certain parts of Tamilnad and 2 found on potsherds discovered in Alagairai and Uṛaiyūr. We are however leaving the Arikamēḍu potsherds out of consideration now.

The historical information we cull from the inscriptions are got in two ways: 1. inferential and 2. direct. We shall take up the former first.

In the first place we know from this source that there were rocks which were cut into beds on which some people knew to inscribe, that there were pots which however have become sherds now on which also it was a habit to inscribe: Probably—since we are dealing with inferences now—those two media were chosen for inscription since even as exposed materials rock and the writing on it would endure and buried pottery saved from exposure to sun and rain would endure. These writings indicate that the society to which the scribes belonged was literate. Those people must have known and used whatever material they put into these pots in the context of pottery. The use of this particular script has generated important questions and attracted feeble answers. It has been asked, for instance, why the Brāhmi script should be used to write the Tamil language in the Tamil country. Three answers have been given: 1. That Brāhmi was the only script that ancient India knew whether it was indigenous or not. This script when used in the Tamil country was modified to accommodate special Tamil phonetic sounds like ḻ and ṟ. 2. That the Tamils had a script of their own, independent of Brāhmi, and when the immigrant

Brāhmi-users tried to write Tamil in the script they were accustomed to, they borrowed the letters which were special to Tamil. Thus we have a modified Brāhmi which has been called Tamil Brāhmi, i.e., an enlarged Brāhmi script used to write the Tamil language. 3. That the two major linguistic areas in India viz., the Sanskritic and the Tamil borrowed the same script from the same area outside India, viz., either Sumeria or Phoenicia and that each linguistic group modified it to suit the genius of its own language. This is perhaps nearest to the truth. There is another doubt and that relates to the authorship of these inscriptions. It has been held till recently that Jaina ascetics settling down in natural caverns in Tamilnad and enjoying the munificence of local chieftains and the hospitality of the Tamil society were the authors of these brief writings. But was it natural that these inscriptions were written by the donees and not the donors and if the donors wrote them and if they were intended to mean something to the general public would it not be in order for the script to be a local script? If the inscriptions were intended to convey some meaning to the donees is it not more probable that the language too was that of the donees and not the regional language. These questions have not been answered satisfactorily nor can they be. One thing at least is certain and this is outside the range of inferences, that some of the inscriptions at least refer to matters not necessarily of interest to Jaina ascetics. The heavy concentration of these lithic inscriptions in and around Madurai can either mean that the Pāṇḍyan king was particularly hospitable or that there were most suitable natural caverns around Madurai. It is an undoubted inference that donations to ascetics and recording of minor secular transactions were occasional phenomena in that society. If epigraphic recording was a more common practice we should have had a larger number of epigraphs. As for potsherds the spade of the archaeologist has not dug up the last inscribed potsherd; many more evidently await excavation.

Let us now turn to direct information from these two sources

I. 1. The Māṅguḷam first inscription: 'This is a dedication to Kaṇiyan Nanda the monk (Āśiriyika). This monastery (Paḷḷi) was caused to be given by Kaḍalanvaḷudi a servant of Neḍumseḻiyan. 2. Dedication to Kaṇiyan Nanda, monk. This monastery was made by Sadikan father of Iḷansadikan brother-in-law (?)

of Neḍumseḷiyan. 3. Dedication to Kaṇiyan Na'(n)da, the monk the son of Kāḷitika Andai a Kāvidi (a merchant) of the Nigamam or the merchant guild of Velarai caused this lattice to be given. 4. Kaṇiyan Natan was the giver (of this). 5. Chandaridan was the person who caused this to be given. 6. The merchant guild of Velarai were the givers of this.

We know from the above six epigraphic pieces the following facts: 1. There were Jaina monks (Jaina because of the use of the word Kaṇiyan) and one of them bore the name Nanda. 2. They lived in places called Paḷḷi. 3. Sons and fathers bore the same name, the former distinguished from the latter by the addition of the prefix Iḷam. 4. Sadikan, Kālidika and a Chandaritan were some of the proper names of those times. 5. There were merchant guilds called Nigama (but for Heaven's sake let us not call them chambers of commerce). 6. Merchants bore the title Kāvidi. 7. A monk was called an āśiriyaka. The word āśiriyaka literally means one who attached himself to or sought refuge in a superior and did not mean what one would be tempted to call a teacher, an ācārya. So the Tamil word asiriyar perhaps does not mean a teacher but only one in whom another takes refuge. 8. A lattice—either a window or a door could be an object of donation. 9. Vellaraj was a commercial centre. 10. The two names Kaḍalan Vaḷudi and Neḍumseḷiyan were—Paṇḍyan family names; but what is interesting is that the former is indicated as the latter's servant or officer and this shows that royal servants bore their master's titles. 11. The dedication was deemed an act of charity as it was called dharma; the use of the word 'dhamma' instead of dharma indicates Pāli influence. 12. The name Kālidikai Andai perhaps means Kālidikan, the father. The phrase stands as the son of Kālidikan Andai; the use of Andai in this context indicates a curious practice of nomenclature. That is, the reference is to the father as well as to the son in the same context. It is not certain if Andai means father or avandandai 'his father'.

II. *Tiruvādavūr* 1st inscription: This was caused to be given by Aritan of Pangāḍu. 2. Paraśu, an upāsaka i.e., a lay devotee caused this abode (உறை) to be given.

Here we have the proper names Aritan, Paraśu. Aritan perhaps ought to be Āritan. We know of Aiyan Āritanān, author of Puṛapporuḷ Veṇbāmālai. Again Ūṛai in the inscription is evi-

dently a devil for Uṛai. This shows, if any showing is needed, that the inscribers were not very literate though they might have been using manuscripts.

III. *Keeḻavaḷavu*: Ilavan — a lay devotee from Toṇḍi gave this paḷḷi. Toṇḍi an eastern port seems to have been infested with Jainas. Lay devotees seem to have shown their devotion by donating monasteries.

IV. *Koṅgarpuḷiṅkuḷam*: 1. Upparuvan, a lay devotee caused this canopy to be given. Canopy seems to have been provided separately for walled structures. 2. I, Śeruttan (Śēran Ātan (?)) plaited the fronds for the canopy. 3. Pērātan piṭṭan of Pāhanūr caused this canopy to be thatched.

From the above we see that there were canopies which had fronds, which needed plaiting and the man who did it sought advertisement. Canopies were thatched and it was perhaps an accident that the plaiter of the fronds and the 'thatcher' of the canopy were both called Ātan.

V. *Vikramaṅgalam*: 1. The son of Āndaipikan made this gift (dāna). 2. Kuviran of Pētalai. 3. Śeṅguviran. 4. Kuvirātan. 5. The gift of Śātan of our village

Pikan, Kuviran, Seṅkuviran, Kuvirātan and Sātan were proper names. Was Kuviran a corruption of Kubēran?

VI. *Mēṭṭuppaṭṭi*: 1. Andaiāriti. 2. Andai Iravātan. 3. Andaiviswan of Matirai. 4. Andaisenda made this gift. 5. Sandandai Sandan. 6. Andai of Patinūr. 7. Kuviran Andai made this gift. 8. Kuviran Andai a vēḷ made this gift. 9. A gift of the residents of Tiṭṭil.

Āriti like Āritan, Iravātan, Viśuvan, Śēdan (this must be the form of Senda) and Sandan, must have been personal names; Sandandai was perhaps Sandandandai.

Padinūr and Tiṭṭil were the names of places; and Matirai was a common epigraphic error for Madurai. Here we get personal and place names and mention of the fact of gift.

VII. *Sittannavāśal*: Bed or seat made by the Iḻaiyan of Śirupāvil for Kāvuti Iṭen born at Kumuḷūr of Erumaināḍu. There was a territorial unit—Erumaināḍu; a town Kumuṭūr. Sirupāvil

was another name of a place. Kāvuti Iten—a rather curious personal name and for such a person a bed or a seat was provided by the youth of Sirupāvil. This bed or seat is called Adiṭṭānam.

VIII. *Karuṅgālakkuḍi*: Ilaiyūr had a monastery where Āriti resided. Pāḷi is monastery.

IX. *Marukaltalai*: A rock bed caused to be given by Kāsipan a vēḷ. The epigraphic form of vēḷ, it may be noted, is vēṇ here though grammar does not require it to be so. Vēḷ also was known to them as can be seen in one of the epigraphs from Mettupatti. Kanchanam is the word for a bed and the donation is a kalkanchanam i.e. a rock bed.

X. *Alagarmalai*: 1. A gift by Ātan a goldsmith of Madurai; note that the form for Madurai is Madirai and a goldsmith was a Ponkolavan which can be compared with the form Poṟkollan. The word tāna need not be construed as dāna i.e., gift. It could be more easily sthāna i.e., 'place' making the inscription say that it was the goldsmith Ātan's place. 2. Is too fragmentary for comment. 3. Kani-nakan and Kaninatan — children of Iravi. Kaṇi in both cases a professional prefix meaning astrologer or wiseman. Nakan and Natan then are the proper names. Natan as a name occurs in Māṅguḷam. 4. So there is no need to introduce the letter 'n' and make Natan into Nandan. For 'children' the word is Makaḷ and not Makkaḷ as it ought to be. These and numerous other instances will show that the scribes had poor schooling and could commit scriptal errors. It will follow that any generalisation regarding ancient grammar or syntax on the basis of these epigraphs would be risky. 4. Is a fragment making little meaning. 5. Viyakaṉ Kaṇatikan, a salt merchant. Here Uppu vāṇikan is salt merchant. Uppu figures as uppu which again must have been a scriptal error. 6. Gift (?) made by Ātan son of Kanaka Ātan. Here Ātan is the personal name quite common in the Saṅgam age. 7. Mentions the name Sāpamita as the name of a nun. 8. Nedumalan—a sugar merchant, Pānita vāṇikan being a sugar merchant. 9. Elasandan a trader in ploughshares. Koḻu means the iron tip of a ploughshare. 10. Records a gift by Kaḷumāran. The second part of that name is suggestive of Pāṇḍyan lineage. 11. He who caused to be given this dripledge; (but does 'Tāra aṇi' mean dripledge, though Mr. I. Mahadevan thinks so?) It is interesting to note that the word Koḍuppittavan (கொடுப்பித்தவன்) was written then as

Koḍuppitta-van.' 12. Of Kāśapan the monk. 13. All of them caused to be given. Here it may be noted that 'all of them is indicated by the word avarūm (அவரூம்) which is clearly an error for avarum (அவரும்). All these errors show that this scriptal pattern does not mean any stage in linguistic or literary evolution of Tamil and that except in certain important cases any comparative study based on these epigraphs and the Tolkāppiam will take us nowhere. 14. Eḷa a Ātan, a textile dealer of Vēṇpal. The word Eḷa ought to have been Iḷa meaning the junior. We have thus Neḍum, Iḷa, Pēr (vide. Pērātan IV, 3), apart from Iḷaiyar and Iḷavan as names in themsmelves. 15. Tiyan Sandan which is obviously a male personal name.

XI. *Varicciyūr*: 1. The Paḷḷi caused to be given by ...... 2. A rather damaged epigraph mention Nūṛukacana which has been made to mean a hundred (rock) beds. 3. Four beds or seats made by Natan or Natar. Irukkai is more properly a seat but the rock beds could be used as seats too.

XII. *Tirupparankunram*: 1. Anduvan was the person who caused this to be given. Anduvan is a typical Śaṅgam name. 2. Is a fragment. 3. Also a fragment, mentions Mārāyattu, though the second letter is only 'ra'; mārāyam we know was a title borne by official dignitaries even in the Śaṅgam age. 4. Polālayan of Erukkāṭṭu a householder from Ceylon did this (signed) Ay, Sayan, Neḍsāttan; Erukkāṭṭūr is a famous Śaṅgam toponym. Iḷam is Ceylon. Āy and Sāttan are familiar Śaṅgam names.

XIII. *Muttuppaṭṭi*: 1. Kāvi of Saiyalan of Vindaiyūr. How is kāvi turning cavern? Saiyalan is certainly not Ceylon. Kāvi seems to be an abridged form of Kāvidi. Saiyalan also is a personal name. 2. The son of Atai Sāttan of Nāgappērūr, Atai should have been Andai. Here Andai could not have been Avan tandai nor even merely father, but is probably in itself a proper name, though perhaps unusual. 3. Too fragmentary.

XIV. *Ānaimalai*: These ...... gift ...... Nātan ...... the dormitory of Kunṛattūr ...... Eri Avitan, Attuvāyi, Araṭṭa kāyipan the last three names are perhaps signatures of the makers of the dormitory; Kunṛattūr is a Śaṅgam toponym. Iva the word used in the epigraph must be Ivai meaning 'these.' Here again a colloquialism is preferred to the literary form.

XV. *Pugaḷūr:* 1. The abode of Seṅkāyapan Jaina monk hailing from Yāṟṟūr; stone cut by Iḷankaḍuṅgō son of Perum kaḍuṅgōn son of king Ātan Śel Irumporai on becoming their apparent. 2. Practically a re-production of XV: 1, with the difference that Iḷan Kaḍuṅgō is preceded by the word Kaḍuṅgōn which only means Iḷan Kaḍuṅgō son of Kaḍuṅgōn. This is about the most important and informative of the Tamil Brāhmi rock cut inscriptions. This gives a geneology, in addition to providing information about a stone abode which was provided by some 'royal' philanthropists to a monk. The word Amaṇan stands for Jaina, meaning Samana from Śramaṇa. Kāyapan a corruption of Kāśipan and Sen Kāyapan were perhaps typical monkish names. Uṟai means abode; Iḷaṅkō co-king; making a rock bed is indicated by the significant phrase, 'Aṟutta Kal' i.e., stone cut.

Now with regard to the geneology: who are these three people i.e., Iḷan Kaḍuṅgō, Perun Kaḍuṅgōn and Ātan Śel Irumpoṟai? Mr. Mahadevan treats them as three successive rulers of the Cēra Irumpoṟai family exactly corresponding to the Padiṟṟuppattu geneology viz., 1. Selva Kaḍuṅgō Vāḻiyātan. 2. Perumśēral Irumpoṟai and 3. Iḷamsēral Irumpoṟai. These two lists agree only in so far as both relate to Irumpoṟai families, the first king's name is Ātan and the 2nd and 3rd ones Perum and Iḷam respectively. We would prefer to be more conservative and wait till the equation can be further clinched. It is no doubt true that names mentioned in the Paḍiṟṟuppattu are also found in the Tamil Brāhmi inscriptions and to that extent the two sources have been further proved to belong to the same age. These inscriptions show that on occasion of the nomination of an heir-apparent charities were instituted. 3. Mention two kings—Kīran and Koṟṟan sons of Piṭṭandai of Nalliyūr. But the inscription merely says: Nalliyūra Makaḷ Kīran Koṟṟa. It is to be noted here also as in X: 3. Makaḷ is used for Makkaḷ. 4. Monastery caused to be made by Kiran and Ōri. The young sons of Piṭṭan of Nalliyūr. Is this Piṭṭan of Nalliyūr the same as the one mentioned in XV: 3? Kurumakkaḷ is a new expression made to mean the younger sons by Mr. Mahadevan. One does not really know who Kurumakkaḷ are. It is more probable that the word merely means young sons. 5. Bed of Śeṅgāyapan of Yāṟṟūr. The fragmentary......ttānnan must be the later part of Adiṭṭānnam meaning a bed or a seat. 6. & 7. Also mention Adiṭṭānnam but

nothing else. 8. The bed of Vēni Ātan a merchant......Vaṇṇikan is curiously enough the form adopted for merchant. Vaṇikan or Vāṇikan is the usual form. 9. Is too fragmentary. 10. 'Koṟṟandai (I) ḷavan mūnṟu' is also fragmentary but is interesting for the use of the word Koṟṟandai which means Korran Tandai. 11. Bed of Atti—a gold merchant from Karūr. Pon vāṇikan is gold merchant; Kolavan in X: 1 is different from Ponvāṇikan in XV: 11, the former meaning the goldsmith and the latter a gold merchant. The form Karu ūr for Karūr is suggestive, since in ancient and medieval Tamil கருவூர் is the form for கரூர். 12. Iḷankīran son of Nāgan.

XVI. *Tiruccirappaḷḷi*: 1. merely mentions the name Seṅkāyapan.

XVII. *Kunnakkuḍi*: 1. simply mentions the name Ātan Sāttan 2. is fragmentary.

XVIII. *Mamaṇḍūr*: 1. This is the hill of Kaṇimān conqueror of Tēnūr. This was made by the stone mason...... The word Tanda for 'conquered' is interesting; but Taccan for stone mason is intriguing; now Taccan is only carpenter.

XIX. *Araccalūr*: 1. Tēvan Sāttan, a lapidary dealing in precious stones caused to be made these seven beds. 'Paṇṇuvittān' for 'caused to be made' is good Tamil. 2. is a symmetrical arrangement of five letters in each line made up of the three letters Ta, Ti and Te. It is suspected that these letters stand for dance beats even as in the Kudumiamalai inscription we have certain letters representing musical notes. 3. is similar to 2.

XX. *Piḷḷiyārpaṭṭi*: Peruparaṇan chieftain of Erukkāṭṭūr. Peru is like Neḍum and Iḷa. Paraṇan as well as Erukkāṭṭūr are quite Śaṅgam names.

XXI. This is the place of penance of Candiranandi, the monk who observed 57 days of fasting. We do not know if Candranandi died on the 58th day.

Apart from these we shall consider two potsherd inscriptions, part of the finds from Alagairai and Uṟaiyūr. The potsherd from Alagairai has the word kūttan on it. The Uṟaiyūr potsherd has but a fragment yielding nothing sensible. Kūttan however is a dancer generally but could be the name of a person, whether that person bore the name of a deity is uncertain, since it is not

beyond doubt if Naṭarāja concept was familiar to the people who made these inscriptions.

The above mentioned Brāhmi inscriptions are a fair representative collection of Brāhmi epigraphs of the early centuries of the Christian era in the Tamil country. The Arikkamēḍu finds bearing Tamil–Brāhmi inscriptions and certain numismatic Tamil–Brāhmi legends are not brought within our purview here.

A close analysis of the contents of these epigraphs will definitively limit the range of extra knowledge provided by them. Incidentally we will know whether we are or are not exaggerating the importance of such source material. It is deemed fashionable to sneer at literary sources and to consider them worth considering only if they are corroborated by archaeological sources. It has been our experience that literary references do get corroborated more often than not by non–literary sources. This is true at least so far as the Śaṅgam age is concerned. It was not long ago that some senior scholars profoundly distrusted the Śaṅgam literary period; but corroborations which later day epigraphy have provided, has changed this attitude from contempt to tolerance; but the value of the Tamil Brāhmi epigraphic source can be decided only when we imagine the total absence of all other sources and try to see if anything like the history of the Śaṅgam age, political or social, would be then possible. A discreet 'No' can be the only answer.

These inscriptions speak of donations of rock–beds or seats for the benefit of ascetics mostly Jaina made by all kinds of people, kings, merchants etc. Merchant communities, manufacturers of and traders in various commodities get frequent mention. Hardware merchants, goldsmiths, stone masons, textile dealers, lapidaries, gem cutters, sugar merchants, salt dealers, dancers, are about some of the professionals who can very well make up a community of traders, though not a chamber of commerce(?). The merchants indulged in charity as they had good reason to and have done so from time immemorial. The contact between Ceylon and South India is dimly indicated. Kings, princes, their nomination, royal charity on important occasions, royal conquests of neighbouring territories, Jaina monks fasting (unto death), royal officers bearing their overlord's titles, merchants bearing the Kāvidi title, the existence of merchant guilds; the mention of

important cities like Karūr and Madurai; the provision of parts of a structure like a roof a canopy and dripledge; the institutions of monks, nuns and lay disciples, monasteries, caverns, rock–beds and seats. This is all what we know from these epigraphs. Their value if judged by their content should be deemed very little. The real worth of these inscriptions consists in the knowledge we get about the palaeography of the times and certain colloquial usages. It is suggested that in relative evaluations of these source material a sense of proportion should be maintained and mere novelty shall not be made to stand for substantial knowledge.



Are the Caves at Dharasiva Buddhist or Jaina?

BY

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Dhārāśiva is an old town about 37 miles north of Sholapur in the Marathwada Division of Maharashtra. Some years ago its name was changed to Osmānābād by Osman Ali, a nawab of Hyderabad. It is now the chief town of the Osmānābād District of the Marathwada.

About two miles north-east from the town there are a few caves in a ravine facing the west, which have long been known to Archaeologists. They have been described by Burgess in the *Archaeological Survey of Western India,* Vol. III, pp. 4f. and in the *Cave Temples of India,* pp. 504 f. Burgess ascribed them to the Jaina religion. After describing the image in Cave II, he says, "The details of this image, and all the arrangements of this and the neighbouring caves, are so exactly like those of Buddha *Vihāras,* that any one who had not seen other Jaina caves of a similar sort, might easily be led to suppose that these were Bauddha excavations. But a careful study of the Buddha and Jaina groups at Elura suffices to show that these are cave-temples of the Digambara or naked Jains, and perhaps among their earlier attempts at such works, when they began by imitating the Buddhist excavations."[1] Recently Dr. M. K. Dhavalikar has attempted to show that they belong to the Baudhha and not to the Jaina religion.[2] It is proposed to examine this question in the present article.

My attention was drawn to this problem as I was studying recently the history of the Śilāhāras who were ruling over North and South Koṅkaṇ and the Kolhapur region from the ninth to the thirteenth century A.D.; for these kings proudly mention their *biruda Tagara-pura-parameśvara* (the lord of the city of Tagara)

1. *Archaeological Survey of Western India,* (*A.S.W.I.*), Vol. III, p. 7.

2. *Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bombay* (*J.A.S.Bom.*), (New Series), Vols. XIX-XX, 183 f.; *J.I.H.*, Vol. XLVI, pp. 405 f.

in their inscriptions. In accordance with the interpretation of similar expressions such as *Ujjayinī–puravar–ādhīśvara*, *Kālañjara–puravar–ādhīśvara* etc. this *biruda* must be taken to mean that they originally hailed from the city of Tagara, and not that they were then ruling at Tagara. Tagara was a flourishing city in the early centuries of the Christian era. Mercantile articles from several southern places such as Nāgārjunakoṇḍa, Viṇukoṇḍa and Veṅgī were first taken to Tagara and then transported *via* Paiṭhaṇ and Nāsik to Ujjayinī in the north or to Broach in the north–west. Tagara has been mentioned as a famous emporium in the *Periplus of the Erythrean Sea*[3] as well as by Ptolemy.[4] Like the ancient cities of Ujjaiyinī, Tripurī and Kauśāmbī, Tagara also had coins struck in its name. One such tiny coin of the first or second century A.D. has recently been discovered in Marathwada.[5]

The location of Tagara was not certain for a long time. Being misled by the distance and bearing of the city from Broach and Paithan mentioned by the afore–mentioned Greek writers scholars have variously identified it. It was taken to be identical with Devagiri by Wilford, with Junnar by Bhagvanlal Indraji, with Darur in the Bhir District by R. G. Bhandarkar, with Tavangir, 12 miles north of Kanakagiri by V. K. Rajwade, and with Karavīra (Kolhāpur) by Fleet. Fleet ultimately suggested its identification with Ter in the Osmānābād District,[6] which has met with general acceptance. Ter is only about 10 miles north of the caves. It has remains of ancient Buddhist and Hindu temples. In the excavations recently made there by Mr. B. N. Chapekar several pieces of pottery, coins and terracotta figurines dating from the second century B.C. to the third centuy A.D. and thus belonging to the Sātavāhana period have come to notice.[7] Besides, some Sanskrit, Marathi and Kannada inscriptions dating from the eleventh to the fourteenth cenury A.D. have been found there. These antiquities support the identificaion of Tagara with Ter. Sanskrit *nagara* is changed to *ner* in course of time. See e.g. Pimpalner (from Pippalanagara) and Saṅgamner (from Saṅgamanagara). So

3. R. C. Majumdar, *Classical Accounts of India*, p. 376.
4. *Ibid.*, p. 304.
5. This coin will soon be published in *J.N.S.I.*
6. *J.R.A.S.* 1901: pp 537 f.
7. See his *Report on the Excavations at Ter.*

Tagara seems to have been changed to *Ter*. Besides, the place is called Terapura or Terāpura in ancient Sanskrit and Apabhraṁśa works as shown below.[8] So there is now no doubt about the identification of Tagara with Ter in the Osmānābād District.

As stated before, Ter lies about 12 miles north-east of Dhārāśiva. The caves of Dhārāśiva have been described in some Jaina works published during the last fifty years. In 1924 Dr. Hiralal Jain discovered a manuscript of the Apabhraṁśa work *Karakaṇḍacariu* in the Jain Bhāṇḍār at Kāranjā in Vidarbha. He edited it subsequently in the Karanja Jaina Series. Its author Kanakāmara tells us that the minister who patronised him diverted the mind of king Karṇa.[9] This king is probably identical with the homonymous Kalachuri king who flourished in the period A.D. 1041–1073.[10] So the Apabhraṁśa work belongs to the eleventh cen. A.D. It gives the following story of king Karkaṇḍa:

Karkaṇḍa was the king of the country of Aṅga in North India. He ruled from Campā, modern Bhāgalpur. His dominion comprised almost the whole of Bhārata. but the rulers of the southern countries of Cōḷa, Chēra and Pāṇḍya did not acknowledge his suzerainty. So he started with a large army to subjugate them. On his way he encamped at Terāpura. There a local ruler named Śiva met him and told him about the wonderful cave-temple on the hill nearby. His curiosity being aroused, he visited the site. He saw the image of Pārśvanātha in the cave. He also noticed another image of the Tīrthaṅkara on the top of the hill. He brought it down and installed it in the cave. He then noticed a knob or protuberance (*granthi*) on the *siṁhāsana* of the original image in the cave.[11] Thinking that it was marring the beauty of the image, he called an artisan and asked him to chisel it off. The latter told him that the *granthi* was blocking a spring of water inside. If he chiselled it off, the stream of water would inundate

8. The *Bṛhatkathākośa* uses the expression *Ter-ākhya-nagara* (56, 352) and *Ter-ākhya-pura* (56, 390), which may indicate the name of the town to be *Tera* or *Terā*. But in 56, 396 Hariṣena uses *Tera-pattana*, which shows that the name intended was *Terā*, not *Tera*. The *Karakaṇḍacariu*, however, gives the name a *Terāpura* in 4.3.1.

9. *Karakaṇḍacariu*. 10.29,6.

10. *C.I.I.*, Vol. IV, Introd., pp. xciii f.

11. *Karakaṇḍacariu*, 4.12.1. Dhavalikar has not noticed this account in the work. He thinks that it occurs only in the *Bṛhatkathākośa*.

the whole cave. But the king insisted on getting the *granthi* chiselled off. As soon as it was done, a large stream of water gushed forth and filled the whole cave. The king felt distressed, but he was consoled by a heavenly being who came there from above. He gave him the following account of the cave:

In the southern Vedyardha[12] there ruled two Vidyādhara brothers named Nīla and Mahānīla. Having been ousted by their enemies, they fled to the south and established themselves at Tērānagara. They were converted to Jainism by a Muni. Thereafter, they got the cave excavated and installed the image of Pārśvanātha therein. As for the other image of Pārśvanātha found on the hill Karkaṇḍa was told that it had been brought there by two Vidyādharas from the Pudi hill in Kerala. While going through the air they noticed the cave. To see it they alighted on the hill, and keeping the image there, they went down to see the cave. When they came back, they found that their image could not be moved at all. So they left it there and went away.[13]

Karkaṇḍa got two more caves excavated on the hill. He then invaded Siṁhala and on his return from there he defeated the rulers Cōḷa, Cēra and Pāṇḍya and then went back to his own country.

The story of Karkaṇḍa occurs also in the Sanskrit work *Bṛhatkathākośa* of Hariṣeṇa. It is similar to that given above, differing from it in one or two particulars. According to it, the image of Pārśvanātha found on the hill-top had been brought from Laṅkā.[14]

The *Bṛhatkathakośa* was composed at Vardhamānapura in the Śaka year 853, Vikrama year 989 (A.D. 931–32).[15] So it is earlier than the Apabhraṁśa work *Karakaṇḍacariu*. In fact, the story in the latter appears to be based on Sanskrit version on the earlier work. The mention of Terapura in the *Bṛhatkathākośa*

12. This means in the country to the south of Kailāsa.

13. *Karkaṇḍacariu*, 5.8. 4 f.

14. *Bṛhatkathākośa*, 56, 397-98. Again, the *Karakaṇḍacariu* states that Karkaṇḍa excavated only two caves on the hill, while the *Bṛhatkathākośa* says that he excavated three.

15. *Bṛhatkathākośa*, Intro., p. 121.

is the earliest reference to that city so far known in Sanskrit literature.

The caves mentioned in both these works are undoubtedly those on the hill near Dhārāśiva. There are at present six caves on that hill, of which four are excavated facing west, and two more in another part of the hill.[16] Of the former, Cave No. II is noteworthy, though now in a dilapidated condition. It resembles the Vihāra caves Nos. XVI and XVII of the Vākāṭaka age at Ajaṇṭā.[17] (*See Plate I*). The verandah in front of the cave measures 78 ft. in length and 10 ft. 4 inches in breadth. Its pillars, of which there were six or eight, have now fallen, bringing down the whole front except for a small fragment carved with the figures of the Jinas. The hall inside is 82 ft. in depth and from 79 to 85 ft. in width. It has 32 pillars arranged in two squares, one inside the other. The outer square has 20 pillars and the inner one 12 pillars. The pillars in front of the shine are round in shape with square bases and constricted cushion capitals, being decorated with horizontal bands of beads and festoons. There are twenty-two cells in the walls of the hall, 8 in each of the two side walls and 6 in the back wall, three being on each side of the shrine at the back. In the shrine, 19 ft. 3 inches wide, 15 ft. deep and 13 ft. high there is a large image of Pārśvanātha seated in the *dhyāna-mudrā*, with hands on the lap, the palms being turned up. On his *siṁhāsana* there appear two deer on each side of what appears to have originally been a wheel placed on its edge, but it has now almost completely disappeared. Over the head of the Tīrthaṅkara Pārśvanātha there are spread seven hoods of a serpent, with a small crown on each of them. There is a Chawri-bearer and above a flying Gandharva on each side of the Tīrthaṅkara. (*See Plate II*).

It may be noted that in the floor of the cell in the north-west corner of the hall there is a hole which is always filled with water. It is probably connected with the cistern at the west end of the verandah in front of the hall.

A little to the east of this cave lies Cave No. III, somewhat smaller in size, but otherwise resembling it. There is a similar

16. *A.S.W.I.*, Vol. III, pp. 9 f.
17. *C.I.I.*, Vol. V, Introd., pp. lxvi f.

figure of Pārśvanātha in the shrine, with the wheel on the *siṁhā-sana* quite clear in front. No deer are, however, noticeable on the two sides of it. It is not known if they were carved before. There are four other caves excavated in the hill, but we need not notice them here as they are not relevant to the present discussion.

These caves have been described as of the Jaina religion in the Sanskrit work *Bṛhatkathākośa* and the Apabhraṁśa work *Karakaṇḍacariu*. I have cited above the opinion of James Burgess, who has described them fully in the *Archaeological Survey of Western India*, Vol. III, and rather briefly in the *Cave–Temples of India*. He also ascribes them to the Jaina religion. But recently Dr. Dhavalikar has put forward the view that they are Buddhist. He has advanced the following arguments in support of it:—

(1) Stylistically these caves resemble the Mahāyana Bauddha caves of the Vākāṭaka age, which were carved towards the end of the sixth century A.D. On the other hand, they differ from the Jaina caves at Ellora.

(2) In the fifth and sixth centuries A.D. to which these caves belong, Buddhism, not Jainism, was flourishing in the northern Deccan. It was only in the 9th century A.D. that Jainism flourished there when it received royal patronage, more particularly under the Śilāhāras.

(3) Literary evidence furnished by the *Bṛhatkathākośa* and the *Karakaṇḍacariu* indicates that Cave No. II was Buddhist, not Jaina. Karkaṇḍa is said to have installed another image of Pārśvanātha in that Cave. Where was the need of installing a new image of Tirthaṅkara if there was one there already.[18] So it seems that Karkaṇḍa, after worshipping the image, realised that he had committed a mistake, since it was an image of the Buddha. But it was not easy — nay, it was impossible — to instal a new image in place of the old one, because the latter was carved out of the living rock. In fact, Karkaṇḍa did not instal a new image. He only removed the *dharma–cakra* carved in front of the *siṁhāsana*.

18. Karakaṇḍa may have installed it in the cell to the west of the verandah. For the image of Pārśvanātha found there see *A.S.W.I.*, Vo.l III, pl. III, fig. 2. This is a loose image.

So we do not notice it now between the deer on the two sides. The version of the story of Karkaṇḍa in both the Jaina works supports this conjecture. It tells us that Karkaṇḍa got a knob (*granthi*) on the *siṁhāsana* of the Tīrthaṅkara image chiselled off. That knob was nothing else than a *dharmacakra* carved on the siṁhāsana. A similar *dharmacakra* is noticed on the *siṁhāsana* of the image in the adjoining Cave No. III. So both these images are of the Buddha.

(4) There is no doubt a seven-hooded *nāga* over the head of the image in Cave No. II, but representations showing *nāga*-hoods over the Buddha's head are not wanting in Buddhist art. In fact we have several representations of the Buddha in the *dhyāna-mudrā* with a seven-hooded serpent over his head discovered at Nāgārjunakoṇḍa.[19]

(5) Karkaṇḍa seems to have got excavated the rock-cut court in front of the cave and also the frieze of Jaina images on the facet of the verandah. This is of a later age — probably of the 9th century A.D. He may also have got excavated caves Nos. V and VI in another part of the hill.[20]

Dr. Dhavalikar has, therefore, come to the conclusion that Caves Nos. II and III were originally Buddhist. Later, in the 9th or 10th Century A.D., they were converted into Jain Caves. We shall next proceed to examine his arguments to determine this matter.

(1) There is no doubt much similarity in the plans of the Mahāyāna caves (Nos. XVI and XVII) of the Vākaṭaka age at Ajaṇṭā and Caves II and III at Dhārāśiva. All of them have a verandah in front, a hall with cells on three sides behind it, a shrine at the further end, with an image on a *siṁhāsana* in it. But it would not proper to infer from these similarities that they are all of the same faith. We can only conclude on the basis of this similarity that they were excavated in the same age. The similarity may be due to the employment of the same artisans by the princes or wealthy persons of the time for getting the Caves excavated. As Dr. U. P. Shah has observed, 'no art is entirely

19. *Mem. A.S.I.*, No. 54, pls XXIII (b); XXXI (b).

20. *J.A.S.Bom.*, Vols. 39-40, p. 188.

Jain, Buddhist or Hindu. The same artists who worked for one sect, were employed also by other sects in any particular unit of time and space .... Do we not find identical art style in the Jaina, Buddhist and Hindu specimens of the Kushāṇa period obtained from Mathurā[21]."

Dr. Burgess has shown that Jaina images are noticed on the frieze of the verandah of Cave No. II. Dr. Dhavalikar also has admitted. We have no reason to suppose this frieze only was carved three or four centuries after the cave behind it was excavated. It must have been carved along with the cave in the same period.

(2) That Jainism was not flourishing in North Deccan or Maharashtra in the sixth and seventh centuries A.D. when these caves were excavated is irrelevant in the present discussion; for Tagara where the caves are situated was formerly not included in Maharashtra, as it is now. It was Kannaḍa-speaking in those days. This is shown by *birudas* assumed by the Śilāhāra kings of Tagara who founded principalities in the Koṅkaṇ and Kolhāpur regions in the ninth and later centuries by the favour of their Rāshṭrakūṭa and Cālukya suzerains. See *e.g.*, the following *birudas*:[22] *Malagalagaṇḍa* (the hero among hillchiefs), *Gaṇḍara-gaṇḍa* (the hero of heroes), *Gaṇḍaraṅgara* (gold among heroes), *Nannisamudra* (an ocean of truth), *Villaviḍeṅga* (clever in the use of the bow), *Pusiganjuvāta* (who is afraid of falsehood) etc. These are all Kannaḍa *birudas*. Though the Śilāhāras of North Koṅkaṇ ceased to assume such *birudas* in later times, being naturalized in the Marathi-speaking country, the Śilāhāras of Kolhāpur continued to bear them to the last as appears clear from their inscriptions. Many of the records of these later Śilāhāras of Kolhāpur are in the Kannaḍa language.[23] So these rulers must originally have been Kannada-speaking in their home-town of Tagara. The history of Northern Deccan or Maharashtra will not be of any use in finding out whether Jainism was flourishing

21. *Studies in Jaina Art*, p. 3.

22. See Janjirā plates of Aparājita, *Important Inscriptions from the Baroda State*, pp. 35 f.; Bhādāna grant of Aparājita, *Ep. Ind.*, Vol. III, pp. 267 f. etc.

23. See *Ep. Ind.*, Vol. XIX, pp. 30f.

in the country round Tagara. Unfortunately, we have no records from Tagara dating back to the sixth or seventh century A.D. But the jaina religion was undoubtedly prevalent in Karṇāṭaka in that period. It had the support of the Kadambas and Early Cālukyas who were ruling in that age. It is well-known that the Cālukya Emperor Pulakeśin II gave liberal patronage to the poet Ravikīrti who erected a Jaina temple at Aihole in the Bijāpur District.[24] Aihole is only about 150 miles as the crow flies south of Dhārāśiva. So it is not unlikely that Jainism was flourishing at Tagara in the sixth or seventh century A.D. According to Jain tradition, the Vidyādhara princes Nīla and Mahānīla were converted to Jainism and then they got these caves excavated. It is noteworthy that the Śilāhāras trace their descent from the Vidyādhara Jimūtavāhana. It is not known if they had adopted the Jaina faith when in Tagara, but it is not unlikely that the caves were excavated with their royal patronage and so in course of time they came to be associated with the Vidyādharas.

(3) Dr. Dhavalikar has drawn attention to the *dharmacakra* carved on the *siṁhāsana* of the image in Cave No. III in support of his view that it is of the Buddha. A similar *dharmacakra*, now mutilated, was also carved between two deer on either side of the image in Cave No. II. The *dharmacakra* is a characteristic symbol of the Buddha image. After worshipping the image in Cave No. II, Karkaṇḍa realised that he had committed a mistake. So he got the *dharmacakra* chiselled off in order to convert the image into that of a Jaina Tirthankara. The knob (*granthi*) which, according to both the above mentioned jain works, was caused to be removed by Karkaṇḍa was nothing else but this *dharmacakra*. So Dr. Dhavalikar takes this *cakra* placed edgewise on the *siṁhāsana* or pedestal of an image to the distinguishing mark of a Buddha image. We shall examine this argument at some length.

Gautama Buddha first preached his doctrine in the Deer Park at Sārnāth. This event is called *Dharmacakrapravartana* (Revolving of the Religious Wheel), and it is indicated by carving a deer on either side of a wheel placed edgewise on the pedestal or *siṁhāsana* of a Buddha image. This is no doubt a significant symbol of Buddhism. But it seems that it was adopted by the

24. *Ibid.*, Vol. VI, pp. 1 f.

Jainas also in the beginning.[25] Caves Nos. II and III at Dhārāśiva are of this age. The Jainas also regard the wheel as a sacred symbol. Haribhadra's *Āvaśyaka Sūtra* has the following narrative about it.

Once upon a time Ṛsabhanātha, the Jaina Tīrthaṇkara, went to Takṣaśilā. He reached the place in the evening. When Bāhubali, the ruler of the place, came to know of it, he thought of going next morning to have his *darśana*; but when he went there, he found that the Tīrthaṅkara had already left the place. Bāgubali felt disappointed. He consoled himself by erecting and worshipping a *cakra* there. This was the origin of the worship of the *cakra* in Jainism. Such a *cakra* of bronze fixed on a stick is preserved in the Patna Museum.[26]

The Jainas recognise twenty-four Tīrthaṅkaras. Their images are all alike, but they are distinguished by their cognisances carved on their *simhāsanas* or pedestals. In the Śaka and Kushāṇa periods these cognisances were not evolved. The images of the Tīrthaṅkaras had only the *dharmacakra* carved on their pedestals or *simhāsanas* and they were distinguished by their names incised on them. The cognisances were evolved later in the Gupta period.[27] Recently two images of the Tīrthaṅkara Candraprabha and one of Puṣpadanta were discovered in the Vidiśā District of Madhya Pradesh. They have only the *dharmacakra* carved on the pedestal and are distinguished by the mention of their names in the inscriptions thereon. The cognisances are not carved on the two sides of their *Dharmacakra*.[28]

Later, these cognisances such as the bull in the case of Ṛsabhanātha or Ādinātha, the deer of Śāntinātha, the conch of Neminātha, the snake of Pārśvanātha and the lion of Mahāvīra came into vogue. See, for instance, the image of Neminātha at Rājgir.[29] The identity of the Tīrthaṅkara is suggested by the *dharmacakra* with the Cakrapuruṣa standing in front and a conch placed on

25. Burgess also says that the caves at Dhārāśiva were imitated from the Buddhist caves.
26. *Studies in Jaina Art*, pl. VI, fig. 15.
27. *Ibid.*, pp. 14|f.
28. *J.O.I.*, Vol. XVIII, pp. 247 f.
29. *Studies in Jaina* Art, pl. VII, fig. 18.

either side of it. Recently an image of a Tīrthaṅkara was discovered at Keedabrahma in North Gujarat. It has on its *siṁhāsana* a *cakra* placed edgewise with a deer on either side exactly as on the case of a Buddha image.[30] It has been identified as an image of Śāntinātha. There is a similar image of Śāntinātha in the Faizabad Museum.

The *Dharmacakra* was thus not a distinguishing characteristic symbol of the Buddha image. It was used to signify the images of the Jaina Tīrthaṅkaras also. The identity of the Tīrthaṅkara was generally indicated by his cognisance carved in addition. In the case of the image in Cave No. II at Dhārāśiva the cognisance is the *nāga* or serpent which is shown as spreading his hood over its head. The image is therefore of the Tīrthaṅkara Pārśvanatha.

(4) But it may be said that 'the serpent hoods are seen over the head of the Buddha images also. Several such images have been discovered at Nāgārjunakoṇḍa. The image in Cave No. II at Dhārāśiva which has *nāga–hoods* over its head can, therefore, be taken to be that of the Buddha also.' This objection is, no doubt, relevant. It must be considered at some length.

The serpent–hoods spread over the head are not a distinguishing characteristic of a Buddha image as they are of the image of the Jaina Tīrthaṅkara Pārśvanātha. They are not noticed on all images of the Buddha. They are seen only in connection with an episode in the life of Gautama Buddha. Gautama spent five weeks at Gayā after he attained enlightenment. Then he went to the Nāga Muchaliṅda who was dwelling in a lake nearby. To protect him from a storm which broke out at the time, the Nāga spread his hoods over his head. This episode is shown on the railing of many stūpas. The Nāga–hoods are shown over the head of the Buddha only in connection with this episode in the relics of Nāgārjunakoṇḍa.[31] He is shown as sitting on the coils of a serpent. Some Nāgas with similar hoods are shown humbly bowing to him. No such episode is intended to be represented in the caves Nos. II and III at Dhārāśiva. The images

30. *J.O.I.*, Vol. X, pp. 63 f.

31. See *M.A.S.I.*, No. 54, pp. 28 and 32.

with nāga-hoods over their heads must, therefore be taken to be those of the Jaina Tīrthaṅkara Pārśvanātha.

(5) On the frieze of the verandah are carved small images of Jinas, which leave no doubt that the cave behind is of the Jaina faith. We have no reason to suppose that this façade of the verandah was carved three or four centuries after the cave.

The foregoing examination of Dr. Dhavalikar's arguments must have shown that Cave Nos. II and III are of the Jaina faith. There is no evidence to attribute them to Buddhism. They were regarded as Jaina caves from the 9th to the 11th century as is clear from their description in the *Bṛhatkathākośa* and *Karakaṇḍacariu.*

We need not suppose that all the description of Cave No. II in the aforementioned two works is correct. Neither Hariṣeṇa nor Kanakāmara is likely to have personally seen them. The former was staying at Vardhmānapura which, as I have shown elsewhere,[32] was situated in Malwa. Kanakāmara may have been staying somewhere near Tripuri, the capital of King Karṇa mentioned in the *Karakaṇḍacariu.*[33] Both these authors lived far away from Dhārāśiva. Their description of Cave No. II at Dhārāśiva is evidently from hearsay or Jaina tradition. It is also imaginary to a great extent; for they describe the image in the cave as inlaid with jewels and that on the hill-top as inlaid with gold and jewels. The hall of the cave had a thousand pillars! The story of water stream gushing out of a chiselled knob on the *siṁhasana* of the Pārśvanātha image in Cave No. II is equally fanciful. It may have been suggested by the presence of a small hole in the cell in the north-west corner of the cave which is always filled with water. As Burgess conjectured, it has perhaps some connection with the cistern at the west end of the verandah. The cell in which the cistern has been excavated has two holes in the floor noticed by Burgess.[34] The miraculous story of the water stream inundating the whole cave may have owed its origin to the presence of these holes which are always filled with water.

32. *Studies in Indology*, Vol. IV, pp. 137 f.
33. *Karakaṇḍacariu*, 10, 29.6.
34. *A.S.W.I.*, Vol. III, p. 6.

The story that these caves were excavated by the Vidyādharas Nīla and Mahānīla, who hailed from the Himalayan region and were ruling from Tagara, may be equally imaginary. It occurs first in the Sanskrit work *Bṛhatkathākośa* (10th cen. A.D.) Nearly a hundred years before, the Śilāhāra kings had commenced their rule in North Koṅkan. They state in their records that they had hailed from the city of Tagara. They also trace their descent from the Vidyādhara Jīmūtavāhana. This must have led to the tradition that the caves near Tagara were excavated by the Vidyādharas who had been converted to Jainism. We do not know whether the Śilāhāra kings ruling from Tagara were of the Jaina faith. The caves may have been excavated with their generous support. The tradition that the caves were excavated by the Vidyādharas Nīla and Mahānīla after their conversion to Jainism is evidently due to the supposition that those who were responsible for the excavation must have been of the Jaina faith. It may be noted in this connection that a feudatory of the Śilāhāras of North Koṅkaṇ viz. Cāmuṇḍarāja, who flourished in the first half of the eleventh century A.D., assumed the *biruda Tribhuvana-Nīla*. His father Vijjarāṇaka was known as *Āhava-Nīla*.[35] These birudas are reminiscent of the traditional rule of the Vidyādhara Nīla at Tagara: for like his Śilāhāra overlord, Cāmundarāja also bore the *biruda Tagarapura-parameśvara*, suggesting Tagara as his original home.

35. *Ep. Ind.*, Vol. XXXII, p. 66.



PLATE I. Cave No. II at Dhārāśiva
K marks the cell with a hole always filled with water.
N marks the cell containing a cistern



PLATE II. Image in Cave No. II at Dhārāśiva

Status of Hill Tippera as a "Native" State

BY

B. P. BARUA

Hill Tippera or Independent Tippera is the parent state of the modern province of Tripura. The early history of Tippera is shrouded in mystery. A clear picture emerges since the invasion of Tippera by Tugril Khan, the then Governor of Bengal under the Sultanate of Delhi, in 1278 or 1279 when Ratnapha was placed on the throne. Inspite of the extension of influence by the Muslim rulers of Bengal, Tippera maintained its independence through the centuries. It was in 1733 that Sujauddin, Subadar of Bengal, Subdued Raja Dharma Manikya, and compelled him to cede some territories and renamed Tippera as Roshnabad or the country of light. Henceforward the Rajas of Tippera were reigning as the tributary kings of the Mughal Subadars of Bengal.[1] But the Mughals were soon to give way to the British in eastern India.

The British contact with Tippera began as early as 1760 when Nawab Mir Qasim ceded to them the districts of Chttagong along with Burdwan and Midnapore. A British force from Chittagong entered Tippera in 1761 ostensibly to punish, on behalf of the Nawab, the rebellious Raja Krishna Manikya, but actually to bring the king under British sphere of influence. Krishna Manikya surrendered to the British and in 1765, after the acquisition of the *Diwani* of Bengal, he was recognised as the Raja of Tippera.[2] In the hill territories he remained an absolute ruler. A settlement was made with him as the *zamindar* of his plain territories described as *Pergunnah Roshnabad* in the Mohammedan revenue roll. In 1783 Rajdhar Manikya, the next king

1. J. N. Sarkar, *Bengal Nawabs*, p. 7. Mughal conquest of Bengal: Acc. to Sarkar, 1729; Stewart, 1733; and Rev. J. Long, 1739.

2. Rev. J. Long, *Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal*, 1850, Vol. XIX, p. 554.

was imprisoned and prosecuted on a charge of harbouring dacoits, but was released for lack of evidence. He was invested by the British in 1785 and was made the settlement-holder of Roshnabad in 1792.[3] From the beginning Rajdhar Manikya was left in undisputed possession of the hills. Thus arose the dualism of the Hill Tippera Raja; he was both an independent ruler and a British Indian *zamindar*. As a *zamindar*, he was liable to the jurisdiction of British courts, and as a ruler of the hill territories, he was independent exercising powers of life and death over his subjects. His position was unique among Indian princes. The income from his estate in British India was much more than the revenue of his independent jurisdiction. To distinguish it from Tippera proper, which was a British district, Hill Tippera was called Independent Tippera.

In 1838 the status of Independent Tippera was reviewed while considering the question of the Raja's right to levy duties on Hill Tippera produce passing to British territory. It was argued by the Commissioner of Chittagong that Hill Tippera did not constitute an independent state because of the fact that the British force had subjugated the whole of Tippera in 1761, that the Raja had submitted to investiture at the hands of the British Government and that Rajdhar Manikya had been apprehended and tried for justice by British officers. All the arguments were rejected by the Deputy Governor of Bengal. Whatever might have been the nature of British occupation in 1761, it was pointed out, only the plain territories were administered by the British Government. Secondly, the investiture of inferior princes by the paramount power could not alter the independent status of a state. As for the arrest of the Raja, it was stated that the exercise of jurisdiction under the regulations over a *zamindar* did not necessarily mean the exercise of the same jurisdiction over an independent Raja. On the other hand, the Raja by prescription had a claim over Independent Tippera. Since the accession of the British, particularly since 1792, the Raja had been ruling over Hill Tippera as an independent ruler, without a challenge from any quarter. Moreover, the British authorities had all along treated him as an independent ruler. The Deputy Governor of

3. A. Mackenzie, *North East Frontier of Bengal*, p. 273.

Bengal come to the conclusion that the Raja had an independent hill territory and that he had every right to levy any duty he pleased in his territory.[4]

The position of Hill Tippera was again considered in 1860 with reference to Sir Charles Wood's despatch of 26 July 1860, regarding the grant of sanads giving the right of adoption to "Native" chiefs. After describing the peculiar position of the Raja as a *zamindar* in British territory whose state was held as an adjunct of his *zamindary*, Sir John Peter Grant, Lieutenant Governor of Bengal, expressed the opinion that the British Government had no right to interfere with the immemorial custom of the Tippera Raj in matters of succession. According to him, "Independent Tippera is not held by gift from the British Government or its predecessors, or under any title derived from it or them, never having been subjected by the Moguls. The British Government cannot interfere with the succession to the *zamindary* of Tippera by adoption, nomination or such other means as the special custom of the family lawfully sanctions..... There is nothing for the British Government to concede, in which view any communication made to the Rajah would not profess to be a concession."

This view was apparently accepted by the Government of India as no adoption sanad was sent for presentation to the Raja.[5]

The title of the state was finally determined in 1866. When the Lieutenant Governor's opinion was sought regarding a notification which the Government of India proposed to issue relating to the distribution of original criminal jurisdiction between the several High Courts, Sir Cecil Beadon suggested the substitution of the words "Independent Tippera" used in the draft by "Hill Tippera." For, he observed, "this territory, though not subject to the jurisdiction of our courts, is not practically independent." This suggestion was approved in the Resolution of the Government of India, dated 26th Sept. 1866. Henceforward Independent Tippera came to be known as Hill Tippera. The Raja, however, continued to use the words "Independent Hill Tippera" in his

4. *Ibid.*, pp. 409-414.

5. Government of India, Foreign Department, *Political proceedings A*, March 1862, No. 376.

official documents. These terms were thought to be harmless as the Raja never asserted his independence by any action or questioned the authority of the British Government in any way.[6]

As early as 1860 the District Magistrate of Tippera and the Commissioner of Chittagong urged upon the Government to interfere in Hill Tippera consequent upon Lushai raids in British territory across Hill Tippera.[7] Mr. C. T. Buckland, Officiating Commissioner of Chittagong, suggested that the Government should either set aside the Raja's independence or appoint a Political Agent at Agartala to relieve the Raja of his duty of frontier defence. He added that an enquiry should be made as to the professsed independence of the Raja of Hill Tippera. In his opinion, if the Raja was in any way tributary or in allegiance to the Mahammedan power, he would have stood in exactly the same position in relation to the British Government. In case his independence was taken as an admitted and unquestionable fact, Buckland opined, his relation with the British Government should be reviewed and certain principles should be laid down for future guidance. Buckland observed that there was nothing in Hill Tippera for the Government to desire annexation. It was all hill and jungle, its population was small and its revenue would not pay the expenses of its government. He opined that the Raja of Hill Tippera might be treated like the chiefs of Chittagong Hill Tracts.[8] No order was, however, passed on the proposal by the authorities.

In 1868 Sir William Grey reversed the opinion hitherto held by the Lieutenant Governors of Bengal while classifying the chiefs within his jurisdiction with reference to the nazarana rules. On the basis of a note prepared by his Under Secretary, Mr. Geoghegan, he was of the opinion that Hill Tippera had at one time been subjected to the Mughal. He was obviously referring to the subjugation of Hill Tippera by the Mughal subadar of Bengal in 1733. He observed that the *Raj* was so insignificant that succession to it naturally followed the succession to *zamindary*, and the claimants

6. *Bengal Political proceedings B*, 21 February 1877 Nos. 82-83.
7. *Bengal Judicial proceedings A*, 7 November, 1877, Nos. 82-83.
8. *Ibid.*, June 1862, Nos. 5-7.

to the throne always applied to Government, as to a paramount power, for recognition. In his opinion, "Hill Tippera is really non-British, though the Raja is a feudatory."[9] Acting upon this, the Government of India, in their Resolution, dated 6 March 1870, decided that the Raja was a "feudatory," and as such *nazarana* should be demanded from him on succession.[10]

When the question of the appointment of a Political Agent was under consideration, the position of the Raja and his state was fully discussed. In 1870, in a letter to the Government of India, Mr. Eden, Secretary to the Government of Bengal, referred to the anomalous position of the Raja whereby a British subject possessed the power of war and peace, and of life and death, without limit or control in a tract of country almost surrounded by British territory. It was suggested that the Government might properly go further, than the appointment of Political Agent and place the Raja in a somewhat similar position to that occupied by the Cuttack Chiefs. No change in his status was, however, made when final orders were passed.[11] When the Raja remonstrated against the proposal to appoint a Political Agent at Agartala, the Government of India assured him that in appointing a Political Agent the Government had no intention to cause a reduction of his power and interest.[12]

The Status of Hill Tippera again came under the consideration of Government in connection with the Laws (Local Extent) Bill and the Scheduled Districts Bill. According to Aitchison, whether a particular territory is a state or part of British India should be judged by the evidence of long usage and writings. On that basis, it was evident that Hill Tippera did not form a portion of British India. Accordingly, it was excluded from the schedule of the Scheduled Districts Bill, as territory to which the power of Government to extend its legislation did not apply.[13]

9. Government of India, *Foreign Department, Political proceedings A*, March 1862, No. 376.

10. *Ibid.*, January 1869, No. 426.

11. *Bengal Judicial proceedings A*, Nov. 1870, No. 103.

12. *Ibid.*, October 1870, No. 106.

13. *Bengal Political proceedings A*, 12 July 1880, No. 1.

Hill Tippera was never regarded a non-regulation province of British India, the King being a feudatory, it was nothing but a vassal state. In consonance with the new interpretation of the status of Hill Tippera, the Government of India drew the attention of the Government of Bengal to the impropriety of the use of terms "throne" and "crown" in the Administrative Report of the Political Agency of Hill Tippera for 1874–75.[14]

The High Court of Calcutta in a case between Rajkumar Nabadeep Chandra Dev Barman Vs. Maharaja Bir Chandra Manikya Bahadur, Radha Kishore Thakur and Samarendra Chandra Thakur, described Hill Tippera as "Sovereign State" in 1883. That Hill Tippera made and administered its own laws without dependence on any power and that the Maharaja exercised the power of life and death within his territory were treated as clear evidence of its sovereignty. "Its acknowledgement of the British Government as the paramount power and the nuzzur paid on the recognistion by that Government of each succeeding Maharaja do not take from it the status which by the law of nations it is entitled to hold."[15]

Thus, theoretically and legally Hill Tippera was a sovereign and independent state. There was no treaty binding Hill Tippera into a subsidiary alliance with the British Government. Nor was it a created state. The only mark of subjection was that the Raja received his investiture from the British Government and was required to pay the usual *nazarna* on succession. Its legal status was even superior to that of large states like Hyderabad, Gwalior and Indore. But in practice Hill Tippera was treated as a small "Native State" subservient to British paramountcy The Maharaja was not even invited to attend the Delhi Darbar in 1877; he was asked to celebrate it at Agartala.

In the opinion of Sir Cecil Beadon, Lieutenant Governor of Bengal, Hill Tippera formed a part of the "British Empire." This opinion had been communicated to the Foreign Department in 1863.[16] But the question was never fully discussed. With the

14. *Ibid.*, 3 October 1875, No. 3.
15. *Ibid.*, 2, July 1883, Nos. 28-30.
16. *Ibid.*, 12 July 1880, Nos. 1-2.

liberal interpretation of the terms, empire and paramountcy,, "Native States" were reduced to vassal states. By the end of the nineteenth century the internal affairs of Hill Tippera were brought under the general supervision of the Government exercised through the Commissioner of Chittagong and the District Magistrate of Tippera-cum-Political Agent of Hill Tippera. By a sanad issued to the Raja Radha Kishore Manikya in 1904, the Chiefship of Hill Tippera was made hereditary in the Deb Barman family, and the traditional and recognised custom of succession was replaced by the principle of lineal primogeniture.[17]

British paramountcy became an established fact by the end of the nineteenth century and the Raja of Hill Tippera was reduced from the position of a sovereign ruler of a semi-independent state to a minor prince of a small "Native State" subordinate to the paramount power.[18]

The importance of Hill Tippera as a "Native" State lies in the fact that it offers a striking example as to how a sovereign state was reduced to a subordinate state through the exercise of mere political pressure. Secondly, the case of Hill Tippera needs to be studied because the Raja was the only prince who had extensive *zamindaries* in British India and as such he was both a subject *zamindar* and an autonomous prince. Hence, the position of Hill Tippera deserves to be cited in text-books.

17. Aitchison, *Treaties, Engagements, Sanade etc.*, 1909, Vol. II, p. 281.

18. The Chief of Hill Tippera was conferred the title of Maharaja as a hereditary distinction in January, 1919. He was styled as "His Highness" in official correspondence since 1884. As a prince he was entitled to a salute of 13 guns.

A Note on Husain Shah's Assam Expedition

BY

SUNILKUMAR DAS

Husain Shāh's encounter with the Ahoms is a matter of much controversy. The bewildering texts lead scholars to doubt their relevancy with regard to this critical but interesting episode. The difficulty is further intensified by the curious fact that, though numerous coins and a few inscriptions describing Husain Shāh as the conqueror of *Kāmrū* (Kāmarūpa) and *Kamtah* (Kamatā) have been discovered, they are completely silent with regard to his expedition against Assam.

'Ālā-ud-Dīn Husain Shāh (1493–1519 A.D.), the Sultan of Bengal conquered Kāmarūpa after vanquishing its ruler Nilāmbara,[1] the third and the last king of the Khena dynasty, who ruled with his capital at Kamatāpura situated on the left bank of the Dharla, about fourteen miles south-west of modern Cooch Behar. With the defeat of Nilāmbara his kingdom was incorporated into the Bengal Sultan's dominion. From his base at Kāmarūpa, the victorious Gauḍa Sultan is said to have led a campaign against Assam and became quite successful. The consolidation of the conquests was left in charge of his son, identified with Dānyāl,[2] who could not join his new post of the Governor of Kāmarūpa, the headquarters of which was situated at Hājo, few miles north-west of Gauhāṭi, before 1498, for he

1. *Riyās-us-Salāṭin*, tr. M. A. Salam, 1902, p. 134; *History of Bengal*, Vol. II, ed. J. N. Sarkar, 1948, p. 146; E. A. Gait, *History of Assam*, 1963, pp. 44-46; M. Martin, *Eastern India*, London, Vol. III, pp. 410f. Accounts vary regarding the end of Nilāmbara. He was taken prisoner, escorted to Gauḍa and later managed to escape and was heard no more, or he was killed in the battle-field (see Martin, *op. cit.*, p. 411; *JASB*, 1873, p. 240; H. N. Chaudhuri, *The Cooch Behar State*, 1903, p. 224).

2. Salam, *op.cit.*, p. 132 note 1; J. Princep, *Useful Tables*, 1835, p. 117; Cf. also *JASB*, 1872, pp. 79 note, 335; Badauni, *Muntakhāb ut-Tawārīkh*, Bib. Ind., 1868, vol. I, p. 317; *Ibid.*, ed. G. S. A. Ranking, 1898, p. 417.

was in Munghyr at least till that year. This is corroborated by the Munghyr inscription of 903 A.H. (1497–98 A.D.)[3] in which year he is said to have constructed a vault over the shrine of Pīr Nāfah.[4] The appointment of the Governor of Kāmarūpa is further supported by the traditional date of the fall of Nilāmbara rather Kamatāpura, which is ascribed to the year 1498.[5]

Numerous hoards of Husain Shāh's coins have been found, some of which bear the epithet "the conqueror of *Kāmrū* and *Kamtah* ....." These coins are dated 899 A.H. (1493 A.D.),[6] 910 A.H. (1504 A.D.),[7] 912 A.H. (1506 A.D.),[8] 914 A.H. (1508 A.D.),[9] 915 A.H. (1509 A.D.),[10] 919 A.H. (1513 A.D.),[11] 920 A.H. (1514 A.D.),[12] 921 A.H. (1515 A.D.),[13] 922 A.H. (1516 A.D.),[14] 924 A.H. (1518 A.D.).[15] Of the epigraphs, mention may be made of an inscription on a little mosque near the Thānā of English Bāzār, Gour, dated 1st *Ramazān,* 907 A.H. (March 10, 1502 A.D.).[16] The Sylhet inscription[17] dated 918 A.H. (1512 A.D.) of Husain Shāh also records the same eulogy (i.e., the conqueror

3. *JASB*, 1872, p. 335; S. Ahmed, *Inscriptions of Bengal,* Dacca (undated), vol. IV, pp. 153f.

4. *Nāfah* is a Persian word meaning 'pod of musk'.

5. Gait., *op. cit.*, p. 44; Sarkar, *loc. cit.; JASB*, 1873, *loc. cit.; Ibid.*, 1872, *loc. cit.*, *ibid.*, 1874, p. 281.

6. H. N. Wright, *Cat. of the coins of Ind. Muse.*, 1907, vol. II, p. 173, pl. V, No. 175; A. W. Botham & R. Friel, *Suppl. to the Cat. of the Prov. Cab. of coins, Assam,* 1919, pp. 152f, No. 6/17; *JPASB(NS)*, 1929, p. 6N.

7. Botham, *Cat. Prov. coin Cab. Assam,* 1930, p. 170, No. 18.

8. Wright, *loc. cit.*, No. 176.

9. *Ibid.*, No. 177; Botham, *op. cit.*, p. 168, Nos. 10, 11; Botham and Friel, *op. cit.*, pp. 150 f, Nos. 6/10; 6/12.

10. Botham, *op. cit.*, p. 170, No. 19; Botham and Friel, *op. cit.*, pp. 148f, No. 6/1.

11. Wright, *op. cit.*, p. 174, No. 179; S. Lanepoole, *Coins of the Md. States of Ind.*, 1885; p. 47, pl. 6; No. 122; N. K. Bhattasali, *Cat. of the Coins in the Collec. of H. Rahman,* 1936, p. 24, pl. II, No. 120; *JPASB(NS)*, 1929, p. 7N.

12. Botham and Freil, *op. cit.*, pp. 150f, No. 6/8.

13. *Ibid.*, No. 6/9; Botham, *op. cit.*, No. 20.

14. Wright, *op. cit.*, p. 173, No. 178; *JPASB(NS)*, 1929, *loc. cit.*

15. Botham, *op. cit.*, p. 169, No. 16; Botham and Friel, *op. cit.*, pp. 152 f, No. 6/16.

16. *JASB*, 1874, p. 303.

17. *Ibid.*, 1922, p. 413.

of *Kāmrū* and *Kamtah*) as that occurs on the coins as noted above.

The available specimens thus make it apparent that the earliest and the latest coins styling Husain Shāh as the conqueror of *Kāmrū* and *Kamtah* are dated respectively in 1493 and 1518 A.D. All this, therefore, suggests that Husain Shāh's Kāmarūpa expedition took place between 1493 and 1498, and not between 1498 and 1502 as some scholars would have us believe.[18] The problem that requires consideration is, therefore, why the coin legends continued to style Husain Shāh as the conqueror of *Kāmrū* and *Kamtah* as late as 1518 A.D. although the region was already under control of the Sultan by 1498 A.D. It may not be unreasonable to infer that though the conquest of the tract was an incident of the past, the continuation of the epithet on the coins and in inscriptions unmistakably bespeaks that Husain Shāh was strong enough to retain his hold over Kāmarūpa.

At any rate, the victorious Gauḍa army, consisting of infantry and cavalry, records the *Ālamgīrnāmāh*,[19] won an initial victory over the Assamese. Incapable of holding against the Bengalee forces, the king of Assam retired to the hills leaving the plains below to be occupied by the Muhammadan soldiers. Leaving his son to bring about the subjugation of the region, Husain Shāh returned to Bengal. When the rains set in, the Rājā accompanied by his followers descended from the hills, blocked the roads, surrounded the Muslims and captured them to the last man. Almost an identical description is recorded in the *Fathiyāh–i'–Ibriyāh*[20] and the *Riyās–us–Salātin*.[21] The *Rajamālā*,[22] while narrating Husain Shāh's war with Tippera, incidentally refers to his Assam affairs. After suffering defeat

18. *Ibid.*, 1872, p. 79 note; Gait, *op. cit.*, pp. 44-46; Sarkar, *op. cit.*, pp. 146f; Salam, *op. cit.*, p. 132; R. K. Charaborti, *Gauḍer Itihāsa*, 1909, Vol. II, p. 113; R. D. Banerji, *Bāṅgālār Itihāsa*, 1324 B.S., Vol. II, pp. 247f.

19. Muhammad Kāzim, *op. cit.*, Bib. Ind., 1868, pp. 730 f.

20. *JASB*, 1872, p. 79; *Fathiyāh-i'-Ibriyāh* or *Tārīkh-Fath-i-Āshām* was written by Shihābud-Dīn Tālish between August 9, 1662 and May 13, 1663.

21. Salam, *op. cit.*, pp. 132f.

22. *Op. cit.*, ed. K. P. Sen, 1337 Tripurābda, Vol. II, p. 24.

at the hands of Tippera Rājā, Husain Shāh is said to have exclaimed!

> *Yuddhete Āsāma Koca māriā laila /*
> *Tripurāra sainya āmā apamāna dila //*

'The Assamese and the Koch people inflicted injury on me in the battle and the soldiers of Tippera also insulted me.'

This is, in all, the extent of literary sources in support of Husain Shāh's Assam expedition. Some scholars are of opinion that Husain Shāh attacked Assam immediately after his conquest of Kāmarūpa in 1498 A.D. But it would perhaps be improper, in the absence of epigraphic and numismatic evidence, to attach any undue importance to Husain Shāh's expedition against Assam.

According to S. N. Bhattacharya, "the Kāmatā and Assam campaigns (of Husain Shāh) were successive in time, the second one being a supplement and a corollary to the first."[23] He also identified the commanders of Husain Shāh's Assam campaign with Bit Mālik and Mit Mālik,[24] who, according to the chronicles of Assam,[25] were responsible for Assam invasion in 1527 A.D., and rejected[26] thereby the views of E. A. Gait,[27] according to whom Husain's Assam campaign was a myth.

But a critical examination of the evidence reveals that the inference drawn by Bhattacharya is debatable.

In the first place, he suggested that the Ahom dominion, during the close of the fifteenth century, had stretched eastward of Barnadī far to the upper Brahmaputra valley.[28] This view is endorsed by M. R. Tarafdar.[29]

But this proposition is refutable on the ground that the Ahom dominion, by the close of the fifteenth century, did not extend beyond the river Dikhu.[30] And it was not contiguous to the

23. *Mughal North East Frontier Policy*, 1929, p. 85 note.
24. *Ibid.*, pp. 86 ff.
25. *Ahom Burañjī*, ed. G. C. Barua, 1930, pp. 66-68.
26. *Op. cit.*, p. 85 note.
27. *Ibid.*, pp. 91-92, note 1. Also see *JPASB*, 1910, p. 157.
28. *Op. cit.*, p. 71.
29. *Husain Shahi Bengal*, ASP, Dacca, 1965, p. 49; *JNSI*, 1957, p. 57.
30. See Laksmi Devi, *Ahom Tribal Relations*, Gauhati, 1968, p. 80.

boundary of the Kamatā kingdom as believed by S. N. Bhattacharya and M. R. Taraídar. The region intervened between the Kamatā and the Ahom kingdoms was ruled by several independent principalities controlled by the Chuṭiyās[31] on the north bank of the Brahmaputra and the Kachāris on the south bank with their headquarters in the Dhansiri valley.[32] Besides, a number of petty chieftains designated as the Bhūiyāñs, whose identity is wrapped up in obscurity, controlled the tracts situated to the north-east and south-east of Kamatā and it extended as far as the Subansiri in the north of the Brahmaputra and the Kapili valley in the south.[33] The configuration of the region leaves no doubt that the Muslim soldiers must have encountered with these chiefs or they were required to form an alliance of friendship with them before they could have marched to the Ahom dominion. But neither the Muhammadan sources nor the Assamese chronicles enlighten us on this point. But the admittedly short duration of the campaign and its abrupt end make the subjugation of all these political entities improbable within so limited a time. So Husain Shāh's alleged campaign against Assam could hardly make the Ahoms feel its real impact.

Secondly, Sultán Husain Shāh, contends Bhattacharya, led his campaign against Assam when it was ruled by Shū-hen-phā.[34] At the same time, he referred to the name of the Barapātra Gohāin,[35] the notable commander of the battle that ensued with the Muslims.[36]

But the statement of Bhattacharya requires a modification because of the fact that the post of the Barapātra Gohāin, the third dignitary of the Ahom court was created in the reign of

31. W. B. Brown, *An outline grammar of the Deori Chutiya Language*, 1895, p. 77.

32. See Botham & Friel, *op. cit.*, p. 214.

33. The seats of the Bhūiyāñ power and the extension of their jurisdiction will be taken up shortly.

34. *Op. cit.*, *pp.* 84, 85. This view is also maintained by R. C. Majumdar (see *An Advanced History of India*, ed. Majumdar, Roychoudhuri and Dutta, 1963, p. 389).

35. *Op. cit.*, p. 87.

36. G. C. Barua, *loc. cit.*

Shū-hummōng (1497-1539),[37] and not in the reign of Shū-hen-phā, who, according to the chronicles of Assam, ruled[38] from 1488 to 1493 A.D.—a period almost prior to the accession of Husain Shāh to the throne of Gauḍa (Bengal).

Thirdly, he attempted to identify[38a] Husain Shāh with 'Khunphang' of *Purani Asam Burañjī*[39] and 'Khoopangh' of *An* Account of Assam.[40] Following Bhattacharya, M. R. Tarafdar also maintained the same identification.[41] But the above identification is not supported by evidence.

A writer of an essay 'Ancient Assam' published in the *Calcutta Review*[42] points out that "his (Husain Shāh's) march does not seem to have extended beyond Tezpore; and though he succeeded in demolishing their capital and loading himself with plunder he was ultimately repulsed by the Baro-Bhuyas and was obliged to content himself with his possession in Kamroop."

On a careful examination of the materials regarding the rise and fall of the Bāro Bhūiyāṅs it becomes clear that the above statement of the contributor of the article 'Ancient Assam' appears to be certain. The actual Government of Kāmarūpa, holds K. L. Barua, since the transfer of its capital to Kamatāpura was controlled virtually by the petty Bhūiyāṅ chiefs.[43] Their supremacy on the south of the Brahmaputra, rather Central Assam of present times is corroborated by the *Śaṅkaracarita* of Bhūṣaṇānda[44] and the *Bhāgavata* (Ch. X)[45] of Śrī Śaṅkaradeva. According to these sources, Śrī Śaṅkaradeva (1449-1569 A.D.), the great great-grandson of Caṇḍīvara, a renowned Bhūiyāṅ chief, was

37. *Sātsarī Assam Burañjī*, ed. S. K. Bhuyan, 1969, pp. 12f, 67f; *Deodhāi Asam Burañjī*, ed. Bhuyan, 1962, pp. 124f.

38. Gait, *op. cit.*, p. 86; Botham, *op. cit.*, p. 450.

38a. *Op. cit.*, p. 86 note.

39. *Op. cit.*, ed. H. C. Goswami, 1922, p. 58.

40. J. P. Wade, *op. cit.*, ed. B. Sharma, 1927, p. 30.

41. *Husain Shahi Bengal*, p. 45.

42. 1867, p. 528.

43. *Early History of Kāmarūpa*, 1933, p. 217. See also Gait, *op. cit.*, p. 38.

44. Cf. N. N. Vasu, *Social History of Kāmarūpa*, 1926, vol. II, p. 14, note 11.

45. *Op. cit.*, padas 1477-78

born at Baṭadravā (modern Bardowa) in the district of Nowgong. Caṇḍīvara is said to have ruled over the tract between Nowgong and Tezpore lying on both sides of the Brahmaputra.[46] Besides, the existence of a number of Bhūiyāñ chiefs on the north bank of the Brahmaputra is proved by the fact that Viśva Siṁha (1515–40), the founder of the Koch royal family, rose into eminence only after subduing the Bhūiyāñs.[47] In addition to these, mention is made of Rūpa Nārāyaṇa, Ghosāl Khān, Mal Kumāra and Lakṣmī Nārāyaṇa, probably Bhūiyāñ chiefs, who, after the fall of Nilāmbara, are said to have been either defeated by or surrendered to Husain Shāh's soldiers.[48]

From what has been said above, it seems fairly certain that Husain Shāh's alleged Assam Campaign was actually carried against the Bhūiyāñs. The war strategy, as recorded in the Muhammadan chronicles, a common practice amongst the mountainous people, was followed by the Bhūiyāñs, who though defeated initially, became successful at length after inflicting a crushing defeat on their opponents, the Muslims. This eastern campaign beyond Kamatāpura is perhaps alluded to in the later Muslim chronicles as the Assam campaign of Husain Shāh. There is perhaps no reason to attach any undue importance to the information recorded in the *Ālamgīrnāmāh*, *Fathiyāh–i'–Ibriyāh*, *Riyās–us–Salātin* and the *Rajamālā* as these are not supported either by numismatic and epigraphic evidence or by sufficient authentic references.

46. Cf. Vasu, *op. cit.*, p. 15.

47. Sūrjya Khari Daibajña, *Darrang Rāj Vaṁśāvalī*, ed. H. C. Goswami, 1917, slokas 90-94, 118-22, pp. 16, 21-23.

48. See Salam, *op. cit.*, p. 134; K. L. Barua, *op. cit.*, p. 264; H. E. Stapleton, *Memoirs of Gour and Pandua*, p. 34; Vasu, *op. cit.*, pp. 22f.

A Note on *Apratirathah*

BY

V. C. Pandey

The Gupta inscriptions apply the epithet *'apratirathaḥ'* to Samudragupta and Chandragupta II alone. For instance, the Allahabad Pillar Inscription describes Samudragupta as *"Pṛthivyāmapratirathaḥ."* The word *apratirathaḥ* occurs on his Archer type of coins as well. The Gupta records, e.g., the Bhitarī Stone Pillar Inscription of Skandagupta, uses, for Chandragupta II, a slightly different epithet—*svayam-apratirathaḥ.*

Dr. Fleet has translated these two designations as 'one who had no antagonist (of equal power) in the world'[1] and 'one who was himself without an antagonist (of equal power)' respectively.[2] But some scholars following Dr. B. Ch. Chhabra, have sought to prove that both these designations connote the Vaiṣnava faith of the two Gupta emperors.[3] According to Dr. Chhabra, the epithet *'apratirathaḥ'* figures among the thousand names of Lord Viṣṇu, as would appear from the following *śloka* in the *Viṣṇu-Sahasranāma*:

Aniruddho' pratirathaḥ pradyumno' mitavikramaḥ

As regards *svayam-chāpratirathaḥ* used for Chandragupta II, it means 'the very (svayam-sākṣāt) incarnation of Lord Viṣṇu.'

However, it is difficult to accept such a view for a variety of reasons:

1. Samudragupta was undoubtedly a Brahmanist, as would appear from his performance of a horse sacrifice and his description as 'the supporter of the real truth of the scriptures[4] and 'the

1. Fleet C.I.I., Vol. III, p. 14.
2. *Ibid.*, p. 54.
3. Gupta Samrāt aur Viṣṇusahasranāma (in Hindi), Nāgarī Prachāriṇī, Sabhā, Varanasi.
4. *Śāstra-tatvārtha-bhartuḥ*—Allahabad Pillar Inscription.

firm rampart of the pale of religion.'[5] But it is difficult to agree with Dr. D. C. Sircar's assertion that 'Samudragupta was certainly a Vaiṣṇava,' but his successors, who claim to have been Bhāgavatas, do not apply that epithet to Samudragupta. There was probably some sort of doctrinal difference between Samudragupta's Vaiṣṇavism and the Bhāgavatism of his descendants.[6] There is nothing to warrant the assumption that Samudragupta and his descendants belonged to two different schools of Vaiṣṇavism. The non-mention of Samudragupta as a *paramabhāgavata* in the inscriptions which invariably call his descendants as *paramabhāgavata* would rather suggest that the former was not a Vaiṣṇava at all.

2. It is true that Samudragupta has been described as *puruṣasyācintyasya*, the Inscrutable Being, and *lokadhāmno devasya*,[7] a good dwelling on earth, in the Allahabad Pillar Inscription. But it is untenable to take these two epithets as the synonyms of Lord Viṣṇu, as Dr. Sircar and Dr. Chhabra have done. The same inscription describes Samudragupta as the like of Kuvēra, Varuṇa, Indra and Yama.[8] All this mitigates against the view that Samudragupta was a Vaiṣṇava or an incarnation of Lord Viṣṇu. In fact, the attribution of divinity to Samudragupta in the Allahabad Pillar Inscription conforms to the concept of the divinity of king in Hindu Polity. However, barring a few exceptions, ancient Indian law-givers did not propound the theory of the divine origin of kingship as it was understood in the West. When Manu[9] postulated that the king was created from the eternal particles of eight *lōkapālas*, he was only attempting a functional comparison between the king and the gods. But he has nowhere called his king as the incarnation of God. All that he means is that the king may be as good as a god so long as he behaves like a god. This functional comparison is brought out in clearer terms by the *Agni Purāṇa* which tells us that the king is wind god, because he roams all over the world in the person of his spies. He is Yama, because he burns the evil-doers. He is Kuvēra,

5. *Dharma-prāchīrabandhaḥ—Ibid.*
6. *Select Inscriptions*, p. 266, foot note 4.
7. Compare Manu VII.8—*Mahatī devatā hyeshā nararupena tishṭhati.*
8. *Dhanadavaruṇendrāntakasamasya*—Allahabad Pillar Inscription.
9. Manu VII.4—*Indrānilayamārkāṇāmagneścha varuṇasya cha chandravitteśayośchaiva mātrā nirhṛitya śāśvataḥ.*

since he makes gifts to the Brāhmaṇas and the learned. He is the god of rain, since he pours down wealth on the poor. He is Śeṣanāga, since the whole universe is supported by his forbearance. He is Hari, since he protects the people. Thus, the object of the scribe comparing the king with various gods, including *"puruṣasyā-cintyasya,"* was not to portray the religious faith of his patron, but to emphasise the benevolent character of ancient Indian kingship.

3. Samudragupta's reign marked the gradual elimination of foreign influence on Indian coinage. In the process the *Meru* symbol of the Śakas was replaced by the Garuḍa symbol and alien goddesses like Ardoxsho by Durgā and Lakṣmī. But the adoption of Garuḍa as the royal emblem by Samudragupta appears to have been motivated by political rather than religious considerations. Garuḍa, the arch enemy of the serpents (*Nāgas*) heralded the triumph of the Gupta monarch over the Nāga princes[10] who were 'uprooted' (unmūlya) and 'forcibly extirpated' (prasabhoddharaṇa) by him, in his Āryāvarta campaigns. The goddess Lakṣmī has never been depicted on the coins of Samudragupta in the company of her consort, Lord Viṣṇu. In fact, her figure appears to be a replica of Ardoxsho rather than of an Indian goddess. It seems 'Garuḍa' and 'Lakṣmī' were yet to make their presence felt as unmistakable constituents of the Vaiṣṇava paraphernalia in Gupta records.

4. Had the epithet *'apratirathaḥ'* been a synonym of Lord Viṣṇu, it would have been applied, with greater justification, to the successors of Chandragupta II who, unlike Samudragupta, made themselves publicly known as the devotees of Lord Viṣṇu (Paramabhāgavatas).

The fact is that *'apratirathaḥ'* simply means 'one who is without an antagonist' and is indicative of victorious military career of Samudragupta and Chandragupta II. Since none of the successors of Chandragupta II enjoyed unchallenged and unbroken supremacy over their rivals, this epithet was quietly dropped out of official usage during the reign of their successors.

10. Compare—*Narapatibhujagānām mānadarpotphaṇānām Pratikṛtigaruḍājñām nirvishīm chāvakartā*—Junagargh Inscription.

5. That *'apratirathaḥ'* or *'chāpratirathaḥ'* simply meant 'one who is without an antagonist' is borne out by numerous literary sources. For instance, the *Mahābhārata* describes Duṣyanta as *chāpratirathaḥ*[11] in this sense.

If we were to take *'svayam chāpratirathaḥ'* as meaning 'the very incarnation of Lord Viṣṇu, in the case of Chandragupta II, as suggested by Dr. Chhabra, it would ill fit in his description of *'paramabhāgavata'*. For he could not be described as the *Bhagavān* and the *Bhakta* in the same breath.

11. *Tam chāpratirathaḥ śrīmānāśramam pratyapadyata Devalokapratīkāśam sarvataḥ sumanoharam*—*Ādi*, 70, 23.

The Impact of Ultra-Leftism on the Communist Party of India, 1928-36

BY

CONRAD WOOD

Prefatory Note

This article attempts to demonstrate the adverse impact of 'leftist' tactics on the work and fortunes of the C.P.I. from 1928 to 1936, 'leftism' being defined in terms of Leninist orthodoxy.

Since C.P.I. leftism consisted in this period largely in a negative attitude to the Indian national movement, the C.P.I.'s relations with Congress constitute a central concern of the article. The C.P.I.'s failure in the trade-union movement in 1929-32 is shown to have been basically a result not only of the Party's leftism in general but also of C.P.I. antagonism to the national movement in particualr.

Abbreviations

A.I.C.C.	:	All-India Congress Committee.
A.I.T.U.C.	:	All-India Trade-Union Congress
A.I.W.P.P.	:	All-India Workers' and Peasants' Party.
B.P.C.C.	:	Bombay Provincial Congress Committee.
Comintern	:	Communist International.
C.P.I.	:	Communist Party of India.
C.P.S.U.	:	Communist Party of the Soviet Union.
C.S.P.	:	Congress Socialist Party.
E.C.C.I.	:	Executive Committee of the Communist International.
G.K.U.	:	*Girni Kamgar* Union.
G. of I.	:	Government of India.
I.N.C.	:	Indian National Congress.
Inprecor	:	International Press Correspondence.
P.P.T.U.S.	:	Pan-Pacific Trade Union Secretariat.
Profintern	:	See 'R.I.L.U.'.
Red T.U.C.	:	Red Trade-Union Congress.
R.I.L.U.	:	Red International of Labour Unions.
U.P.	:	United Provinces.
W.P.P.	:	Workers' and Peasants' Party.

"The transfer of state power from one class to another *class* is the first, the principal, the basic sign of a *revolution*, ...".[1]

A long–term aim of all Communist Parties is to achieve a socialist society through 'proletarian' or 'socialist' revolution of which the transfer of state power from the previous ruling class to the proletariat is the essence. However in 1905 Lenin had stressed the conditions on which the accomplishment of such an aim was contingent. Since like all Marxists he was convinced that "the emancipation of the workers can only be brought about by the workers themselves";[2] he had said, referring to his own country, but at the same time laying down principles applicable to all countries in which capitalist development was still rudimentary:

"The present degree of economic development of Russia (an objective condition) and the degree of class consciousness and organisation of the broad masses of the proletariat (a subjective condition indissolubly connected with the objective condition) make the immediate, complete emancipation of the working class [through the socialist revolution] impossible."[3]

Thus, outside the developed capitalist world, Communist Parties were set the task of helping establish the preconditions for socialist revolution by, paradoxically, working for the acceleration of capitalist development. As Lenin put it:

"The idea of seeking salvation for the working class in anything save the further development of capitalism is *reactionary*. In countries like Russia, the working class suffers not so much from capitalism as from lack of capitalist development . . . . The removal of all the remnants of the old order which are hampering the wide, free and speedy development of capitalism is of *absolute* advantage to the working class."[4] .

But further, since the "bourgeois revolution is precisely the revolution which most resolutely sweeps away the survivals of the past . . . . a revolution which most fully guarantees the widest,

1. Lenin, 'Letters on Tactics', first published April 1917, *Selected Works*, Vol. VI, 33. Throughout stress is in the original.
2. 'Two Tactics of Social Democracy', *Selected Works*, Vol. III, 52.
3. *Ibid.*
4. *Ibid.*, 75.

freest and speediest development of capitalism" it follows that in 'backward' countries "the *bourgeois* revolution is in the *highest degree advantageous to the proletariat.*"[5]

The political implications are of the greatest importance. If the 'bourgeois revolution is absolutely necessary in the interests of the proletariat,"[6] then the way would seem open for cooperation between political representatives of bourgeois interests (as Marxists regard the Indian National Congress for example) and Communist Parties in the fight to effect such a revolution. Such co-operation in the struggle to complete the tasks of the bourgeois or 'national democratic' revolution would be collaboration directed against two enemies: those forces representing autocratic, pre-capitalist society (such as the princes and great landowners of India) — the 'democratic' aspect of the revolution, and those representing obstacles to the establishment of an independent 'nation-state' whose market the 'national bourgeoisie' can exploit for itself (in India, notably, British rule) — the 'national' aspect of the revolution.[7]

Of course both Communists and the bourgeoisie would be collaborating against common enemies only out of self-interest. Indeed, Lenin stressed that the joint struggle against 'feudalism' and imperialism was necessary preparation for the proletarian, anti-bourgeois revolution:

"The more complete, determined and consistent the bourgeois revolution is, the more secure will the proletarian struggle against the bourgeoisie and for socialism become."[8]

Thus whilst cooperation with the national bourgeoisie might be necessary to defeat 'feudalism' and imperialism a "Social-Democrat[9] must never .... forget that the proletarian class struggle for socialism against the most democratic and republican bourgeoisie and petty bourgeoisie is inevitable." A tactical con-

5. *Ibid.*
6. *Ibid.*
7. See for example *ibid.*, 99: "the *national* character of the democratic revolution".
8. *Ibid.*, 75.
9. This was written in the pre-First World War period when Marxists had not yet rejected the label 'Social-Democrat.'

sequence was 'the absolute necessity of a separate, independent and strictly class party of Social-Democracy."[10]

Such organisational independence of the Communists was seen as necessary also because, paradoxically, the bourgeoisie was regarded as less reliable in executing 'its own' revolution than the proletariat. As Lenin claimed:

"It is to the advantage of the bourgeoisie if the bourgeois revolution .... is not fully consistent, if it is not determined and ruthless .... if the necessary bourgeois-democratic changes take place ... by means of reforms and not by means of revolution ... if these reforms develop as little as possible the revolutionary initiative .... of the common people, ... for otherwise it will be easier for the workers .... to turn the guns which the bourgeois revolution will place in their hands the liberty which the revolution will bring, the democratic institutions which will spring up on the ground that will be cleared of feudalism, against the bourgeoisie .... The very position the bourgeoisie as a class occupies in capitalist society inevitably causes it to be inconsistent in the democratic revolution. The very position the proletariat as a class occupies compels it to be consistently democratic. The bourgeoisie looks behind, is afraid of democratic progress which threatens to strengthen the proletariat. The proletariat has nothing to lose but its chains, but by means of democracy it has the whole world to win.[11]

The organisational independence of Communists from the bourgeos national democratic movement was therefore necessary not only because of the inevitable eventual struggle for power between the two but also because of the immediate need for Communists to combat the bourgeoisie's irresolution in pursuing its own revolution.

Since the vacillating attitude of the bourgeoisie towards the bourgeois revolution was a consequence of the appearance of the proletariat on the stage of history, the further the development of the working class in numbers, class-consciousness and organisation, the more unreliable an ally the bourgeoisie was liable to

10. *Ibid.*, 100.

11. *Ibid.*, 75-7.

become. Thus in 1913 Lenin had contrasted the situation in Europe where "the commanding bourgeoisie, fearing the growth and increasing strength of the protetariat" had betrayed the democratic revolution and was supporting "everything backward, moribund and medieval," with that in Asia where the "bourgeoisie .... is *as yet* siding with the people against reaction."[12]

This favourable estimate of the chances of the Asian bourgeoisie playing a significant role in the national democratic revolution iound further expression in the preliminary theses on the national and colonial questions prepared by Lenin for the Second Comintern Congress in 1920:

"In regard to more backward states and nations .... all the Communist Parties must assist the bourgeois–democratic liberation movement in these countries."[13]

At the same time Lenin's conviction that in time the colonial porletariat must conduct the socialist revolution against bourgeois resistance led him to declare that Communist support for "the bourgeois–democratic national movements in colonial and backward countries" should be "only on the condition that the elements of future proletarian parties existing in all backward countries, which are not merely Communist in name, shall be grouped together and trained to appreciate their special tasks, *viz.*, the tasks of fighing the bourgeois–democratic movements within their own nations." Thus the tactics Lenin had outlined in 1905 were reaffirmed as follows:

"The Communist International must enter into a temporary alliance with bourgeois democracy in colonial and backward countries, but must not merge with it, and must unconditionally preserve the independence of the proletarian movement even in its rudimentary form."[14]

The two basic 'deviations' from this position are the 'ultra-leftist' and the 'rightist'. The former denies the necessity for collaboration with the bourgeoisie in the fight for national democra-

12. 'Backward Europe & Advanced Asia', *The Awakening of Asia*, 26.
13. Lenin, 'Preliminary Draft Theses on the National & Colonial Questions', *Selected Works*, Vol. X, 236.
14. *Ibid.*, 237.

tic revolution. The latter rejects the ideas that whilst the Communists are marching "side by side with the revolutionary and republican bourgeoisie," such a march should be "without merging with it,"[15] and that of "the provisional character of our tactics to 'strike together' with the bourgeoisie and the duty to carefully watch [*sic*] 'our ally as if he were an enemy.' "[16]

At the Second Comintern Congress the leftist deviation marked the contributions of Indian Marxist neophyte M. N. Roy. The main thrust of Roy's arguments was that support for bourgeois nationalist movements would contradict the interests of the colonial masses, and therefore the development of the revolutionary movement. Thus the minutes of the proceedings of the Comintern colonial commission record that Roy had asserted that 'the revolutionary movement in India, in as much as the broad masses are concerned, has nothing in common with the national liberation movement"[17] whilst in the original draft of his 'Supplementary Theses on the National & Colonial Question'[18] he had claimed that "colonial bourgeois democratic movements" and "revolutionary mass action through the medium of a communnist-party" were "two contradictory forces; they cannot develop together."[19]

Roy's "leftism" did not go unchallenged. The minutes of the proceeedings of the colonial commission[20] record criticism by

15. 'Two Tactics of Social Democracy', *op. cit.*, 71.

16. *Ibid.*, 100. Haithcox (*Communism and Nationalism in India*, 15) in attempting to distinguish between the Leninist and the 'ultra-left' Royist positions at the Second Comintern Congress, seems unconsciously to attribute a 'rightist' deviation to Lenin when he says that Roy was "Less trustful of the national bourgeoisie than Lenin". The above quotation hardly suggests Lenin was in any way 'trustful' of the national bourgeoisie.

17. Adhikari, *Documents of the History of the Communist Party of India*, Vol. 1, 162. Adhikari states that these minutes are preserved in the Central Party Archives of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism in the U.S.S.R. and that a Soviet scholar, A. Reznikov quotes from them in two articles in *Kommunist*, the theoretical organ of the C.P.S.U.

18. Roy (in his *Memoirs*, 380-1) states that Lenin, on discovering his disagreement with the preliminary theses, suggested that he draft his own "alternative" theses. A photostat of Roy's original draft appears in Adhikari, *op. cit.*, 173-7.

19. Adhikari, *op. cit.*, 177 & 188.

20. *Ibid.*, 162-3.

Lenin and British Communist Quelch of Roy's negative attitude to bourgeois national movements, whilst Lenin heavily amended Roy's draft supplementary theses, excising the more extreme leftist formulations (including that quoted above).[21]

In fact, the 'Theses on the National and Colonial Questions' which the Congress finally adopted corresponded closely to Lenin's preliminary theses. One important change was made however. In the colonial commission's report Lenin explained that as a result of that body's discussions "we unanimously decided to speak of the nationalist–revolutionary[22] movement instead of the 'bourgeois–democratic' movement."[23]

Overstreet and Windmiller have claimed: "It was clear that to Lenin's mind the change was more apparent that real, for he declared in the debate, 'There is no doubt that every nationalist movement can be only a bourgeois–democratic movement.'[24]

Lenin, as a Marxist, was certainly convinced that "every nationalist movement can be only a bourgeois–democratic movement," but this was not to say also that "every bourgeois–democratic movement can be only a nationalist–revolutionary movement"as would have to be the case for the change to be "more apparent than real." In fact, the significance of the change was explained by Lenin in his report as follows:

"It was argued that if we speak about the bourgeois–democratic movement all distinction between reformist and revolutionary movements will be obliterated; whereas in recent times this distinction has been fully and clearly revealed in the backward and colonial countries .... A certain rapprochement has been brought about between the bourgeoisie of the exploiting countries and those of the colonial countries, so that very often, even in the

21. *Ibid.*, 173-7, 178-88.

22. In some translations (e.g. that in Degras, *Communist International*, Vol. I, 139-44) this in fact appears in the adopted Theses as 'revolutionary liberation'. The difference is, of course, not significant.

23. *Selected Works*, Vol. X, 240.

24. *Communism in India*, 29.

majority of cases, perhaps, where the bourgeoisie of the oppressed countries does support the national movement, it simultaneously works in harmony with the imperialist bourgeoisie, *i.e.*, it joins the latter in fighting against all the revolutionary movements and revolutionary classes .... The meaning of this change is that we Communists should, and will, support bourgeois liberation movements in the colonial countries only when these movements are really revolutionary, when the representatives of these movements do not hinder us in training and organising the peasants and the broad masses of the exploited in a revolutionary spirit."[25]

Overstreet and Windmiller's assumption that Lenin believed all bourgeois-democratic movements were revolutionary (and therefore should be supported) is shown here to be erroneous. Lenin plainly believed *some* bourgeois democratic movements were revolutionary whilst others were reformist and that only the former should be supported.[26]

25. *Selected Works,* Vol. X, 241.

26. Support for bourgeois reformist movements would clearly have been regarded by Lenin as rightism. Like Haithcox (see above 6) what Overstreet and Windmiller, in the above passage and elsewhere, often *assume* as the Leninist position is in fact what Lenin himself would have dismissed as rightism. An important consequence is that formulations which in reality are orthodox Leninism are mistaken for leftism. Thus referring to the C.P.I.'s 1930 'Draft Programme of Action' (see below, 34) as "a leftist document from beginning to end" (*op. cit.*, 145) Overstreet and Windmiller quote as an example of this programme's leftism a passage listing as some of the "main objects of the present stage of revolution":

" The confiscation without compensation of all the lands, forests and other property of the landlords, ruling princes, churches, the British Government, officials and money lenders, and handing over for use to the toiling peasantry. Cancellation of slave agreements and all the indebtedness of the peasantry to money lenders and banks'." (*Ibid.*, 146).

Such tasks are essentially those of the bourgeois 'national democratic' revolution. They are directed against both imperialism (the British Government and officials) and 'feudalism' (landlords and moneylenders, ruling princes and churches). The handing over of the property of such elements to the peasantry would in itself promote capitalism not socialism. The ending of "slave agreements" and peasant indebtedness would do likewise.

Of course the Indian bourgeoisie might well resist pressing the bourgeois revolution to such lengths, but Lenin was quite explicit that an essential task of Communist Parties was to agitate for the most thorough-going bour-

But if colonial bourgeois liberation movements were to be supported only when they were revolutionary rather than reformist what criterion was available for distinguishing between the two tendencies? For Marxists[27] the distinctive feature of a revolution is the "transfer of state power form one class to another *class*." Thus a colonial bourgeois democratic movement of the revolutionary type would be one objectively promoting transfer of state power from the imperialist bourgeoisie to an indigenous class, whilst a reformist movement would be one content to leave the existing power structure basically unchanged, working merely for the advance of the native bourgeoisie under the class rule of foreign capitalism.

This being so, in India the prospect of Communist support for Congress action against British imperialism and its allies seemed increasingly bright. The Second Comintern Congress occurred during a period when what for Marxists was India's most important political expression of bourgeois interests, the Indian National Congress, was passing increasingly into the hands of militants who were willing to take actions which directly threatened the duration of British rule. Indeed the year of the Comintern Congress was also that of the adoption of the I.N.C. Nagpur constitution, changing the aim from self-government within the Empire to *swaraj*, a change indicative of the rapid (though still incomplete) transformation of Congress into the type of organisation capable of undertaking actions objectively furthering revolution in the Marxist sense.

Nor did it seem likely in 1920 that Communist-Congress cooperation would fail to materialise because of the absence of favourable response from Congress. Even before the Comintern Congress Communist attitudes to imperialism had attracted attention from Indian nationalism. At the time of the Treaty of Versailles Indian nationalist K. P. Khadilkar had written in

geois revolution possible. In the above passage the 1930 document does just that.

The C.P.I. 'Draft Pragramme of Action' (as is emphasised below, 34) certainly *was* a leftist document.. The above passage quoted from it by Overstreet and Windmiller is however not in itself leftist but quite consistent with Leninism.

27. See above, 2.

Kesari that President Wilson could not take credit for putting forward the slogan of a peace without annexations and indemnities since "Lenin did it more than two years ago."[28] On 20 July 1920 *Kesari* even claimed in an editorial on Soviet foreign policy that "the only devotees of the principle of self-determination are the Bolsheviks."[29] With Tilak in 1919 having stated[30] that the Bolshevik revolution was found to be a favourable factor in the struggle for *swaraj* and Gandhi in the same year retorting to British suggestions for Congress's co-operation against Bolshevism with: "I have never believed in a Bolshevik menace,"[31] the possible obstacle[32] to Communist-bourgeois cooperation of the political representatives of the colonial bourgeoisie joining with imperialism "in fighting against all the revolutionary movements and revolutionary classes" seemed in the case of contemporary India unlikely.

Of course not everything in the attitudes of Indian nationalists to the Communist movement favoured smooth progress towards cooperation. It was the policy of the *Raj* to play on the 'dangers' to India from Communism,[33] propaganda which it must be assumed had its effect on (especially) the propertied elements in Congress. However by 1919-20 at least *some* influential Congress men had come to believe that Communism did not amount to the threat to Indian nationalism the British represented it as, and others that it might be an asset in the struggle against imperialism. To what extent Indian Communism could capitalise on this favourable situation depended on the fortunes of leftism in the movement.

28. Quoted in Sardesai, *India and the Russian Revolution*, 21.
29. *Ibid.*, 26.
30. According to a Scotland Yard Report on Tilak in London, mentioned in Adhikari, *op. cit.*, 277.
31. Quoted in Zafar Imam, 'The Effects of the Russian Revolution on India, 1917-1920', *St. Anthony Papers*, No. 18, 90.
32. See Lenin's suggestion above, 8.
33. Thus, for example, Hallett, Secretary to Government of India (hereinafter G. of I.). Home Department, told all the Local Governments in India on 16 May 1934: "The Government of India .... attach great importance to persistent propaganda against communism which they hope may prove an effective means both of checking the movement and of keeping the subject continually before those whom communism threatens." (F/7/11/34—Poll; P/83). An example of such propaganda was the 'Assembly Letter' (see below, 15).

Even after the opposition to Roy at the Second Comintern Congress leftism was not entirely eliminated from the theses adopted on the colonies. The colonial commission adopted[34] not only Lenin's amended preliminary theses but also Roy's supplementary theses. Despite Lenin's cuts thesis 7 still spoke of "two distinct movements .... the bourgeois democratic nationalist movement, with a programme of political independence under the bourgeois order, and .... the mass action of the poor and ignorant peasants and workers for their liberation from all sorts of exploitation," which, claimed Roy, "every day grow further and further apart."[35]

Moreover Roy, who during much of the 1920s was entrusted by the Comintern with the task of nurturing the embryonic Indian Communist movement, apparently did not totally abandon leftism. In 1922 he described "the development of indigenous capitalism" as "a force promising to be rather an ally of the imperialist power than a power working for the revolution"[36] whilst at the Fifth Comintern Congress (1924), Manuilsky had alleged:

"As at the Second Congress" Roy had "exaggerated the social movement in the colonies to the detriment of the nationalist movement."[37]

Even so, despite periodic manifestations of lingering allegiance to leftism, Roy, during his period of influence over the Indian Communism, generally guided it along the Leninist lines of 1920. In fact in a letter to Indian Communist Dange (19 December 1922) Roy applied Lenin's tactics to India by pressing for the formation of an illegal Communist Party (thus satisfying the need for independent political organisation of the proletariat), and for the establishment of a 'front' organisation to operate within Congress to fight the compromising tendency and develop the revolutionary trend in bourgeois nationalism. As the letter put it:

34. See Lenin's Report, *Selected Works*, Vol. X, 239.

35. Adopted text of Roy's supplementary theses, in Adhikari, *op. cit.*, 185.

36. In the preface to the German edition of his *India in Transition* quoted in *Ibid.*, 364.

37. Quoted in Haithcox, *op. cit.*, 39.

"The time has come for the organisation of our party in India .... A revolutionary mass party has to be organised as a part of the Congress, but this party must be under the control and direction of our own party which cannot but be illegal."[38]

The 'front organisation' within Congress eventually took the form of the Workers' and Peasants' Parties. The first was formed originally as the 'Labour Swaraj Party of the Indian National Congress' on 1 January 1925.[39] Indian Communist Muzaffar Ahmad who played a leading role in this party claims[40] that its founders,[41] though influenced by Communism, took their initiative independently of Roy and the Comintern.

The only other major W. & P.P., that of Bombay, emerged when "a group of .... Nationalists, having failed to obtain acceptance of their ideas by the Indian National Congress formed a Workers' and Peasants' Party."[42] This is confirmed by Indian Communist S. V. Ghate's statement before the Sessions Judge in the Meerut Conspiracy Case in which he claimed that the Bombay W. & P.P.'s origin is to be found in what is known as the Congress Labour Group — the left section of the Bombay Provincial Congress Committee and which transformed itself into a WPP."[43]

However independent of the Comintern the initiators of the W. & P.P.s were,[44] it is clear that Communists played the key rôle

38. Adhikari, *op. cit.*, 593 and 595.

39 'The Report of the Executive Committee of the Peasants' and Workers' Party of Bengal, 1927-28', 42. This report is item p. 52 in the *Proceedings of the Meerut Conspiracy Case.* The name of the Labour Swaraj Party was changed first to the 'Peasants' and Workers' Party of Bengal', and later to the 'Workers' and Peasants' Party of Bengal', Muzafar Ahmad, *The Communist Party of India and its Formation Abroad,* 153.

40. *Op. cit.*, 153.

41. Qazi Nazrul Islam, Hemanta Kumar Sarkar, Qutubuddin Ahmad and Shamsuddin Hossain, *ibid.*

42. *White Report on Labour Situation* issued by the Bombay Government, 1929, Appendix B, quoted in Punekar, *Trade Unionism in India,* 93.

43. Quoted in Adhikari, 'Comrade S. V. Ghate', *New Age,* 6 December 1970.

44. That Communists played the key role in forming the Bombay party seems clear from the statement of Mirajkar (a leading Bombay Communist at this time) that "we Communists decided to organise a socialist group

in these parties. As Ahmad puts it [45] members of the C.P.I. were their "life and soul." Thus the statements of the W. & P.Ps. can be taken as expressing the Indian Communist standpoint during the period immediately after 1925.

In the political resolution of the March 1928 conference of the W. & P.P. of Bengal, the adherence of Indian Communists to a tactical position far from leftism was made clear:

"We and our sympathisers must become members of the provincial and All-Indian Congress Committees, and take active part in such work as leads towards the development of the mass movement. We must suppport the Congress while it fights Imperialism, but must not hesitate to criticise the compromising tendencies of Congress leaders however prominent. The alliance of the Party with the petty-bourgeois 'left' of the Congress must be consolidated, on the basis of direct action for complete independence, against the compromising bourgeois leadership."[46]

In 1928 the chances of such a Communist-Left nationalist alliance with the object of forcing a revolutionary confrontation with the *Raj* appeared good. Jawaharlal Nehru, who "fresh from his internationalist and communist connexions in Europe"[47] had persuaded the 1927 Madras Congress session to pass a number of extreme anti-imperialist resolutions, was merely the most notable of a new generation of prominent Congressmen who, during the fight against the Simon Commission, were to help push Congress towards a degree of militancy not seen since 1921-22.

Thus, of the 1928 Calcutta Congress session, Viceroy Irwin commented:

"There is no doubt that the Congress was a great triumph for extremism .... independence has ceased to be an academic ideal it appears that Jawaharlal Nehru and .... Bose do not mean to

in the Congress itself .... In a few months this group was transformed into the Workers' & Peasants' Party." See his essay in Communist Party of India, *S. V. Ghate*, 33.

45. *Op. cit.*, 154.

46. Workers' and Peasants' Party of Bengal, *A Call to Action*, p. 9.

47. Haig, Secretary to G. of I., Home Dept., to Hirtzel, Under-Secretary of State, 19 January 1928, *L/PJ/6/1955*, 365/28.

stop at words but are prepared for action .... Their present policy .... is to spend the coming year in preparation for rousing anti-government feeling in every way possible, foster in their own words a revolutionary mentality .... the situation has swung a good deal to the left and contains considerable potentialities of future trouble."[48]

Even Congressmen not of the 'Left' had already indicated their perception of common interest between Indian nationalism and Communism during the Assembly debate on the Public Safety (Removal from India) Bill[49] which "was especially directed" against British Communists, Spratt and Bradley,[50] who had been sent to India to assist the movement there. Thus Lajpat Rai had claimed the Bill was "really directed against Indians themselves, Nationalists as well as Labourites" and that it would be "utilised for the purpose of prosecuting Nationalists and others who want Indian economic advance and political freedom." According to 'Left' Congressman Jamnadas Mehta Communists were "quite prepared to work with [nationalists] in the task of achieving India's independence" and, he said, Congressmen welcomed Communist policy "to that extent."[51] Thus by early 1929 the *Raj* was noting "a tendency for the political and the Communist revolutionaries to join hands."[52]

Such a tendency was one which those concerned with preserving British rule in India were on the alert against. Petrie, head of Indian Intelligence, had in 1927 noted that "the hatred of British rule which animates both will always serve to establish a certain identity of interest between the Indian extremist and

48. Viceroy to Secretary of State (tel. 2558), 19 January 1929 *L/PJ/6/1976*. 184/29.

49. The Bill was introduced to provide for the removal from British India in certain cases of persons not being Indian British subjects or subjects of States in India". *L/PJ/6/1967*, 3788/28.

50. Irwin to Hailey (Governor of U.P.) 28 September 1928, *Hailey Collection*, Vol. 13; 494.

51. Official Report of Legislative Assembly Debates, 12 September 1928, 638 and 15 September 1928, 825 in *L/PJ/6/1967*, 4259 & 4260/28.

52. Haig to all local Governments (secret letter No. D342), 21 February 1929, *L/PJ/6/1976*, 792/29. This was reiteration of a view expressed by Irwin in his 19 January 1929 telegram to the Secretary of State (see above footnote 48).

the Bolshevik agent—predisposing the one to accept assistance and the other to render it."[53]

During the Public Safety Bill debates Home Member Crerar tried to check any tendency for nationalists to make common cause with Communism against Government by quoting from the 'Assembly Letter' such choice passages as:

"The banal and cowardly doctrine of bourgeois nationalism that all our activities are above board, we have nothing to hide."[54]

Crerar attempted to point a lesson:

"No one can suppose .... that any form of Nationalism in India or elsewhere will profit by [Communist doctrines] .... I contend and I contend very strongly that in this matter the interests of India and of Britain are identical."[55]

One especial fear was that Communism, which at this time seemed to be "a movement which acts so powerfully on the masses" would not be ignored, for "the immediate assistance they may derive" from it, by "those Nationalists who for the attainment of their ends look to the sanction of force."[56] Whilst Communism was felt to be "one of the most dangerous forms of direct appeal to the masses," the extremist leaders had, Government believed, "hitherto achieved no appreciable success with the masses."[57]

The source of these astounding testimonials of the potency of Communism as a force to mobilise the masses was its significant

53. G. of I., *India and Communism*, (hereinafter referred to as '*India & Communism*'), 23.

54. This letter was alleged to have been written by Roy to Muzaffar Ahmad and intercepted by the police, *ibid.*, 130...In August 1928 the Raj decided it would be desirable to "publish material about Communist plans", and "M. N. Roy's letter" was "an important part of that material", Viceroy to Secretary of State, (tel. No. 499-S), 11 August 1928, *Halifax Collection*, Vol. 9, 136. The letter became known as the 'Assembly Letter' after Crerar's use of it in this debate. 'Roy' was referring here to the necessity for illegal Communist Party organisation.

55. Official Report of Legislative Assembly Debates, 10 September 1928, 448 in *L/PJ/6/1967*, 4259/28.

56. Haig's secret letter No. D 342, see above 52.

57. Haig to all local Governments (secret letter No. D. 342/29), 24 June 1929, *L/PJ/6/1976*, 2585/29.

advance among the Bombay proletariat in 1927–29. Up to this time Communism had made such little progress in this city, which was one of the two major centres of Communist activity,[58] that Wilson, Governor of Bombay since 1923, could speak in 1928 (not without exaggeration however) of the "Communist element" as "making now, so far as Bombay is concerned, its first most unwelcome appearance."[59]

The Communists' advance took place because they provided the most effective leadership of millhands faced with the adverse consequence to their living standards of the "very bad"[60] economic situation in their industry.

With the end of boom conditions in 1922, the industry had "entered .... a period of fundamental difficulties," since "steadily expanding competition from Japanese producers and mills elsewhere in India forced considerable readjustment and adaptation during the next decade and a half."[61] In 1927 the Tariff Board, after examining the industry's request for production, had told it that "because of the weakened competitive position of the Bombay mills the 'only alternative to a reduction in wages is increased labour efficiency' " and "recommended greater standardisation of work and more rational labour deployment."[62]

However when the millowners tried to introduce the new recommended methods which, as Rainy (member of the Viceroy's Executive Council) put it, were "likely to result in reduction of numbers emloyed"[63] a five and a half month strike ensued.[64]

58. See the testimony of Irwin in Viceroy to Secretary of State (tel. No. 927-S), 27 February 1929, *Halifax Collection*, Vol. 15, 52, and Petrie to Hailey (Confidential Letter No. 16/Bol 29-Kw-IV), *Hailey Collection*, Vol. 16a, 44. The other centre was Calcutta.

59. Wilson to Irwin, 12 May 1928, *Halifax Collection*, Vol. 22, 432.

60. Wilson to Irwin, 28 April 1928, Halifax Collection, Vol. 22, 408.

61. M. D. Morris, *The Emergence of an Industrial Labour Force in India*, 30.

62. *Ibid.*, 121-2.

63. Telegram to Irwin, 26 April 1928, enclosure in Viceroy to Secretary of State (tel. No. 135-C), 28 April 1928, *Halifax Collection*, Vol. 9, 66.

64. Sykes Governor of Bombay to Irwin, 26 January 1929, *Halifax Collection*, Vol. 23, 112b.

The Bombay Communists, gaining from the trade-union experience and moral support from the activities[65] of British Communist Bradley, found it easy to win leadership of the millhands from the 'moderate' union leaders 'who for years had failed to secure the establishment of a more sympathetic attitude on the part of the employers towards the workmen."[66] The impact of the Communist organisation of the Bombay labour movement is implied in the observation[67] that "until 1928" the "qualities characteristic of virtually all strikes" were "unrest without discipline" and "strike without organisation."[68]

Nor were such Communist efforts confined to the Bombay mills. According to British Intelligence, "[by] the end of 1928 .... there was hardly a single public utility service or industry which had not been affected, in whole or in part, by the wave of Communism which swept the country during the year."[69] Moreover by April 1928 the Communists had "not only secured a voice in the control of the [labour] movement, but had obtained—particularly in Bombay — a definite hold over the workers themselves."[70] In the course of the 1928 textile strike the famous *Girni Kamgar Union* was formed with Communist leadership. In a few months its registered membership climbed from 174 to 54,000.[71] As Bradley wrote in an intercepted letter of 2 February 1929, "the mill workers .... are with the G.K.U. .... We have .... got the support of the workers to such an extent that even

65. *Ibid.*

66. This the estimate of B. N. Mitra, member of the Viceroy's Executive Council, in a note of 16 April 1930, enclosure in Viceroy to Secretary of State, 23 April 1930, *Halifax Collection*, Vol 6, 85. Irwin minuted: "I think the views he expressed are generally sound", *ibid*, 81.

67. *Morris, op. cit.*, 182.

68. This is confirmed by the Raj's Intelligence Bureau which observed "the enormous increase in the influence and powers of organisation of the working classes under Communist direction" (the references was to India in general, though to Calcutta in particular) in this period, *India & Communism*, 127.

69. *Ibid.*, 126.

70. *Ibid.*, 117.

71. See union membership records in *L/E/7/1347*, 1827/30 and 1693/30. Though the reliability of these actual figures may not be great there is no doubt that the order of the membership rise is correct.

N. M. Joshi[72] told me he thought to be impossible, well over 60,000 members and a big fighting fund."[73]

Thus by December 1928 participation in the national movement, along with the British Communist-supported[74] initiative in assuming a key position in the labour movement, had placed Indian Communism on the crest of a wave. Their policy towards nationalism had helped create for the C.P.I. a rewarding situation in which leading Bombay journals such as the *Bombay Chronicle* were displaying "pro-communist sympathies" and setting up "the Soviet regime of Russia as an attractive alternative to British Rule" since it was "vaguely imagined in extreme nationalist circles that because the Communists desire to destroy the foundations of British power .... therefore their doctrines are to be encouraged in India."[75] Moreover, Communists had come to hold positions of importance in Congress, getting themselves elected to the A.I.C.C.[76] and controlling the Bombay Porvincial Congress Committee.[77]

The turn of the year in fact, saw three notable successes for Indian Communism. At the Jharia session of the All-India Trade Union Congress in December 1928, the affiliation of the A.I.T.U.C. to the League against Imperialism was achieved when the *Raj*

72. A long standing 'moderate' union leader, C.W.

73. Quoted in Peel to Irwin, 27 February 1929, *Halifax Collection*, Vol. 5, 43.

74. Philip Spratt and Ben Bradley were the two main foreign Communists operating in India at this time.

75. Note by Coatman, Director of Public Information: enclosure with Irwin to Lambert, Governor of U.P., 23 March 1929, *Hailey Collection*, Vol. 15a, 35. This estimate of the favourable attitude to Communism shown by important sections of the nationalist press (even to the extent of reprinting articles from *Inprecor*, organ of the Comintern) is supported by G. of I. *Communism in India*, 27 and 39.

76. *India & Communism*, 127 and Ahmad, *Communist Party of India: Years of Formation*, 41.

77. See for example Mirajkar's essay on Communist Party of India, *op. cit.*, 33, in which he states that at one stage the Communists had a majority on the B.P.C.C. and also held the secretaryship. Communist control of the B.P.C.C. at this time is confirmed in a speech by S. K. Patil on 24 March 1931, in Report of Commissioner of Police, Bombay, No. 1633/H/3717 25 March 1931, *L/PJ/7/78*, 1847/31

again promoted cooperation between Communists and non-Communists by arresting the fraternal delegate from the League to the A.I.T.U.C. session. According to Irwin the delegates voted for affiliation in a "moment of pique"[78] and the capture of the A.I. T.U.C. by the militants (among whom the Communists were a compact, well-disciplined group,[79]) was only "narrowly averted."[80]

In the same month 30,000 labourers organised by the Calcutta Communists and with banners demanding a Soviet India made a big impact on the annual Congress session.[81] Moreover, in January four candidates in the Bombay municipal elections, representing the first time Communists had participated in any Indian election, and pressing as one of their demands complete independence, polled a respectable total of 12,453 votes.[82]

Even so, Communist success had been registered almost solely in the labour movement via Communist-dominated unions such as the G.K.U. and in the political movement via the W. & P.Ps., and 'united front' tactics had tended to become a substitute for the task of organising a strong independent C.P.I., instead of these being seen as complementary tasks as laid down by Lenin in 1920. Clemens Dutt, Indian Communism's mentor at this time, had complained that the C.P.I. and W. & P.P. were "becoming too much two names for the same thing."[83] In fact, practically all

78. Viceroy to Secretary of State (tel. No. 1021-S), 8 March 1929, *Halifax Collection*, Vol. 15, 57.

79. Bose, *The Indian Struggle*, 154.

80. 8 March 1929 telegram, Viceroy to Secretary of State, see above, footnote 1.

81. *India & Communism*. 127; 19 January 1929 telegram, Viceroy to Secretary of State (see above, 14); Ahmad, *Myself and the Communist Party of India*, 433.

82. Roy, 'Indian Communists in the Electoral Struggle', *Inprecor*, No. 12, 202, 1 March 1929. Roy pointed out that although the electorate excluded almost the whole working-class, the Communists polled only a little less than what would have been the average vote per candidate if the whole electorate (of 600,000) had voted and the votes shared equally between the 145 candidates. Two of the Communists were beaten by the only 146 and 227 votes, being at the head of the unsuccessful candidates in their respective districts.

83. *India & Communism*, 129.

activity was undertaken through the W. & P.P.,[84] so that in 1929 Irwin could justly say that in India there was "no regular communist party on lines of British organisation of that name."[85] Such neglect was to assume significance in the period of the turn towards leftism heralded by the Sixth Comintern Congress.[86]

Like Roy's leftism of 1920, the new leftism originated in an over-estimation of the degree of political development of the colonial proletariat, resulting in sectarian emphasis on the development of the Communist movement in contradiction to the need to cultivate cooperation with bourgeois nationalism. In view of the widely-known criticism of Roy's position in 1920 it was hardly possible for the new leftism to take the form of the simple straight denial of common interest between the Communist and national movements Roy had made then. Instead a fresh theoretical basis was sought for the new leftism.

That the national bourgeoisie tended to become less resolute towards the bourgeois revolution as the proletariat became a political factor of increasing importance was a firmly-established Marxist contention. The new leftism argued however that the development of the colonial proletariat had recently occurred at such a pace, within a wider revolutionary mass movement, that the national bourgeoisie was abandoning the revolution altogether and becoming counter-revolutionary. From such an analysis the conclusion was drawn that proletarian hegemony in the revolution was on the agenda since the bourgeoisie was finally revealing its betrayal of that revolution to the peasant and petty-bourgeois masses.

The period of the 1928 (Sixth) Comintern Congress saw the first moves towards such a position by the international Communist movement. Before the Congress, which began in July, the Draft Pro-

84. Thus although the four candidates in the Bombay election were said by Roy to be well-known as Communists, they contested the election in the name of the W. & P. P. See Roy's article in *Inprecor,* 1 March 1929, above, 19.

85. Viceroy to Secretary of State (tel. No. 1176-S), 22 March 1929, *Halfiax Collection*, Vol. 15, 61.

86. An investigation of the complex of factors which resulted in this turn to leftism is beyond the scope of this article.

gramme of the Communist International,[87] declared that the "revolutionary tendency" in the colonies was being "temporarily paralysed .... by the treachery of the national bourgeoisie" which had become "scared by the revolutionary–mass movement." Their "rapprochement with the imperialist powers" was said to lead in the final analysis to "the decline of national bourgeoisie influence among the masses of the people .... and to the creation of favourable conditions for establishing the hegemony of the colonial proletariat in the popular mass struggle for independence."

But if the colonial bourgeoisie was playing such a treacherous role with regard to national liberation, how was it that for the first time the largest party of the Indian bourgeoisie, Congress, under the influence of its growing left–wing had, at its Madras session adopted a resolution for complete independence? A pre–Sixth Congress report[88] interpreted this as "a pseudo–revolutionary formula to be used as a 'threat' against the British government to extract concessions." Taking into consideration "the increased political development of the broad masses" the bourgeoisie was merely playing with revolutionary phrases "for the purpose of getting nearer" to them and "utilising their revolutionary orientation for its reformist policy."[89]

Thus leftism had led the Comintern to interpret a real advance of the I.N.C. towards revolutionary confrontation with the *Raj* as a grave menace to the future of the Indian revolution. The bourgeoisie was striving to divert the revolutionary energies of the masses into reformist channels, the improvement of its own position under continued imperialist rule. This scheming bourgeoisie was "so particularly dangerous" because, although they had "not yet finally passed the counter–revolutionary camp," there was "no doubt that they would do so "later on" and meanwhile "their real physiognomy" had "not yet been exposed" in the eyes

87. Adopted by the Programme Commission of the E.C.C.I. (Executive Committee of the Communist International). It appeared in *Inprecor*, No. 30, 551-63, 6 June 1928.

88. Communist Party of Great Britain, *The Communist International between the Fifth and the Sixth World Congresses, 1924-28*, 'Report up to 1 May 1928'. This was intended as a pre-Congress discussion document. Referred to hereinafter as 'the pre-Congress report'.

89. *Ibid.*, 466-476.

of the masses. Unless this was achieved "bourgeois national-reformist leadership of the national movement" in the coming revolutionary upsurge would "represent an enormous danger for the revolution."[90]

The vehicle for such reformist corruption of the revolutionary drive of the masses had been identified by the pre-Congress report as "the Left nationalist elements composed of the mass of the petty-bourgeoisie and the intelligentsia" whom the bourgeoisie tried to keep under their influence by means of "the independence slogan." By keeping the leadership of the petty-bourgeoisie in its hands, the bourgeoisie was trying "to establish a connection with the upper strata of the proletariat and the peasantry which it hopes to draw into its struggle."[91] It was therefore a task of the C.P.I. "to carry on a consistent struggle against petty-bourgeois influence over the proletariat, employ all means to liberate the backward masses of the peasantry from the influence of the petty-bourgeois parties and to win from them the hegemony over the peasantry."[92]

Of course in 1920 Lenin had established the necessity for Communists to combat bourgeois reformist tendencies in national movements. However the Comintern was now to advocate that this should be done in India by dissolving the one organisation through which Communists had registered their most notable successes in the political movement.

Thus the Colonial Theses deemed it "absolutely essential" for colonial Communist Parties to "from the very beginning *demarcate themselves in the most clear-cut fashion,* both politically and organisationally, from all the petty-bourgeois groups and parties."[93] However the Comintern had already made clear its estimate that the "petty-bourgeois origin of the W.P.Ps." of India had made itslef "very much felt in the composition of the parties as well as in their programmes and activity."[94] Consequently, the Colonial

90. 'Theses on the Revolutionary Movement in the Colonies and Semi-Colonies', adopted at the Sixth Comintern Congress and published in *Inprecor*, No. 88, 1668, 12 December 1928.

91. Communist Party of Great Britain, *op. cit.*, 466-476.

92. Colonial Theses, *Inprecor, op. cit.*, 1669.

93. *Ibid.*, 1668.

94. Communist Party of Great Britain, *op. cit.*, 466-476.

Theses concluded that, "Special 'Workers' and Peasants' Parties' whatever revolutionary character they may possess, can too easily, at particular periods, be converted into ordinary petty-bourgeois parties, and accordingly, Communists are not recommended to organise such parties."[95]

Such suicidal defensiveness in the face of the 'petty-bourgeois danger' may seem strange in view of the sanguine Comintern estimate of the degree to which the colonial proletariat had progressed as a political force.[96] However, certainly in India's case, the Comintern was well aware of the weakness of the Communist Party itself at that time.[97] Past neglect of Communist organisation may therefore have been a factor in the Comintern's leftist attack on the W. & P.P.s. However, whatever the reasons, the tendency had reappeared for the task of working within the national movement to be seen as contradictory instead of complementary to that of nurturing the C.P.I.

Moreover, work through the W. & P.P. was not the only C.P.I. activity to be threatened by the Sixth Congress's leftism: the fruitful trade-union work was also placed in jeopardy. Although the Colonial Theses had made "obligatory" Communist work in "the reactionary trade-unions which contain masses of workers," the only type of work specified was "revolutionary propaganda work." The seeds of the later C.P.I. tendency to use unions for revolutionary aims abstracted from the struggle to deal with workers' immediate grievances lay in such advice. Moreover, the Theses went on to say that in "those countries where circumstances dictate the necessity for creating special revolutionary trade-unions .... it is necessary to consult on this question with the leadership of the R.I.L.U."[98]

95. *Op. cit.*, 1669.

96. See, for example, 'Before the Sixth Congress of the Comintern', *Inprecor*, No. 31, 566, 7 June 1928 which claimed that the "Indian working class" was "undoubtedly the most important factor" in the "new upsurge in the national movement".

97. Thus the pre-Congress report, *op. cit.*, 466-476, had spoken of the Party's inability "to develop into a general Communist Party" and its failure to "show any signs of revolutionary vitality in connection with very important events".

98. *Op. cit.*, 1669, R.I.L.U. was the 'Red International of Labour Unions.'

However, R.I.L.U. chief Lozovsky had specifically advised that in the case of India, where the "national bourgeoisie" was "always ready to compromise with the British bourgoisie *against the toiling masses*" and "nationalists and home-made reformists" were "at the head of labour organisations," the Communists' main task was the "establishment of *independent labour organisaions*."[99] Lozovsky thus used the new Comintern characterisation of the national bourgeoisie as a force moving rapidly towards collaboration with imperialism against the mass movement as justification for his injunction to Indian Communists to adopt sectarian tactics which were to spell disaster in the labour movement.

The first sign of the C.P.I.'s application of the new leftist line came in December during the first all-India conference of the W. & P.P.[100] The thesis the conference adopted spoke of the "consolidation of the whole bourgeois class, on the basis of .... the complete acceptance of imperialism .... into a single reactionary *bloc*" and of the "divergence between the masses and the bourgeoisie" as having "sharpened decisively." The conclusion drawn was that the policy of the W.P.P. working as "a section of the Congress" could "no longer be the situation." At the same time the "traditional policy of forming fractions within Congress organisations for the purpose of agitation, of exposing its reactionary leadership and of drawing the revolutionary sections towards the W.P.P." was recommended as a temporary measure. This was necessary because firstly, the Congress, though "under bourgeois leadership" and "a petty-bourgeois following including different social strata and different political tendencies, some of a potentially revolutionary nature," and secondly, because the W.P.P. was still "relatively weak and unorganised in the country."[101] The Comintern might well

99. Discussion on Kusinen's report on 'The Revolutionary Movement in the Colonies', 37th session of the Sixth Congress, *Inprecor*, No. 76, 1414, 30 October 1928.

100. Spratt (*Blowing up India*, 43) claims that in preparing the theses for this conference he took into account what he understood the new Comintern line to be on the basis of press reports.

101. 'The Political Situation in India', Thesis of the W.P.P. adopted at the A.I.W.P.P. conference, Calcutta, December 21-24, 1928, reprinted in *Labour Monthly*, Vol. 11, No. 3, March 1929, 154.

have proffered these as reasons for immediate W.P.P. withdrawal from Congress.[102]

Of course the very formation of an all-India W.P.P. contravened the injunction against the organisation of such parties. Probably the experienced leaders of the Indian Communists were wary of embracing untempered leftism. Thus it seems significant that a meeting of the leadership after the W.P.P. conference decided[103] that the Comintern's Colonial Thesis "should be taken up as a basis" but "changed according to the conditions of India." No doubt this apparent disposition partially to resist Comintern advice was encouraged by opposition displayed to the new line by Communists holding positions of special influence with the C.P.I.: the British Communists and Roy.

British Communist opposition, especially to the line on the W.P.Ps., had been publicised in the *Inprecor* reports of the Sixth Congress.[104] But whether or not *these* reached India at this time, it seems established that British advice in contradiction to the Comintern line *did*. Thus in November 1928, one of the important Indian communists was advised by Clemens Dutt to recruit more workers to the W.P.P.[105]

Roy had for some time ceased to be responsible for guiding the C.P.I. Even so his influence on it was probably still significant in late 1928—early 1929. Between 24 August 1928 and 1 February 1929, six articles by Roy in which he maintained a position differing in important respects from the Comintern line appeared in *Inprecor*. Moreover Ahmad claims that Adhikari, one of the C.P.I. leaders "made no secret of the fact that" he returned to India "as

102. Indeed the pre-Sixth Congress report had said that the "W.P.P. cannot develop into a party of mass national-revolutionary struggle unless it emancipates itself entirely from the influence of bourgeois politics" and that the "main weak point of the W.P.P. is that, in practice, it is acting more as a Left-wing of the Congress than as an independent political party", *op. cit.*, 466-476.

103. According to notes made by one of the participants and later found by the police, quoted in Overstreet & Windmiller, *op. cit.*, 134.

104. See, for example, Clemens Dutt's speech in *op. cit.* No. 76, 1424, 30 October 1928, and Declaration of Rothstein, *op. cit.*, No .81, 1529, 21 November 1928.

105. Overstreet & Windmiller, *op. cit.*, 129.

M. N. Roy's representative,"[106] and it may be significant that though Roy had been censured at the Sixth Congress Adhikari claimed in a letter to him (15 March 1929), "Nobody here is making any propaganda against you."[107]

Whatever the truth about the exact attitude of the C.P.I. leadership to the Comintern line at this time, it is a recorded fact that even at their next meeting in March 1929 no decision to dissolve the W.P.P. was taken.[108]

Any possibility of the C.P.I. avoiding leftism was effectively ended however by the events of the next few months.

On 20 March 1929 almost the whole leadership was arrested and charged with conspiracy.[109] One of the chief objects was to behead the movement by including all leaders "of any account .... in the case."[110] The C.P.I. found the task of adequately replacing them one of great difficulty, no doubt largely because of the "neglect of the Party during the palmy days of 1928."[111] Even in Bombay, where, exceptionally, "other leaders of much the same type"[112] replaced the arrested men, they were, not surprisingly, inexperienced and young and not likely to discern the dangers of the developing leftism to be pressed on the C.P.I. with increasing vigour during 1929.

106. *Myself and the Communist Party of India*, 454. Adhikari had been in Germany. Ahmad adds that Adhikari "got over his illusions .... about Manabendranath Roy", *ibid.*, 455.

107. Quoted in Overstreet & Windmiller, *op. cit.*, 133.

108. This according to notes made at the meeting by a participant. Mentioned in *ibid.*, 134.

109. *India & Communism*, 135. The case against them was to become famous as the Meerut Conspiracy Case. The action had been recommended as far back as August 1928 (Peel to Irwin, 17 January 1929, *Halifax Collection*, Vol. 5, 11) but the material for the case took months to collect.

110. Viceroy to Secretary of State, (tel. No. 257-S), *Halifax Collection*, Vol. 15, 23. The net was thrown so widely that the Governor of Bengal noted: "The arrest of K. L. Ghose .... has caused *us* some surprise. Even Tegart [Commissioner of Police] tells me he hardly expected his name to be on the list. He classified him as 10% Communist, not more. However, if he is tinged to this extent, perhaps he might as well be included with the others". Jackson to Irwin, 23 March 1929, *Halifax Collection*, Vol. 23, 302.

111. *India & Communism*, 180.

112. Haig, secret letter No. D-342/29 of 24 June 1929 (see above, 16).

At the Tenth Plenum of the E.C.C.I. in July the leftism of the Sixth Congress was pushed to greater extremes. The general consensus[113] was that the Indian bourgeoisie had finally become counter-revolutionary[114] and that the "real national-liberation movement in India was represented not by the last bourgeois-national congress but by the proletarian mass demonstration *against* this national congress.[115] Lozovsky spelled out the implications by remarking that since the Indian bourgeoisie was "concentrating now on struggle against Communism" the Sixth Congress decision that temporary agreements with that class might be permissible[116] no longer held. Rather should the C.P.I. adopt "an uncompromising attitude: *no agreement whatever, ruthless struggle against the Indian bourgeoisie,* because this is now the only way to educate and weld together our still feeble Indian Communist Party."[117]

The line was now clear. The advance of the revolution and the C.P.I. was to occur via assault against the bourgeoisie and the Congress. There was now no longer any question of working within that body to strengthen a revolutionary against a reformist tendency; Congress as an organisation was written off as counter-revolutionary. Not surprisingly therefore the Plenum complained about the continued existence of the W.P.P.[118]

Moreover from mid-1929 there was no question of support for any possible deviation from the Comintern line from any source within the international movement. The British Communist posi-

113. Shubin, a current expert on India, attempted to have some of the more extreme formations moderated but was apparently a lone voice. See his contribution to the discussion on the reports of Kuusinen and Manuilsky, *Inprecor,* No. 51, 1095, 17 September 1929.

114. See 'Theses on the International Situation and the Immediate Tasks of the Communist International', *Inprecor* No. 46, 975, 4 September 1929 and discussion contribution of Lot-In, *Inprecor,* No. 51, 1073, 9 July 1929.

115. 'Report of Kuusinen', *Inprecor,* No. 40, 846, 20 August 1929.

116. See Colonial Theses adopted at the Sixth Congress, *Inprecor,* No. 88, 1668, 12 December 1928.

117. Lozovsky's discussion contribution, *Inprecor,* No. 48, 1038.

118. See Lozovsky, *op. cit.,* 1038 and Shubin, *op. cit.,* 1097. In fact although the W.P.P. formally still existed, its existence as a body of any real importance had ended with the Meerut arrests. Certainly it undertook no work within Congress after March 1929.

tion on India had changed, with the W.P.P. now seen as no longer fulfilling "the needs of the proletariat".[119] Roy continued strongly to oppose the new leftism and the writing-off of Congress, but had been publicly denounced at the Plenum as a Menshevik[120] and as no longer a "comrade".[121]

Under these circumstances the C.P.I. was led further towards leftism by the new leadership. The strong position that had been built up in the labour movement suffered first.

Believing that they stood at the head of "the growing revolutionary movement" as they had been told by Kuusinen,[122] and that in the past they had "lagged far behind the sentiments of the broad massess",[123] the Indian Communists sought to convert strikes into revolutionary confrontations with Government regardless of the real state of readiness for struggle of the workers. Thus, when in April 1930, sharp discontent appeared among Calcutta carters at new rules imposed on their businesses by Government, Communist leaders of their union vainly called for a general strike by the city's workers.[124]

Such tactics virtually destroyed the C.P.I.'s great achievement of 1928, the powerful G.K.U. In April 1929 the new leadership launched the Bombay millhands into an 'anti-victimisation' struggle which Kuusinen[125] described as a "political strike" which was "the revolutionary answer" of the millhands to imperialist machination. In their revolutionary fervour the inexperienced Communist leadership of the G.K.U. had chosen an unfavourable time for

119. C. Dutt, 'The Class Struggle in India', *Labour Monthly*, Vol. 11, No. 7, July 1929, 408.

120. By Lozovscky, *op. cit.*, 1038.

121. Interjections by delegates during Kuusinen's speech, *op. cit.*, 846. In fact according to a statement in *Inprecor*, No. 69, 1470, 13 December 1929, the Plenum had resolved to expel Roy from the Comintern although this was not publicly known in July 1929.

122. In his Tenth Plenum report, *op. cit.*, 846.

123. P. Sch. (*sic.*, P. Schubin or Shubin), 'The Conferenec of the Workers' & Peasants' Party of India', *Inprecor*, No. 16, 319, 29 March 1929.

124. Tegart to Chief Secretary, Government of Bengal, 1 April 1930, *L/PJ/6/2000*, 1974/30, and 9-11 April 1930, *L/PJ/6/2000*, 2987/30.

125. In his Tenth Plenum report, *op. cit.*, 846.

the millhands, exhausted by the 1928 struggle[126] to strike.[127] In September the strike was called off with no success for the workers.[128] The result was a slump of the G.K.U. to a few hundred members [129] and the workers "left in a mood of distrust of any leaders."[130]

The precipitous C.P.I. decline in the trade-union movement was accelerated by their growing isolation in it. This in turn was the outcome of their sectarianism which promoted splits in the movement.

At the December 1929 Nagpur session of the A.I.T.U.C. the 'moderate' leaders split away to form their own federation[131] leaving the Communists and nationalists to share control of the weakened parent body. A 'moderate,' Shiva Rao, claimed[132] that "a message from Moscow, dated 12th June 1929" had instructed the C.P.I. "to get rid of" the 'moderate' leaders "and Jawaharlal Nehru and Subhas Chandra Bose" (presumably from the leadership of the A.I.T.U.C.). Rao claimed that the message was published in the newspaper of a Communist-led union[133] and that the editor,[134] Ranadive, had "confessed" that this was so.

126. According to a pro-Communist journalist of this period M. G. Desai, one of the Communists arrested in March 1929 (Dange) had advised the millhands against a protest strike because of the weakened state the 1928 strike had left them in. 'Some Anecdotes of the Meerut Conspiracy Case', *New Age*, 5 October 1969, 9.

127. Meerut prisoner S. S. Mirajkar was, much later, to assess the 1929 strike as "uncalled for", *Communist Party of India, op. cit.*, 39.

128. *Annual Report on the Working of the Trade Disputes Act, 1929, for the Bombay Presidency for the period ending 31/12/29*, Government of Bombay. 1930, in *L/E/8/47*, 6012/30.

129. Morris, *op. cit.*, 184-5.

130. Note by Mitra, 16 April 1930, see above, 17.

131. *India & Communalism*, 159-60.

132. In a letter sent by Major Graham Pole to Secretary of State Benn, enclosure in Benn to Irwin, 15 January 1930, *Halifax Collection*, Vol. 6, 16.

133. *The Railwayman*, organ of the Great Indian Peninsula Railwaymen's Union

134. Secretary to Government of Bombay, Home Department to Secretary to G. of I., Home Department (Political), (letter No. SD-1897), 9 November 1929 in *P/76*, 483.

Rao's allegations seem likely to be correct in view of the Comintern attitude to the Indian trade-union movement at this time. In July for example, H. Eidus had alleged that since the 'moderates' were "losing their hold on the labour movement, the Indian bourgeoisie" was "endeavouring to make use of other agents . . . . the 'Left' nationalists."[135]

Even so, the Communists had not aimed to split the A.I.T.U.C. Rao noted that:

"They were confident that, even if we were defeated and removed from our place on the Executive, we would, under no circumstances, go out of the Congress."[136]

But though the Communists tried to heal the rift by withdrawing a motion offensive to the "moderates' (for affiliation to the P.P.T.U.S.) in face of no opposition and by throwing out hints that other such resolutions might be withdrawn if the 'moderates' would return,[137] they failed. By their own unwise extremist tactics of all-out offensive not against the employers but against 'their social-reformist agents,' the C.P.I. had given the 'moderates' "every pretext to depart."[138]

Communist tactics of at all costs fighting to wrest control of the unions from the hands of the 'agents of the bourgeoisie', whether 'moderate' or nationalist, led after Nagpur to a protracted battle with the latter culminating in a further split in the A.I.T.U.C. at the Calcutta session of July 1931.

The C.P.I. by its leftist opposition to Congress provided its nationalist opponents in the struggle for the unions with allies, the Royists. After his expulsion from the Comintern, Roy was determined to combat its leftism by trying "to capture the Indian Communist movement" which he hoped would "enable him to make

135. 'The Pan-Pacific Trade-Union Secretariat and the Indian Trade Union Movement', *Inprecor*, No. 34, 734, 19 July 1929. The Pan-Pacific Trade-Union Secretariat, P.P.T.U.S., was "the directive agency in the Far East of the Profintern [R.I.L.U.]" according to *India & Communism*, 60.

136. *Loc. cit.*

137. *Ibid.*

138. This was the opinion of the Nagpur A.I.T.U.C. session of President Jawaharlal Nehru, *Autobiography*, 199.

his own terms" with the Comintern.[139] During 1930 Roy sent lieutenants to India in pursuance of this aim, finally arriving himself in December.[140]

A key target was the Communist-led unions, and by early 1931 the Royists were in control of the G.K.U.[141] This was a period when not the unity of the trade-union movement but Communist leadership of it became of first importance[142] to the C.P.I., some of whose members, according to later Comintern critique, in tending "towards sectarianism" refused "to fight for the masses" and were thus unable "to isolate the national-reformist leaders and draw the rank and file over to the Communists' side."[143] The result in fact was often the isolation of the C.P.I. union leaders in what were virtually 'paper' unions existing parallel to unions led by the nationalist-Royist alliance. As the Meerut prisoners were to admit in a mid-1932 memorandum, nearly all the Communist-led unions passed into the hands of the Royists and their allies.[144]

Not surprisingly therefore the Communist A.I.T.U.C. secretary Deshpande, anticipating the removal of Commmunists from leading positions in the organisation, prevented the scheduled annual session from convening in February 1931.[145] When the session was eventually held in July, impending defeat for the Communists in the struggle for control of the organisation led to their seceding to form the "Red A.I.T.U.C."[146] which according to their main nationalist opponent at this session did not subsequently show

139. *India & Communism*, 162.
140. *Ibid.*, 162 and 164.
141. *Ibid.*, 164.
142. Thus an 'Open Letter from the Pan-Pacific Trade-Union Secretariat to the Indian Proletariat' (*Inprecor*, No. 58, 1215, 18 December 1930) told the C.P.I. that the "establishment of *Revolutionary Trade Unions*" was "of extreme importance" and that these "*Red Trade Unions*" would "affiliate with the A.I.T.U.C." only after it had "been purged of all extreme Right elements".
143. 'A Few Facts of History', (unsigned) *Inprecor*, No. 10, 278, 16 February, 1934.
144. *India & Communism*, 182.
145. *Ibid.*, 161.
146. *Ibid.*

"much sign of activity except occasionally in Bombay and in Calcutta."[147]

But leftism adversely affected C.P.I. fortunes in the political as well as the trade-union field.

In the early 1920s Indian Communists had looked forward to a repetition of the type of situation that had arisen during the non-cooperation movement, a situation they believed would be ripe for a national rising against imperialism given the one great desideratum of 1920-22, the existence of a revolutionary party like the C.P.I.[148]

On the eve of the civil disobedience movements the prospects for a spectacular advance of both the national revolution and the C.P.I. appeared bright. The foundations of the Raj were such that Petrie claimed that "while the executive authorities had, with difficulty, withstood the non-cooperation movement . . . the *authority of Government and its officers had since definitely been weakened,*"[149] whilst Under Secretary of State Hirtzel spoke of "British rule" having lost "a sufficient amount of poiltical support to enable the King's government to be carried on."[150]

As far as Congress was concerned C.P.I. participation in the impending movement would certainly have been welcomed. Nationalist sympathy for the Meerut prisoners was manifest[151] and

147. Bose, *op. cit.*, 233. This estimate was no doubt correct. The Comintern later admitted that the sectarian trade-union policy of this period "led to the strengthening of the position of the bourgeoisie and their agents". (V. Basak, 'The Present Situation in India', *Inprecor*, No. 39, 853, 8 September 1933).

148. This was Roy's belief expressed in an issue of his journal, *The Vanguard*. See G. of I., *Communism in India*, 72.

149. Record of proceedings of a conference of 16 December 1929 in Secretary to G. of I., Home Department, Political to Chief Secretary to Government of Bengal (letter No. D. 3947 Poll.), 31 December 1929, *L/PJ/6/1994*, 229/30. Stress as in file copy.

150. Minute on letter D-o No. 315-P.A., H. W. Emerson (giving views of Punjab Government on political situation) to Haig, 3 January 1930, *L/PJ/6/1995*, 373/30.

151. Motilal Nehru had taken the offensive against the Government on this issue from the start (Viceroy to Secretary of State, [tel. No. 1161-S/1162-S], 21 March 1929, *Halifax Collection*, Vol. 15, 60) whilst both he and Jawaharlal helped organise a Meerut Prisoners' Defence Committee (Nanda, *The Nehrus*, 311).

Gandhi invited Indian Communists to cooperate with him in his plans for 1930.[152] Of course the C.P.I. had been seriously weakened by the Meerut arrests. Even so in July 1929 the India Office could still make the assessment that the "revolutionary and communist organisations are by no means finished with" and express the belief that they "would instantly join in, if any general campaign were once let loose by the (presumably) responsible Congress leaders, and it is for that reason that the Congress programme is potentially so dangerous."[153] Moreover the strongest base of the C.P.I., Bombay, was to become "the storm centre" of the civil disobedience movement.[154]

In the event, because of its leftism, the C.P.I. was unable to grasp its opportunity. Belief in the irretrievable 'counter-revolutionary' character of Congress had led Indian Communists to see the Lahore independence resolution as a "revolutionary mask for the bourgeois leadership" and the subsequent movement as a "shamfight."[155] Since the general Communist estimate was that Congress was heading the mass movement against imperialism in order to disorganise it and drive it to defeat[156] it was concluded that "the most urgent task of the Indian Communists" was "to expose .... the real significance of the tactics of the Nationalist leaders."[157] Moreover since the main exponents of the policy of

152. This was, apparently, the testimony of Meerut prisoner Ghate, see Communist Party of India, *op. cit.*, 108.

153. 16 July 1929 minute of R. T. Peel, Principal, Public & Judicial Dept., on Haig's secret letter No. D-342/29, 24 June 1929, see above, 16.

154. Government of India to Secretary of State, (tel. 1010), 18 April 1932, *L/PJ/7/303*, 2074/32.

155. 'Resolution of the All-India Anti-Imperialist League on the General Political Situation and the Tasks of the League adopted at the All-India Anti-Imperialist League Conference convened in Bombay 24 October 1930 to establish the League. The formation of this body had been urged by the International Secretariat of the League against Imperialism in an 'Open Letter to the Lahore Session of Congress', since, it said, "the Congress cannot be regarded as an instrument for prosecuting an uncompromising struggle against imperialism". *Inprecor*, No. 71, 1499, 27 December 1929.

156. C. Dutt, 'The Indian National Revolution', *Labour Monthly*, Vol. 12, No. 6, June 1930, 324.

157. V. Chattopadhyaya, 'Increased Revolutionary Activity in India', *Inprecor*, No. 41, 854, 4 September 1930.

a 'revolutionary mask' for Congress were Left nationalists like Nehru and Bose, their tactics constituted the "most harmful and dangerous obstacle to the victory of the Indian revolution" and the 'exposure of the left Congress leaders" become "the primary task" of the C.P.I.[158]

With such a perspective the C.P.I's political practice during the crucial months of civil disobedience conformed to the estimate that "the *real struggle*" was *"not between the Congress and British imperialism but between the Congress and the Indian revolutionary movement.'*[159] The C.P.I. therefore not only tended "to regard the whole anti-imperialist movement of 1930–31 as a purely Congress movement and to remain aloof from it"[160] but actually clashed with Congress at times during 1930. The most famous incident occurred at the Bombay Independence Day celebrations which were terminated by a C.P.I.-led invasion of the Congress platform resulting in a scuffle and the forcible hoisting of the red flag alongside the Congress flag.[161] However the initial failure of the key Bombay proletariat significantly to participate in the civil disobedience movement,[162] no doubt partly due to C.P.I. policy,

158. 'Draft Platform of Action' of the C.P.I., *Indian Communsit Party Documents,* 3-12. This document appeared first in December 1930 and received "wide circulation throughout India", *India & Communism,* 170.

159. V. Chattopadhyaya, 'The Indian National Congress against Revolutionary Development', *Inprecor,* No. 50, 1036, 6 November 1930.

160. 'Abridged Draft of Political Theses of the Central Committee of the C.P.I.', *Inprecor,* No. 40, 1024, 20 July 1934. The correctness of this later self-criticism by the C.P.I. seems confirmed by contemporary evidence; see for example the Governor of Bombay's comment with regard to the civil disobedience movement in May 1930 that the "Communist & Workers' & Peasants' Organisations are watching and waiting" (Sykes to Irwin, 21 May 1930, *Halifax Collection,* Vol. 24, 370), also a Bombay C.P.I. document (quoted in the three Parties' Open Letter of 19 May 1932, see below, 36) of June 1930.

161. "Bombay Special" to Home Department, New Delhi, (Tel. P. No. SD 148), 30 January 1930 *L/PJ/6/1996,* 770/30. Men who worked in Congress between the wars were often later to recollect this incident, e.g. M. R. Masani: "the Indian Communists insulted on the sands of Chowpathy in Bombay the national flag of the independent India yet to be born", *The Communist Party of India,* 29.

162. See Viceroy's telegrams to Secretary of State during May 1930, *L/PJ/6/200,* for example No. 1451-S, 11 May 1930 (2357/30) and No. S688 25 May 1930 (2817/30).

resulted in great Congress efforts to win them,[163] with the organisation in August of a "Congress Labour Week."[164] This campaign helped persuade the C.P.I. that the 'real battle' was between themselves and Congress, so that "a vigorous struggle" for the support of the unemployed "between the Congress and the Communists" resulted.[165]

However in its competition with Congress it was the C.P.I. that was worsted. In August the non-C.P.I. section of the G.K.U. leadership joined Congress[166] and from this time millhands increasingly backed the Congress campaign.[167] Things were now looking bleak for the C.P.I. Its base among the millhands was badly eroded and its tactics were alienating the nationalist left[168] with which such fruitful cooperation had been developing in 1928. By February 1931 *Inprecor*[169] was speaking of the "revolutionary masses" being "welded together under counter-revolutionary leadership" and the consequent "despair" of some Indian Communists.

The chances of a rapid turn to more realistic tactics were probably ended however by the period of Congress bargaining with the *Raj* which assumed open form from the time of the Delhi pact. In February 1931 'G.S.' had claimed that Congress was "preparing an inconceivable *treachery, the greatest of all.*"[170] Each Congress compromise, from the Delhi pact to participation in the Round Table Conference was regarded not merely as further

163. Sykes to Benn (tel.), 20 July 1930. *L/PJ/6/1998*, 4116/30.

164. Govt. of Bombay to Secretary of State (tel. SD 3523), 17 August 1930, *L/PJ/4/1998*, 4653/30.

165. Sykes to Irwin, 25 August 1930, *Halifax Collection*, Vol. 25, 740.

166. Sykes to Irwin, (tel.), 13 August 1930, *Halifax Collection*, Vol. 25, 688d.

167. Report of G. S. Wilson, Commissioner of Police, Bombay, 23 October 1930, *L/PJ/6/1998*, 6745/30.

168. Later Jaiprakash Narayan was to claim that though he had been converted to "Soviet Communism" in the U.S.A. in the 1920s, when he returned to India in 1929 and "did not find the Indian Communists anywhere on the battle lines" he "kept away from the C.P.I." and joined Congress. *Socialism, Sarvodaya and Democracy*, 141-3.

169. 'The Next Tasks of the Indian Revolutionary Movement', by 'G.S.', *op. cit.*, No. 9, 179, 26 February, 1931.

170. *Ibid.*

exposure of Congress treachery but actually as "a positive gain to the working masses" since they would thereby be emancipated "from the illusions created by the Congress leaders."[171] The reality was quite different. When the Communists organised a rival meeting to Gandhi's in Bombay immediately after the Delhi Pact they could attract an audience of only 150 compared with Gandhi's 200,000[172] When, on the occasion of Gandhi's departure from Bombay for the Round Table Conference, the Communists organised a demonstration of 200 millworkers crying 'Down with Gandhi', the demonstrators "were hammered by a large crowd that collected on the spur of the moment" and which resented opposition to Gandhi. The Communist call for a protest *hartal* was ignored and 50,000 assembled "to hear Mr. Gandhi's parting message and to have his 'darshan'."[173]

By 1932 C.P.I. fortunes were at their nadir. In May *Inprecor* spoke of C.P.I. "passivity" and "despondency,"[174] and in July of "hardly any resistance" to the machinations of the "national-reformists" in the Calcutta trade-unions.[175] By its sectarian tactics the C.P.I. had destroyed the progress made in the labour and political movements up to 1928. The object of strengthening the party had not been achieved, indeed, the C.P.I. was reduced to a few small groups riven with dissent.[176]

The first step away from leftism and towards recovery came in summer 1932 with advice from abroad after a request from Meerut prisoners concerned at the Party's decline.[177] The advice

171. V. Chattopadhyaya, 'The Capitulation of the Indian Bourgeoisie' *Inprecor*, No. 15, 285, 19 March 1931.

172. Report of Commissioner of Police, Bombay, No. 1530/H/3717, 18 March 1931, *L/PJ/7/78*, 1697/31.

173. Report of Commissioner of Police, Bombay, 29 August 1931, *L/PJ/7/78*, 4544/31.

174. 'Open Letter to the Indian Communists from the Central Committees of the C.Ps. of Germany, Great Britain and China', *op. cit.*, No. 22, 436, 19 May 1932.

175. Rathan Singh (an exiled Indian revolutionary) 'The Struggle for the Indian Masses under Conditions of Colonial Terror', *op. cit.*, No. 30, 615, 7 July 1932.

176. *India & Communism*, 162 and the three Parties' Open Letter, *op. cit.*, 19 May 1932.

177. *India & Communism*, 183 and Ahmad, *The C.P.I.: Years of Formation*, 38.

correctly identified the immediate cause of C.P.I. misfortune as isolation from the masses led by organisations, such as Congress and trade-union bodies, which the C.P.I. had labelled as irremediably inimical to the interests of the revolution. However no critique of the theoretical mistakes regarding the rôles of the national bourgeoisie and 'Left' nationalists, which had led to this isolation, was undertaken. Consequently the advice was only a very partial, inconsistent rectification of the leftist line. Advice on the need to renew contact with the masses by participating in all *mass* demonstrations organised by the Congress"[178] and by organising "Communist fractions" in the "mass organisations" of "'left' national reformism"[179] was thus accompanied by support for extreme leftist formulations which had helped isolate the C.P.I. from the masses in the first place. For example Left nationalists were identified as the "especial" target for an "*uncompromising* struggle", whilst "the worst enemies" of the Indian revolution were not the imperialists but the Royists.[180]

Even so the C.P.I.'s acceptance of the revised line came only in 1933 when the release of most of the experienced leaders after Meerut[181] coincided with renewed international exhortation on the lines of those of 1932.[182]

In November 1933 a Calcutta meeting of the main cadres, convened by Adhikari, set about a C.P.I. reorganisation involving the formation of a central organising 'nucleus', the barring of two of the main 1929–33 leaders from elective posts and the reunification of the key Bombay party.[183] A new political thesis which

178. The three Parties' Open Letter *op. cit.*, 19 May 1932.

179. Rathan Singh 'The Struggle for the Indian Masses under Conditions of Colonial Terror', *Inprecor*, No. 30, 615, 7 July 1932. The reference to "mass organisations" clearly refers primarily to the trade-unions.

180. The three Parties' Open Letter, *op. cit.*, 19 May 1932.

181. The first releases, including Adhikari and P. P. Joshi, came in August, *India & Communism*, 140 and 187.

182. 'The Indian Labour Movement', (unsigned), *Inprecor*, No. 22, 490. 19 May 1933; V. Basak, 'The Present Situation in India, *Inprecor*, No. 39, 853, 8 September 1933; 'Open Letter to the Indian Communists from the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China', *Inprecor* No. 51, 1153, 24 November 1933.

183. See *India & Communism*, 187-91 and Ghate's testimony in Communist Party of India, *op. cit.*, 112. The two debarred men were Ranadive and Deshpande.

resulted from this meeting conformed to the revised line of the 1932 Open Letter but added its own original touch by making the first C.P.I. advocacy of what later became known as 'collective affiliation.' Thus the Communists were "to use the Congress platforms," not as the C.P.I., but "through some of the mass organisations of the toilers."[184] That these tactics meant C.P.I.-led 'mass organisations' actually joining Congress was made clear in a contemporary article.[185]

This period also saw the first practical steps by Indian Communists to reunify the trade-union movement. A late 1933 appeal had called for the uniting of C.P.I.-led unions with 'parallel' unions,[186] but some unity in action was achieved in March 1934 when a Joint Strike Committee of Communists and Royists was formed to conduct a strike against wage cutting and rationalisation in the Bombay mills.[187]

In fact, after initial spectacular success, the strike collapsed amidst recrimination between the factions comprising the Joint Committee.[188] That the failure was partly due to C.P.I. sectarianism was suggested by an *Inprecor* analysis which spoke of some of the strike leaders calling for "purely Communist trade-unions" during the second part of the strike after many of the

184. 'Abridged Draft of Political Theses of the Central Committee of the C.P.I.', *Inprecor*, No. 40, 1024, 20 July 1934. According to the Intelligence Bureau, *India & Communism*, 187-91, these were prepared by Adhikari on instructions from the November 1933 meeting and appeared in pamphlet form in February 1934.

185. Orgwald, 'A Conversation with Indian Comrades', *Inprecor*, No. 20, 519, 29 March 1934.

186. 'For Trade-Union Unity in India', said to be an "appeal worked out at the end of 1933 by a group of participants in the Indian trade-union movement", *Inprecor*, No. 31, 820, 25 May 1934.

187. Government of Bombay to G. of I. (letter No. SD-1602), 18 May 1934, *P/83*, File No. 7/5—Political of 1934, Serial No. 341. Bombay Government to Secretary of State, (tel. No. 37), 29 April 1934, *ibid.* Serial No. 12; Maxwell, Home Department (Special) Bombay to Hallett, Secretary to G. of I, Home Department, Report for second half of January 1934, 1-6 February 1934, *Brabourne Collection*, Vol. 14.

188. Brabourne to Viceroy, 5 May 1934, *Brabourne, Collection*, Vol. 14; Bombay Government to Hoare, 6 June 1934, *P/83*, Serial No. 38; Maxwell to Hallett, report for second half of June, 1-7 July 1934, *Brabourne Collection*, Vol. 14.

experienced leaders like Adhikari had been arrested.[189] Even so, the first tentative C.P.I. moves away from leftism had brought their reward. In the autumn the C.P.I. was speaking of its "rehabilitation" with the millhands[190] and the Bombay Governor of Communist domination of the city's unions.[191]

In 1934 the C.P.I. also benefited from its abandoning of the policy of holding aloof from Congress. Thus Adhikari began to establish contacts with Left Congressmen[192] and the Bombay Congress session was the occasion for the distribution of C.P.I. literature which influenced men who were to become Kerala C.P.I. leaders.[193] By January 1935 extending C.P.I. contacts with the recently formed Congress Socialist Party had resulted in an agreement for united action.[194] In April a further such agreement was reached between the C.S.P. and the two trade-union centres A.I. T.U.C. and the Red T.U.C. which in the same month merged at Calcutta.[195]

Thus by early 1935 the C.P.I. was participating in joint Bombay P.C.C.-A.I.T.U.C. meetings festooning the platforms with banners praising Russia and the Comintern.[196] For the *Raj* the spectre of Communist-nationalist collusion was reappearing,[197] alongside

189. 'Problems of the Anti-Imperialist Struggle in India', *op. cit.*, No. 10, 290, 9 March 1935.

190. *India & Communism*, 200.

191. Brabourne to Hoare, 26 November 1934, *Brabourne Collection*, Vol. 14. That Brabourne was not referring solely to Royist control seems certain since earlier (Brabourne to Hoare, draft tel. No. 28, 10 April 1934, *Brabourne Collection*, Vol. 4), he had claimed that "Practically all Textile and other Unions are in the hands of Communist leaders, largely Meerut prisoners". C.P.I. influence in the Bombay unions almost certainly increased between April and November.

192. Biographical sketch of Adhikari, in Rao & Sen, *Our. Doc.* 7.

193. Krishnan, *Kerala's First Communist*, 67.

194. Maxwell to Hallett, report for first half of January, 1-6 February 1935, *Brabourne Collection*, Vol. 14.

195. Weekly Report No. 15, Director, Intelligence Bureau, 20 April 1935, *L/PJ/7/893*, 2734/35, and Punekar, *op. cit.*, 334.

196. Maxwell to Hallett, report for first half of February, 16-21 February 1935, *Brabourne Collection*, Vol. 14; Knight, Secretary to Bombay Home Department (Special) to Hallett, report for second half of May, 1-6 June 1935, *Brabourne Collection*, Vol. 14.

197. Apprehension about the effects on Congress of any Communist support for C.S.P. work in that body had been expressed by G. of I. to Hoare on 16 October 1934 (tel. 38-C) *L/PJ/7/484*, 3736/34.

clear evidence of the C.P.I.'s advance.[198] Indeed the C.P.I. was clearly assisted by the antagonism to imperialism Congressmen shared with Communists.

In particular Congress opposition to the *Raj* hindered the application of repressive measures against the C.P.I. Two weapons used by Government against the C.P.I. at this time were the Criminal Law Amendment Act, under which the Party was banned in July 1934,[199] and the Bombay Special (Emergency) Powers Act, giving certain powers to arrest and intern. However convictions were not easy to obtain under the former[200] whilst internment under the latter did not stop political work by the internees,[201] in fact the exile of two Communists to Ahmednagar enabled them to build such a base among local Congressmen that Dange used it to secure election to the Faizpur Congress session.[202] Thus, since after the "Pathetic"[203] outcome to the Meerut case Willingdon was determined not to have any more conspiracy cases;[204] feeling in Government in favour of anti-Communist legislation was strong.[205] However, the necessity to take into account Congress reaction to "imperialist repression" was an

198. Viceroy to Hoare (tel. R. No. 1578), 28 June 1935, *Brabourne Collection*, Vol. 17; Governor of Bengal to Hoare, 1 June 1935, *Templewood Collection*, Vol. 9, 224.

199. Notification No. F7/8/34, 23 July 1934, *P/12046*, File No. 7/8/34-Poll, Serial No. 3.

200. Viceroy to Hoare, (tel. R. No. 1462), 30 June 1934, *Brabourne Collection*, Vol. 5, see also acquittals of Tambitkar and Sarmalkar in Maxwell to Hallett, report for first half of February, 16-21 February 1935, *Brabourne Collection*, Vol. 14.

201. *India & Communism*, 204.

202. Adhikari, 'Shripad Amrit Dange' *New Age*, 5 October 1969, 12.

203. The estimate of Williamson, Director of the Intelligence Bureau, *India & Communism*, vi.

204. Willingdon to Hoare, 26 February 1933, *Templewood Collection*, Vol. 6, 252. Hoare agreed: see Hoare to Willingdon 11 August 1933, *Templewood Collection*, Vol. 3, 791. The *Raj* certainly miscalculated the likely propaganda effect they hoped (see Peel to Irwin, 17 January 1929, *Halifax Collection*, Vol. 5, 11) would accrue from the trial. Indeed it was the Communists who were able successfully to exploit the trial for this purpose (see *India & Communism*, 141). Even in Britain, according to Hirtzel (to Hailey, 9 August 1929, *Hailey Collection*, Vol. 15b, 274) "the whole thing" seemed "to the plain man to be rather a travesty of justice".

205. Brabourne to Hoare, 28 June 1934, *Brabourne Collection*, Vol. 4.

impediment to efforts to have anti-Communist laws placed on the statute book.[206] British attempts to check the re-emergence of Indian Communism after 1933 were hampered by the aim nationalism shared with the C.P.I. of fighting the *Raj*.

Nevertheless, as long as the C.P.I. adhered to the general line of 1932 it could not take full advantage of this favourable circumstance. Whilst Communists continued to brand the C.S.P. as a "maneouvre" of the bourgeoisie to divert the revolutionary energies of the masses[207] that party was likely to react, as it did in 1934, by banning Communists from membership.[208] Whilst (perhaps the less sagacious) Communists continued to launch attacks on Congress meetings[209] the aim of collective affiliation was unlikely to be achieved.

The obvious need was for systematic extension of the halting revision of leftism which had begun in 1932 so that all Indian Communists could be wholly weaned away from it.

The decisive step came at the Seventh Comintern Congress[210] in August 1935. Here it was argued[211] that imperialism was currently waging an "intensified offensive" against the colonial peoples with political consequences of great significance. The antagonism between colonial and imperialist bourgeoisie had accentuated the national-revolutionary tendency, as represented by the formation of Left wings, was increasingly challenging reformism in

206. Hoare to Brabourne, 20 July 1934, *Brabourne Collection*, Vol. 2; Brabourne to Mark Patrick, 1 January 1935, *Brabourne Collection*, Vol. 4.

207. See, for example, R. P. Dutt, 'Congress Socialism', *Indian Forum*, October 1934, 118-123.

208. M. R. Masani to R. A. Butler, 24 July 1935, *L/PJ/7/893*, 2810/35.

209. See for example details of the breaking up of the Independence Day celebration in Calcutta on 26 January 1935 by "young communists", Government of India to Hoare, (tel. 396) 13 February 1935, *L/PJ/7484*, 488/35.

210. It is possible that the change in the line on India at this Congress came about partly because Spratt, who after his release from jail in September 1934 had toured India, sent the Comintern a report on the situation there, according to *India & Communism*, 205.

211. By Wang Ming in his report 'The Revolutionary Movement in the Colonial Countries', 7 August 1935. This was published in *Inprecor*, 11 November 1935, 1488, but a revised and augmented version was published separately. See 1, 3-4, 6, 29-30 especially.

bourgeois nationalist parties. In view of these developments "anti-imperialist united front tactics" had assumed "primary important" for colonial Communist Parties. However C.P.I. work was held up as a model of how not to conduct such tactics. By demanding the I.N.C. accept a united front programme including a demand such as "'the establishment of an Indian Workers' & Peasants' Soviet Republic'" the C.P.I. (in December 1934) had made proletarian hegemony a precondition for cooperation with the bourgeois Congress. Such "'Left' sectarian errors" could only make a united front impossible.[212] The C.P.I. was thus urged to "put a decisive stop to sectarianism" and "in no case disregard work within the National Congress and the national-revolutionary and national-reformist organisations affiliated with it". The Comintern had returned to the pre-1928 line of organisational independence for Indian Communism alongside full participation in the national movement to promote its revolutionary tendency against reformism. Moreover, work within the C.S.P. was now clearly being urged.

Even so, not until after it was subjected to further pressure via the C.S.P. decision to reverse its ban on Communists becoming members[213] and through a new thesis from British Communists (both in January 1936) did the C.P.I. accept the break with leftism.

The new thesis, produced by R. P. Dutt and Bradley,[214] took the idea of collective affiliation and turned it into a means by which, along with other changes such as the democratising of its organisation and the dropping of "the dogma of non-violence" from its creed, Congress itself might be transformed into the desired united front. Of course the Communists would still maintain organi-

212. Of course "proletarian hegemony" in the anti-imperialist movement was quite as much an aim of the Communists as, they assumed, "bourgeois hegemony" was the aim of the Congress leadership. The point was that such hegemony could not be made a *condition* for the formation of the front.

213. Jaiprakash Narayan, 'Problem of Socialist Unity in India', a 1941 article in *Towards Struggle*, 170. No doubt this decision was influenced by the change in Comintern line of August 1935.

214. Dutt & Bradley, 'The Anti-Imperialist People's Front', *Indian Politics*, 2-13.

sational independence but, as individuals, they would play a key role in the task of making Congress uncompromisingly revolutionary. Hopefully, this work would be effected not only by the affiliation of Communist-led mass organisations to Congress, but also by the C.S.P. which "as the grouping of all the radical elements in the existing Congress" had "an especially important part" to play. It was necessary for the C.P.I. to make clear its political differences with the C.S.P. and *vice versa*, but this should be achieved via "comradely discussion" which should not be an obstacle to "common working on all the issues on which agreement can be reached."

To achieve the desired changes in Congress, unity of all national-revolutionary forces was thus essential. But it was clear that equally necessary was the reunification of 'the most consistently revolutionary force,' the proletariat, so that the Dutt-Bradley thesis on unity in the political sphere was accompanied by an appeal for "a united trade-union movement" since, "[in] this manner the united working class" would "be able to bring its full strength to bear" in the united front. The ending of the last remaining divisions in the Indian trade-union movement was thereby urged on the C.P.I. as a key task.[215]

At first there was considerable opposition within the C.P.I. to the Dutt-Bradley formulations,[216] but by spring 1936 a new C.P.I. leadership had accepted the need to implement the new line and had grasped the hand extended by the C.S.P. in January, Communists now being permitted to join that Party on an individual basis[217] From this time the leftist period of the pre-Independence C.P.I. can be taken as ended. Even though leftism was to persist in the party the new formulations had now been accepted as the guidelines for C.P.I. policy. The party now entered a period when the applications of the new line was to see an unprecedented growth in membership and influence.

215. Dutt & Bradley, 'Towards Trade Union Unity', *op. cit.*, 14-24.

216. See the testimony of Communist C. V. Rao in Overstreet and Windmiller, *op. cit.*, 162.

217. *Ibid.*, and Ghate, quoted in Communist Party of India, *op. cit*., 114-116. Ghate and P. C. Joshi were leading members of the new C.P.I. Central Committee.

The Second Comintern Congress had established that, colonial Communist Parties were faced with two basic tasks: firstly, to work in national liberation movements against imperialism and 'feudalism', and secondly, to organize Communist movements to conduct the anti-bourgeois struggle. Though the national movements by nature were bourgeois, no contradiction between the two tasks was admitted. In fact the two were seen as complementary since the completion of the national democratic revolution would ensure the conditions necessary for achieving socialism, whilst the building of Communist Parties would mean strengthening the political expression of the class most consistently interested in the bourgeois revolution: the proletariat. Doubts about this thesis by those Communists who feared that the first task would necessarily hamper the second constituted the origin of leftism which, when it guided C.P.I. work in the earlier 1930s, proved a severe handicap for Indian Communism. The lesson of these years was that *neglect* of the first task inevitably made success in the second impossible. Work within the national movement was necessary, if not sufficient, for success in building the C.P.I.

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Indian National Congress, The Formative Years

REVITALIZATION AS A POLITICAL FORCE

BY

P. N. CHOPRA

The fifth session of the Congress which met at Bombay under the presidentship of Sir William Wedderburn came to be known as the Bradlaugh session,[1] due to the presence of that great parliamentarian whose visit, according to Surendranath Bannerjea, "imparted a new impetus to the Congress cause."[2] Bradlaugh reputed to be the "Member for India" was enthusiastically received by a grateful nation and several hundred addresses were presented to him.[3] Bradlaugh's reply was characteristic of him. "For whom should I work" he remarked "if not for the people, born of the people, trusted by the people; I will die for the people."[4] Addressing the delegates he said, "Your presence here today refutes and answers in anticipation one sneer, that I have heard spoken within the walls of Parliament. It is said there is no Indian Nation; there can be no Indian National Congress; there is no Indian people; there are only two hundred millions of diverse races and diverse creeds. The lesson I read here is that this Congress movement is an educational movement, hammering upon the anvil of millions of men's brains until it welds into one common whole men whose desire for political and social reforms is greater than all distinctions of race and creed."[5]

The Congress at Bombay was larger than the previous one. The number of delegates in that year (1889) was by a curious coincidence exactly 1889.[6] This session was unique in many res-

1. Mazumdar, A. C., *Congress in Evolution*, p. XXI.
2. Bannerjea, S. N., *A Nation in Making*, p. 110.
3. *Proc. I.N.C.* 1889, p. 69.
4. *Ibid.*, p. 70.
5. *Proc. I.N.C.*, 1889, p. 71.
6. *Ibid.*, p. 58.

pects. A skeleton scheme for introducing representative institutions in India was first drafted at this session.[7] "Hume's innocent proposal for some provision for safeguarding the interests of the minorities brought forth a fierce demand from Munshi Hidayat Rasul, a delegate from Oudh, for parity between Hindus and Muslims in the Councils."[8] However, his amendment was rejected by Muhammadan delegates themselves, 16 voting for and 23 against the proposal. One of the resolutions adopted at this session was to send "a deputation to England .... to represent the views of the Congress and to press upon the attention of the British public, the political reforms which the Congress advocates."[9] Hume, Pherozeshah Mehta, Mano Mohan Ghose, W. C. Bonnerjee, Sharifuddin, Eardley Norton, R. N. Mudholkar and Surendranath were to be its members.[10] Surendranath's appeal for funds at the close of the session met with a response which would have been regarded "unique in the annals of any public movement."[11] This session was also memorable in another respect because for the first time some of the lady delegates[12] attended it. Lajpat Rai also attended this session which did not impress him much. As he wrote in his diary "I somehow began to feel that the Congress leaders cared more for fame and pomp than for the interest of the country." But as he explained later this was only a vague feeling and he could not substantiate it.[13] Lajpat Rai did evince much interest in Congress activities. He sincerely believed that the Congress had been founded by a few Englishmen to provide "an innocuous occupation for the intelligentia lest they should organise a strong political movement aimed at England's supremacy." He was of the view that Indians should make themselves stronger by education, by the spread of swadeshi and by smuggling of arms. Only then they would be able to drive out the British."

After the return of Sir William Wedderburn from the Bombay Congress, steps were taken to put the London organisation on a

7. *Ibid.*
8. *Ibid.*, p. 46.
9. Bannerjea, *op. cit.*, p. 111.
10. *Proc. I.N.C.*, 1889, pp. 63-64.
11. Bannerjea, S. N., *op cit.*, p. 110.
12. *Proc. I.N.C.*, 1889, p. 69.
13. Lajpat Rai, "*The Story of My Life*", p. 86.

more permanent footing. With the approval of the Indian leaders, a small committee consisting of Allan Hume, W. S. Caine, M.P., John E. Ellis, M.P. (who became Under Secretary of State for India in 1906), W. S. B. Melaren, M.P., Dadabhai Naroji and George Yule with William Wedderburn as Chairman was appointed. Thus the British Committee of the Indian National Congress came into being. The first issue of the journal "India" appeared in February 1890, the Editor being William Digby. It was issued at irregular intervals till 1892 when it became a monthly journal and later on a weekly in January, 1898. Its main purpose was to "bring grit to the Congress mill."[14] Six thousand copies of it were printed[15] and widely distributed in India. Lord Hamilton expressed concern about "this poisonous little rag" which spread 'lies'.[16] In India it definitely exercised an important influence on the Vernacular Press and the British Intelligence Chief regarded "this influence to be pernicious."[17] The politically conscious Bengal subscribed for 960 copies of 'India' while many of the Indian papers received it in exchange.[18] 'India' continued as a weekly review for many years until Congress closed its official representation in London.[19] Early in 1890, Bradlaugh introduced in the House of Commons the Indian Councils Amendment Bill which was based upon the draft scheme of the Congress.[20]

The Congress continued to grow in strength as Dadabhai wrote to Wacha on December 10, 1890 "Its importance and necessity increases everyday." The growing popularity of the Congress was

14. *Hamilton Papers* D 510/2, Vol. 14, pp. 63-7. *Select Documents, "The Evolution of India and Pakistan"* edited by C. H. Philips, London, 1962, p. 147.

15. Letter dated 18th July, 1899 of C. W. Boston, Chief Secretary to the Government of Bengal, *Hamilton Papers*, India Office Library, D510/2, Volume 14, pp. 227-30, Philips, *op. cit.*, p. 149.

16. Lord Hamilton to Lord Curzon, 18th May, 1899, *Hamilton Papers*, India Office Library, C. 126/1, pp. 135-8, Private papers, Philips, *op. cit.*, p. 147.

17. C. S. Bayley, I.C.S., (Superintendent for the suppression of Thagi and Dakaity).
Note on Congress Support, 18th June, 1899, in Philips, *op. cit.*, 147.

18. *Ibid.*

19. *The Hindu*, December 27, 1935. Frederick Grubb's article "The First National Congress".

20. *Ibid.*

looked upon with grave concern in British Conservative circles. Even a liberal statesman. Lord Dufferin, had denounced the National Congress as a public danger. Gladstone, too, in one of his letters had confessed the 'rising forces of sedition as a headless child which might play with a tiger cub.' Dadabhai Naroji had been assured by one of the two political parties in England that after Ireland is satisfied, the emancipation of India must next be taken in hand. The British were alarmed at the rapid pace of education. "Sir John Gorst only gave the people a better, more education in order to succeed in educating the English out of India." The speeches made at the Congress session were quoted to show that they were highly prejudicial to British interests. "Indeed, if the world was governed by folk," one of the writers said "the Hindus and the Irish would be ruling races of mankind." They were highly critical of the proposal of the Congress to substitute the Viceregal Council with an assembly of which half of the members are to be elected and this assembly should be given all legislative and financial powers. "Was ever an Imperial nation so cruelly requested to abdicate authority and surrender its more cherished possessions to men whose fitness to rule is based simply on a certain imitative capacity to make long speeches." The Government was urgerd by these elements to give up their attitude of "benevolent neutrality" towards the Congress and to put a stop to these meetings of the Congress at present, a few years hence, such a course would be too late. The Government was urged to give up the pretence that "we keep India merely for the benefit of the people of that country and in order to train them for self-Government. We keep it for the sake of the interest and the honour of England and the only form of Government by which we can continue to hold it in subjection is that of despotism."[21]

The Congress this year met (1890) at Calcutta under the presidentship of Sir Pherozeshah Mehta[22] who was proud of its success. "We have survived the ridicule, the abuse and the mis-representation" he declared. We have survived the charge of sedition and disloyality. We have also survived the charge of being a "microscopic minority." We have survived the charge of

21. *Asiatic Quarterly Review*, January-April, Vol. VII, 1889.
22. *Proc. I.N.C.*, 1890, pp. 4-5.

being guilty of the atrocious crime of being educated and we have even managed to survive the grievous charge of being all Babus in disguise,[23] he concluded. As regards the peaceful and loyal aims of the Congress, the President quoted the testimony of no less a person than Lord Randolph Churchill, former Secretary of State who declared publicly that "he could sincerely remark that no one will rejoice more than himself if the deliberations of the Indian National Congress shortly to be resumed were to contribute effectually to the progress and the welfare of the Indian people."[24] The Chairman of the Reception Committee, Mano Mohan Ghose claimed in his welcome address that the "Congress represents the thinking portion of the people of India. The delegates present here today, he said, are the chosen representatives of that section of the Indian people who have learnt to think and whose number is daily increasing with marvellous rapidity."[25] He condemned the British policy of "Divide & Rule" as "unworthy of the great English people" and fraught with ultimate danger "to the safety of the British Empire."[26]

Some sensation had been caused on the eve of the session due to a notice which appeared in certain English newspapers prohibiting Government servants from attending even as visitors the meetings of the Indian National Congress.[27] Moreover the admission tickets sent to the Lieutenant Governor and his household were also returned on the plea that "the orders of the Government of of India definitely prohibit the presence of Government officials at such meetings."[28] A reference was made to the Viceroy who at once declared that the "Belvidere interpretation of the order of Government of India was a clear misapprehension that in the opinion of the Government the Congress movement was "perfectly legitimate in itself, that the Government of India recognise that the Congress Movement is regarded as representing in India what in Europe would be called the more advanced liberal party as distinguished from the great body of conservative opinion which

23. *Ibid.*, p. 5.
24. *Proc. I.N.C.*, 1890, p. 6.
25. *Ibid.*
26. *Ibid.*
27. For details and letters, refer to *Proc. I.N.C.*, 1891, p. 86.
28. *Ibid.*

exists side by side with it and that the real attitude of the Governmen was one of perfect neutrality in relation to both parties."[29] It was also made clear that it is only from participation that the Government servants were necessarily debarred but even this restriction was not to apply to Government pensioners and others who have quitted the service of the Government for good.[30] Lord Lansdowne went further and invited the delegates not as such, it is true, but as "distinguished visitors" to the garden party. Lord Connemara, Governor of Madras, followed suit when the Congress was held there next year and even helped the Reception Committee with supplies from the Government House. It will be of interest to note what the programme of the Congress was at this time (1890) as detailed in the journal *India* (May 23, 1890). It was at this session of 1890 that the Congress decided upon the bold adventure of holding its session in London itself with 100 delegates so as to impress upon the British public the volume as well as the strength of the Indian demands.[31]

During the year 1890 and 1891 Hume was in despair. The Government did not seem to be willing to accede to any of the Congress demands which were repeated year after year from its platform. Even the Congress request for the separation of executive from judiciary applauded as a "counsel of perfection" by Lord Dufferin had not been put into practice. Then there was paucity of funds which aggravated the matter still further.[32] So Hume, in this frame of mind, it appears thought of suspending the Indian National Congress.[33] This proposal created a great stir throughout the country. Some Muslim-owned newspapers like the *Nizam ul Mulk* (Moradabad),[34] *Mehr-i-Nimros* (Bijnor)[35] and *Akhbar-I-Alam* (Meerut) supported and even praised the proposal saying that "no good has accrued from the National Congress and

29. Mazumdar, A. C., *op. cit.*, p. 81.
30. *Ibid.*
31. *Proc. I.N.C.*, 1891, p. 66
32. Dadabhai to Wacha, December 23, 1891, *Dadabhai* by Masani, pp. 308-14.
33. *Ibid.* Also *Native Newspaers Report for Punjab, N.W.P. & Oudh* (1871-91), p. 858.
34. December 20, 1891, *N.N.R.* (1871-91) *Punjab, NW.P. and Oudh*, p. 858.
35. *Ibid.*, p. 589.

that the time and money spent on it by its supporters have been simply thrown away. It has failed to influence Government in any way which continues to conduct the administration according to its own sweet will,"[36] and that the Congress on the other hand had "created ill feeling between the Hindu and Muhammadan communities and produced doubts in the mind of the Government about the loyalty of the natives."[37] While other papers like the *Rahbar* (Moradabad) pleaded that the "abolition of the Congress would be an ill-advised measure. Its supporters should not be disheartened if the Government has not yet granted their requests. It is a very useful institution and has given valuable political education to natives during the seven years of its existence. Even if it does not do any other good, it deserves to be maintained as a political school for natives." As regards the annual expenditure on Congress sessions the paper asserted that "there are men who can contribute the amount without any difficulty."[38] Dadabhai also wrote in the same strain to Hume "The Congress meetings should not be stopped. Such an action will put back India's progress a generation or at least for years........you have already achieved a great deal in rousing up the people. Don't give them up now."[39]

There was a good deal of discussion about this matter in the next session of the Congress held at Nagpur under the presidentship of Ananda Charlu. Surendranath Bannerjea in a spirited speech condemned this idea to "abandon the Congress, the standard round which we have fought for the last eight years, the standard which we trust one day to carry proudly before us to victory. No, we will do nothing of the kind. We mean to stick to the Congress. We mean to hold to it from years' end to years' end until we have won for ourselves these rights and privileges to which we are indefeasibly entitled."[40] Pt. Ajudhia Nath was no less emphatic when he declared: "India means to carry on this movement or as our opponents call it, agitation (be it so) so long as our reasonable demands are not granted and if Government defer the granting

36. Mihr-i-Nimroz, December 21, 1891.
37. Nizam-ul-Mulk (Moradabad) December 20, 1891.
38. Rahbar, Dec. 20, 1891, *N.N.R.*, *Punjab*, *N.W.P. & Oudh*, pp. 308-14.
39. Dadabhai to Hume, Oct. 14, 1891, *N.N.R.*, *Punjab*, *N.W.P. & Oudh*, pp. 308-14.
40. *Proc. I.N.C.*, 1891, p. 11

of these demands, the Government and the British Parliament and the British nation will be responsible before man and God for the waste of India's time, India's money and India's energy."[41] P. Ananda Charlu in his Presidential Address had made a passionate appeal to Congressmen to "penetrate to the masses and "deeply imbue them with the spirit of the Congress. "It becomes our bounden duty" he declared "to go more amid the masses and to saturate their minds with the aspirations of a united nationality." Though as yet their efforts had not been met with much success, yet the Congress platform is the field on which such bloodless triumphs are to be won.[42]

Like many of her noble-minded Britains, Justice McCarthy's advice to the British Government that it was high time that the Government should listen to the views and demands of the Indian people as put forward by the Congress had also fallen on deaf ears. "You must have the voice of India, you must know what its population wish for themselves and till you hear that voice speaking to you directly as people unto people you cannot possibly hope to govern with stability and with safety a great country like India," he had warned.[43] Hume was becoming impatient. All his efforts to open the eyes of the British authorities to the realities of the situation had proved of no avail. In his famous circular dated Feb. 16, 1892 addressed to Congressmen and marked private and confidential, he gave vent to his feelings of frustration. The existing system of administration, he pointed out, was not only pauperizing the people but also inevitably preparing the way for "one of the most terrible catclysms in the history of the world." He warned the rich and the well-to-do "Do not fancy that Government will be able to protect you or itself. No earthly power can stem an universal agrarian rising in a country like this. My countrymen will be as men in the desert vainly struggling for a brief space, against the Simon. Thousands of the rioters may be killed but to what avail when there are millions on millions who have nothing to look forward to but death—nothing to hope for but vengeance, as for leaders when the hour comes—be sure there will

41. *Ibid.*, p. 72.
42. *Ibid.*, p. 8.
43. *Proc. I.N.C.*, 1895, p. iii.

be no lack of leaders. This is no hypothesis—it is a certainity."[44] This letter came to be published much to the "consternation of the writer and his colleagues." The hostile press made capital out of it and the British Committee had to express regrets that such an injudicious letter should have been circulated.

However, the continuous agitation of the Congress for six years led to the passing of the Council Act of 1892—exactly thirty-one years after the Act of 1861. "The number of members was increased and provision was made for the nomination of some members," writes Sir Chintamani, "the recommendation of statutory local bodies, universities and chambers of commerce though the principle of election was not recognised in terms."[45] And Gokhale had to tell the Congress at Lahore that "if the officer who drafted the Rules for Bombay had been asked to sit down with the deliberate purpose of framing a scheme to defeat the object of the Act of 1892, he could not have done better."[46] Disappointed even in their moderate expectations, the Congress leaders yet felt that they had proved the value of their method of agitating public opinion both in India and in England in order to gain results. Dadabhai gave the credit for the Act to the Congress.[47] With regard to the other important demand of the Congress to hold simultaneous examinations in India and England for all the civil services, "it would not have become a practical fact by the Resolution of the House of Commons of 2nd June," declared the Grand Old Man of India in his Presidential address at the Lahore Session of 1893 "had it not been to a large extent for your perservering but constitutional demand for it made with moderation during the years of your existence."[48] They had also succeeded not only in creating British interest in Indian affairs but were also able to send an Indian to the House of Commons.[49] The President also conveyed to the delegates to the Lahore session which "far surpassed in magnificence the sessions at Nagpur and

44. Masani, *op. cit.*
45. Chitamani, G. Y., *Indian Politics Since the Mutiny*, pp. 25-26.
46. Zacharias, *H.E.C. Renascent India*, p. 126.
47. *Proc. I.N.C.*, 1893, pp. 16-17.
48. *Ibid.*, p. 18.
49. *Ibid.*, p. 19.

Allahabad" the message of the Irish Home Rulers. "Do not forget" they told Dadabhai before he left England, "to tell your colleagues that everyone of Ireland Home Rule members in Parliament are at your back in the cause of the Indian people."[50] Sardar Dayal Singh Majithia who was the Chairman of the Reception Committee discounted the assertion that the "Congress is a Babu movement and the martial races of India have no sympathy with it. This great assembly is a living refutation of all assertions of that description,"[51] he declared. The Congress had come triumphant through all tests. Not only did Congressmen survive all the desperate attacks of opponents but "have actually grown so influential," said the Sardar, "that when a short time ago an attempt was made to set up an anti-Congress demonstration in one of the important cities of this province not far from the capital, the all-powerful district officer actually discouraged the attempt on the ground that such a demonstration even though backed by all the official influence of that place would prove perfectly abortive and quite inadequate for the purpose of stemming the tide of educated public opinion in favour of the national movement."[52]

It was at the Madras session (1894) that the rules for the conduct of business were first framed. The proceedings were marked by a considerable excitement over the question of two fresh taxes proposed to be levied on the already overburdened Indian tax payer. The Congress strongly protested against "the injustice and impolicy of imposing excise duty on cottons manufactured in British India as such excise is calculated to cripple seriously the infant mill industry of this country,"[53] and the Congress also "put on record its firm conviction that in proposing this excise the interests of India have been sacrified to those of Lancashire."[54] The other was the levy of an arbitrary penalty in the shape of costs of punitive police forces quartered in disturbed areas under an amendment of the Indian Police Act of 1861."[55]

50. *Ibid.*
51. *Ibid.*, p. 9.
52. *Ibid.*
53. *Proc. I.N.C.*, 1894, p. 30.
54. *Ibid.*
55. Mazumdar, A. C., *op. cit.*, p. 86.

Indian National Congress had come to be a potent factor in Indian affairs and even the *London Times* had to admit in its editorial of January 5, 1894, that among the many movements moral and political now stirring the life of the Indian people "the Indian National Congress holds a foremost place" and "it is from the fact that it is only one of many and that it is the product of an isolated agitation but of a general social awakening that it derives its true significance."[56] Surendranath Bannerjea in his Presidential Address at the Poona Congress next year held out hopes of a golden age which was "looming in the future. There is a golden age in store for us and our children. It is this feeling which reconciles us to the present. We feel that if the political freedom in the sense in which it is enjoyed by British subjects elsewhere is not to be our lot, it will be the inheritance of those, who coming after us, will hear our names and carry on our work. In that faith we work. In that faith we ask others to work."[57] "Let it not be said," he declared "that the enthusiasm which animated us in the first days of the Congress movement is on the wane. The past ought to encourage us. The future ought to stir us into enthusiasm. The noblest heritage which we can leave to our children and our children's children is the heritage of enlarged rights, safeguarded by the loyal devotion and the fervent enthusiasm of an emancipated people."[58] The Congress here registered a strong protest against a bill introduced in the Supreme Legislative Council to amend the Legal Practitioners' Act of 1879 by which the provincial legal practitioners were sought to be completely subordinated to the District Judges and the Revenue Commissioners. And as Subba Rao (from Madras) declared, "This bill strikes at the root of the independence of the bar, lowers its prestige, impairs its usefulness and tends to destroy the security of the public in the protection of their property, their liberty and their lives."[59] It will also destroy the independence of the members of the bar who "have taken their place as leaders to some

56. *Proc. I.N,C.*, 1895, p. iv.
57. *Ibid.*, pp. 16-17.
58. *Ibid.*
59. *Ibid.*, p. 125.

extent of public spirit and as interpreters to some extent between the rules and the ruled."[60]

Rahimut Ullah Muhammad Sayani, President of the Calcutta session (1896) in a scholarly address[61] traced the origin, history and aims and objects of the Congress. He dealt in detail with the causes of the Muslim apathy towards the Congress and gave replies to their objections. It was a masterly address, typical of the liberal Muslim opinion. He made a passionate appeal to his co-religionists to "actively co-operate in all the public movements in the country generally and especially our good Congress, the germ of our future federated Parliament......with hearts honest, true and unselfish......and thus participate in our great bloodless battle for justice and freedom and especially make a beginning now, when all our minor anxieties are overshadowed by the cloud now impending over our beloved land in which we too plainly discern the spectre of famine frowning upon a teeming, frugal and ceaselessly industrious population and join in asking redress at the hands of Government and in expressing disapproval of the mistaken system."[62]

60. *Ibid.*
61. For Sayani's Presidential Address refer to *Proc. I.N.C.* 1896. pp. 18-64.
62. *Ibid.*

Travancore and The Paramount Power — A Study in Wartime Relationship

BY

P. G. Edwin

The relations between the Native States and the Paramount Power constitute an important aspect of British Colonialism in India. Britian's relations with the Princely States were based on a network of subsidiary treaties entered into by the English East India Company with the rulers of the states. It was the consistent policy of the British Government to tighten its control over the Native States which was achieved through a judicious interpretation of the treaties and an assiduous cultivation of political practices. The two world wars of the present century provided an excellent opportunity for the rulers of the Indian States to demonstrate their loyalty to the British Crown and for the Paramount power to test the loyalty of the Princes and thereby extract from them the maximum contributions to the war effort. In this paper an attempt is made to asses the impact of the world wars on the relations between the Princely State of Travancore and the British Government and deduce conclusions regarding the nature of and the motives involved in their reciprocal relationship.

Long before she emerged as the supreme power in India, Britian had close relations with Travancore. From the very inception of the East India Company the shores of this maritime State were frequented by English merchants. The State was rich in spices and calico and the merchants came here in quest of these precious commodities. Travancore was the first among the states in India to enter into treaty relations with the English. K. M. Panikkar has said: "The first treaty entered into by the East India Company with an Indian State was the Treaty of Anjengo with the Raja of Travancore which was negotiated by Dr. Alexander Orme, the historian's father, who was the chief of the Anjengo

factory."[1] This treaty signed in 1723 was more than a trade agreement; it had political implications. The Raja offered to build a fort at Colachel in South Travancore and the Company promised to supply the artillery and munitions of war for the fort. Article 6 of the Treaty declared that the king of Travancore "will be in league and united in good friendship with the Honourable Company."[2]

During the wars with Hyder Ali and his son Tipu Sultan, the British invariably found the Raja of Travancore a steadfast ally.[3] In the Second Mysore war Travancore forces fought on the side of the English against the Sultan of Mysore. The help rendered by the State was greatly appreciated and Travancore was particularly mentioned in the Treaty of Mangalore, 1784 as an ally of the Company.[4] It was this commitment that prompted Cornwallis to declare war on Tipu Sultan in 1789 when the latter invaded Travancore.

It was towards the close of the 18th century that Travancore became a subsidiary ally of the East India Company. In 1795 a formal treaty was concluded by which the Company agreed to protect Travancore from foreign aggression.[5] By a subsequent treaty signed in 1805, the subsidy was enhanced and the state was brought under the effective control of the Company. Eventually the subsidy payable by Travancore was fixed at Rs. 8 lakhs per annum.[6] The 19th century witnessed a steady growth of British authority in the state and every branch of the State administration was brought under the control of the Resident. With the exception of Swati Tirunal (1847–1860) the rulers of Travancore tried their

1. K. M. Panikkar, *Relations of Indian States with the Government of India*, (London, 1927), pp. 5, 6.

2. W. Logan, *A Collection of Treaties, Engagements and other papers of importance relating to British affairs in Malabar*, (Madras, 1951), p. 207.

3. C. U. Aitchison, *A Collection of Treaties Engagements and Sanads*, (Vol. viii), (Calcutta, 1892), p. 109.

4. P. Shungoonny Menon, *A History of Travancore*, (Madras, 1878), p. 207.

5. C. U. Aitchison, *op. cit.*, p. 123.

6. *Ibid.*, p. 110.

utmost to maintain friendly relations with the British Government and never failed to demonstrate their loyalty to the British Crown.

With the dawn of the 20th century, there was a marked change in the British policy towards the Indian States. Alarmed at the rapid growth of nationalism in the country and the agitational approach of the Indian National Congress the British Government was constrained to adopt a more conciliatory attitude towards the states. The princes were no longer viewed with suspicion and their co-operation was eagerly sought. It was the intention of the British Government to use the princely order in India as a counterpoise against the national movement. The Princes too had no sympathy towards the National Movement and let loose a policy of repression in dealing with such movements within their borders. They reaffirmed their faith in the invincibility of British power and matched their profession of loyalty by appropriate action when the occasion arose.

The First World War provided an opportunity for the British Government to test the loyalty of the princes and for the latter to act in such a way as to justify the trust reposed in them. The Maharaja of Travancore strongly condemned German militarism and offered his unqualified support to the Paramount Power. "He placed all the resources of the State at the disposal of His Majesty, the King Emperor and at a later stage when the tension of the conflict became severe exhorted his subjects in a soul-stirring message to help the cause of the Empire to the utmost limit of their capacity."[7]

The people responded magnificently to their sovereign's appeal and made substantial contributions to the war effort. Many of them enlisted for active service and others invested their money in War Bonds. The State Government granted many concessions to those who volunteered for military service. Special facilities were provided for the veterans in the matter of land assignments.

The contributions made by the State Government towards the war effort, were substantial. Sir M. Krishnan Nair, the Dewan of Travancore in his address to the State assembly informed the

7. The Dewan's address to the 15th session of the Sri Mulam Popular Assembly, (see the *Travancore Almanac and Directory for* 1920, p. vii).

house that His Highness "made a further contribution of one lakh of rupees to the Madras War Fund and the State had so far invested 15 lakhs of rupees in the Government of India War Bonds."[8] The Maharaja and the officers of the State made monthly contributions towards the maintenance of the hospital ship 'Madras' which rendered invaluable service in connection with war relief.[9] The State Government did everything in its power to encourage recruitment from Travancore to the British Army. To facilitate recruitment, an official of the State Government was appointed District Assistant Recruiting Officer for Travancore. Any attempt to dissuade people from joining the army was seriously dealt with. A Proclamation dated 6 July 1918 stated: "No person shall dissuade or attempt to dissuade or abet the dissuation of any person from entering the military or police service of His Majesty, the King Emperor."[10] Apart from the facilities provided for direct recruitment to the Indian Army, the Maharaja offered to place the State forces at the disposal of the British Government. The Travancore Army known as the Nair Brigade was sent out to supplement the British forces. Attached to the 73rd infantry of the Indian Army, the Travancore soldiers acquitted themselves creditably and the officer commanding the Regiment spoke high of their performance.[11]

Apart from the substantial aid given by the State, the entire administration was placed on a war footing. A state of emergency was declared and all activities likely to undermine the war effort were put down with a heavy hand. Restrictions were imposed on the press. A royal proclamation issued in August 1914 prohibited the publication of any news regarding the movements of troops, ships or aircraft other than the information supplied by the Government.[12] Those who were guilty of such offences were liable to imprisonment for one year or a fine up to Rs. 5,000/- or both.[13] No court was authorised to try an offence punishable under this proclamation unless upon a complaint made by the

8. *The Travancore Almanac and Directory for* 1920, p. vii.
9. *Ibid.*
10. *Travancore Government Gazette*, dated 9 July 1918.
11. *The Travancore Almanac and Directory for* 1920, p. vii.
12. *Travancore Government Gazette Extraordinary*, dated 15 August 1914.
13. *Ibid.*

Government itself.[14] The entry of foreigners was restricted and their movements within the state were closely watched. By a Government Notification dated 19 August 1914 all non–Asiatic foreigners, who had not received permission to reside in Travancore, were ordered to appear and register themselves within 24 hours before the British Resident and report themselves periodically if so required by the Resident.[15] All Germans and Austrains residing in Travancore were asked to surrender to the Resident within 24 hours, all arms and ammunition in their possession.[16] It was also stated in the Notification that infringement of these orders would entail expulsion from the state.[17]

The war had its impact on the finances of the state. The revenues for the year 1914–15 registered a sharp decline compared to the sound financial position of the preceding years. Travancore was a maritime state and customs and excise formed the mainstay of her finance. The sea–borne trade was adversely affected by the war and exports dwindled. There was a considerable decline in the revenues from customs, stamps and registration in 1914–15.[18] But there was compensation from other sources. In 1916–'17 the State received more than two lakhs of rupees by way of interest on loans made to the Government of India.[19] Reference was already made to the substantial sum of Rs. 15 lakhs invested by the State in the Government of India War Bonds. Realising the merits of such investments, a further sum of Rs. 10 lakhs was invested in War Bonds during the year 1917–18.[20] While revenues under certain heads declined, expenditure steadily increased during the war period. In 1918–'19 an extraordinary expenditure to the tune of Rs. 8 lakhs was incurred and the increase was partly due to contributions made to the war funds.[21]

The war brought about a definite change in the attitude of the British Government towards the India States. The Princes rallied

14. *Ibid.*
15. *Travancore Government Gazette*, dated 8 Sept., 1914.
16. *Ibid.*
17. *Ibid.*
18. T. K. Velu Pillai, *The Travancore State Manual*, (Vol. II), (Trivandrum, 1940), p. 708.
19. *Ibid.*
20. *Ibid.*
21. *Ibid.*

to fight for the Empire in its hour of peril and offered to place their resources at the disposal of the Paramount Power. "Not only did they help Britian lavishly with men, material and money but some of them even served as officers in the different theatres of war."[22] Some of the leading princes who participated in the war time conferences convened by the Viceroy stressed the essential identity of interests between the states and the British Indian Provinces. In the Montagu–Chelmsford Report on constitutional Reforms there was special reference to the princes and their problems. The authors of the Report urged that steps should be taken for joint consultation by the rulers of Indian States for the promotion of their common interests and recommended the formation of a permanent consultative committee.[23] The Chamber of Princes was accordingly set up in 1921. All those rulers who were entitled to permanent dynastic salutes of eleven guns and more were qualified for individual admission. The Maharaja of Travancore was entitled to a salute of 19 guns and the state was admitted to the Chamber as a fullfledged member. The establishment of the Chamber of Princes ended the period of isolation and inaugurated a policy of active cooperation among the rulers.

The Second World War afforded greater opportunities to the Princes to demonstrate their loyalty to the Crown. The Congress which gave unconditional support to Britian in the First War now adopted a hostile attitude. The Congress Working Committee characterised the war as an imperialist war and categorically stated that they "cannot associate themselves or offer any co–operation in a war which is conducted on imperialistic lines and which is meant to consolidate imperialism in India and elsewhere."[24] Under the circumstances, Britian could count only on the loyal support of the native Princes and more reliance was placed on their co–operation. The Princes, on their part reaffirmed their loyalty to the British Crown and wholeheartedly supported the cause of the Empire.

22. V. P. Menon, *The Story of the Integration of the Indian States*, (New York, 1956), p. 12.

23. *Montagu-Chelmsford Report*, para, 306.

24. *The Resolution of the Congress Working Committee*, dated 15 Sept. 1939.

As soon as war was declared, the Maharaja of Travancore issued a proclamation promulgating the Defence of Travancore Rules.[25] It was a comprehensive document consisting of 131 sections drawn up largely on the lines of the Defence of India Rules issued by the Government of India on 3 Sep. 1939.[26] The Defence of Travancore Rules, among other things, imposed restrictions on the movements and activities of persons, denied access to certain places and areas, imposed restrictions on foreigners and adequately provided for the control of arms and explosives. As a loyal ally of the British Crown the Maharaja placed the entire resources of his state at the disposal of the British Goverment.[27] Of all the states in India, Travancore was worst hit by this war. Commenting on the gravity of the situation, Sri C. P. Ramaswami Aiyar, the Dewan of Travancore said: "I can assert with some confidence that excepting the centres of war like England or the Near East there is perhaps no part of the far-flung British Empire where the impact or the disastrous consequences of the war are more evident than in the state of Travancore."[28] While the other states derived the bulk of their income from land revenue and related heads, Travancore, being a maritime state, concentrated on her exports and hence customs duties formed an important part of her revenues. Food production was neglected and more lands were brought under the cultivation of commercial crops like tea, rubber, pepper, cardamom and ginger which yielded substantial income to the state. The growing competition from countries like Ceylon, Burma and Malaya which were also engaged in the cultivation of cash crops and restrictions imposed on exports by the war put great strain on the economy of the state. Neglect of food production made the state depend on Burma and Siam for import of rice, which was the staple diet of her people. In times of war it became increasingly difficult for the state to procure supplies from outside. The Japanese conquest of Burma cut off all supplies from that source. The Dewan said. "Export and import on which Travancore mainly relies for sustenance—not for profit so much

25. *Travancore Government Gazette, Extraordinary*, dated 9 Sep. 1939.
26. For details see the *Gazette of India Extraordinary*, dated 3 Sep. 1939.
27. *Report on the Administration of Travancore for* 1939-40, p. 8.
28. Dewan's Budget speech, dated 21 July 1941 (see, *Proceedings of the Travancore Sri Mulam Assembly*, Vol. XVIII, p. 20).

as for sustenance—these are greatly threatened.'[29] That Britain should win this war thus became a necessity for Travancore and the sooner it was achieved the better for both sides.

As a trusted ally of the British Government, the Maharaja of Travancore rendered assistance to Britian's war effort on a massive scale. The administrative machinery of the state was geared to meet the needs of the war. An all-out effort was made at all levels of state activity to raise men, material and money for the war. The quantum of assistance rendered was so great and so varied that it should be assessed under appropriate heads.

The contributions made by Travancore to the Royal Indian Navy and the Royal Air Force deserve special mention. A warship built at a cost of Rs. 6½ lakhs was presented to the Navy.[30] It was a trawler and a mine sweeper named "H.M.I.S. Travancore" the first warship to be built in India. To the Royal Air Force the Maharaja contributed two fighter planes "Travancore I" and "Travancore II" at a cost of Rs. 1½ lakhs. The Viceroy, in a communique, expressed his gratitude to the Maharaja for this generous gift.[31] The Travancore State Forces were also placed at the disposal of the British Government. Two infantry divisions of the State Forces were sent on active Service. They were attached to the Indian Army but the entire expenditure for their maintenance was borne by the State Government.[32] Consequent on the departure of these two infantry divisions, the military strength of the State was considerably depleted and a third infantry division was raised for the task of maintaining internal security. A Signal Platoon of this division was deputed for active service with the Indian Signal Corps. Another unit called the Travancore General Purposes Transport Company was also formed and the company left the state in May, 1941 for active service. Apart from these contributions, the Maharaja donated liberally to the Viceroy's war fund and various organisations engaged in relief work.

29. *Ibid.*

30. *Travancore Information* for July 1941, p. 12.

31. Communique, dated 15 Jan. 1941 (See *Travancore Information* for February 1941, p. 76).

32. *Travancore Information and Listener* for Oct. 1943, p. 46.

The contributions made by the ruler of Travancore amounted to Rs. 28,51,050 as apportioned below:[33]

1.	The Cost of the Trawler presented to the Navy ..	Rs.	6,50,000
2.	The Cost of two fighter planes donated to the Air Force ..	,,	1,50,000
3.	To the Viceroy's War Fund ..	,,	15,35,050
4.	To the Viceroy's Comforts Fund ..	,,	2,00,000
5.	Towards Women's Work ..	,,	1,50,000
6.	To the Red Cross ..	,,	1,10,000
7.	To King George's Fund for Sailors ..	,,	30,000
8.	Other contributions ..	,,	26 000
	Total ..	,,	28,51,050

To ensure people's participation and to coordinate their war efforts, the Travancore War Purposes Central Committee was formed with the Dewan as its president.[34] Three District Committees, 17 municipal Committees and a number of Taluk Committees were also formed for the purpose and their activities were coordinated by the Central Committee. To ensure efficiency and speed, the Central Committee functioned through its Sub-Committees such as 1. The Executive Committee; 2. Finance Sub-Committee; 3. Women's Sub-Committee; 4. Sub-Committee for training in first aid and fire fighting; 5. Sub-Committee for propaganda.

Under the auspices of the Women's Sub-Committee, the Women of Travancore made notable contributions to the war effort. Centres were opened for knitting garments and making surgical appliances. Eleven packing cases filled with such articles were sent to the Madras branch of the Joint War Charities for despatch to troops and military hospitals. The women of Travancore also provided one complete ambulance unit out of Rs. 4,500 generously contributed by Her Highness Sethu Parvati Bai and

33. The amount shown is exclusive of the cost of maintaining two infantry divisions on active service at enhanced rates of pay.

34. *Administration Report* for 1939-'40, p. 8.

presented the military hospitals at Colaba and Karachi with two x-ray sets at a cost of Rs. 6,500/- out of subscriptions collected from the Women of Trivandrum.[35] The work done by the Women's Sub-Committee for the Red Cross was also highly commendable.

Besides contributions made in men and money, Travancore supplied essential war materials to the Government of India. Articles like rubber, tea, timber, coir and carbonised coconut shells were supplied by the state in large quantities to meet the needs of the supply Departments of the Government of India. The Rubber factory at Trivandrum and the Ceramic factory at Kundara stepped up production to meet the needs of war. Travancore was the chief supplier of rubber to the Government of India for defence purposes.[36] The forest department of the Travancore Government supplied valuable timber for defence purposes. In addition to the supplies made through Government agencies, private firms also supplied many articles ordered by the Central Government. The leading firms and industrialists of the state organised themselvss as the Travancore War Supplies Syndicate to deal with massive orders placed by the British Government. To coordinate the activities of the various organisations engaged in war supplies, the State Government appointed a Controller of War Supplies, to act as a laison officer between the Government of India and the Travancore War Supplies Syndicate.[37]

The Coir Industry, which employed a large number of people and brought considerable revenue to the State in normal times, suffered a heavy set-back during the war. The loss of its European markets created a slump in the coir industry throwing thousands of people out of employment. The State Government appealed to the Government of India to consider the suitability of coir materials for war purposes. The request was considered favourably and the State Government received substantial orders for the supply of tent components made of coir.[38] The industry was thus saved from impending ruin. Due to acute shortage of coal in war time,

35. *Travancore Information for August* 1941, p. 56.
36. *Administration Report for the year* 1944-45, p. 10.
37. *Administration Report for* 1940-41, p. 15.
38. *Ibid.*

there was great demand for carbonised coconut shell which could be used in certain cases as a substitute for coal. Travancore, which abounded in coconut and coconut products, was naturally approached by the Government of India for the supply of this commodity in large quantities. Production of carbonised coconut shell was taken up as a cottage industry in the villages of Travancore. The State supplied 16,000 tons of carbonised coconut shell to the value of Rs. 14 lakhs.[39]

Travancore provided an excellent recruiting ground for the Indian Army. To facilitate recruitment, a Central War Recruiting Committee was set up.[40] The committee selected 449 candidates for the King's commission in the various fighting forces. By the end of the year 1944–45, in addition to the Commissioned Officers and a large number of technicians, 81,300 men from Travancore joined the war service.[41] To provide an adequate supply of labour force to the Indian Army, 93 labour units of about 845 men each were sent from the state to work in Assam and the neighbouring places.[42] About 1,800 technicians were trained in the State and sent out for service in the Indian Army, Ordnance factories and firms engaged in defence production. Travancore and Mysore, between themselves supplied half the trained technical personnel recruited from the Indian States.[43] Several doctors, nurses and engineers from Travancore also joined war service. The recruits from Travancore, wherever they served, distinguished themselves by their exceptional ability, valour and devotion to duty. Travancore stood first among Indian States in the matter of recruitment to the fighting forces.[44] The War Department of the Government of India expressed their gratitude to the Travancore Government for the splendid and untiring support extended to the cause of recruitment throughout the war.[45]

39. *Ibid.*, p. 14.
40. *Administration Report for* 1944-45, p. 9.
41. *Ibid.*
42. *Ibid.*
43. Dewan's speech of 14 May 1945. (See *Travancore Information and Listener for June* 1945, p. 17.
44. *Administration Report for* 1944-45, p. 9.
45. *Ibid.*

The University of Travancore also played an important role in organising the war effort. In response to an appeal from the Government of India, the University offered to give youngmen technical training for employment in the various technical branches of the Indian army. The workshop of the College of Engineering at Trivandrum worked day and night turning out technicians on a large scale.[46] The University also agreed to admit to its courses Indian students whose studies in British Universities were disrupted by the war.[47]

The foregoing review reveals the nature and implications of the reciprocal relationship that existed between Travancore and the Paramount Power in times of international conflicts. The war provided the occasion for Britain and the Native states of India to realise how much they needed each other's help in times of emergency. The generous contributions made by the Indian states proved their steadfast loyalty to the British crown. Sir C. P. Ramaswami Aiyar, in his speech on the occasion of the Victory Day celebrations, disclosed that out of the 11.64 crores of rupees received by the Viceroy's War purposes Fund for giving relief to the Combatant Forces, a sum of 6.5 crores was contributed by the Indian states alone.[48] The unflinching loyalty shown by the Indian States was particularly significant at a time when the political situation in India was tense. The refusal of the Congress to co-operate with Britain in the war, the Quit India Movement launched by Gandhiji, the growth of terrorist activities in the country and the rapid advance of the Japanese troops to the borders of India—all these disturbing factors made Britain lean heavily on the Indian princes at a time when she was passing through one of the worst crises in history.

The rulers of the States knew that their fortunes were closely linked with those of the Paramount Power and for them it was essential that Britain should come out of the war unscathed. Britain's victory in the Second World War was indispensable for

46. *Administration Report for* 1940-41, p. 14.
47. *Administration Report for* 1939-40, p. 8.
48. Speech at Trivandrum, dated 14 May 1945. (See *Travancore Information and Listener for June*, 1945, p. 16).

the very survival of the states. At a time when their own position was threatened by the onset of political agitation within their borders, victory for the Empire was their only hope. Being autocrats they persistently refused to share power with their people and adopted a policy of repression in dealing with popular movements in their states. They realised that they were isolated from their people and this realisation made them cling to the Paramount Power for their own survival. It was in this context that they placed themselves and the entire resources of their states at the disposal of the British Government.

Among the Native States of India, Travancore enjoyed a unique position and for that reason she had to feel the full impact of international conflicts. In point of literacy Travancore was far ahead of the rest of the country and her people were more politically conscious than those of the other states. During the Second World War the political situation in the state was tense. The Travancore State Congress intensified their agitation to press their demand for responsible government. The Quit India Movement had serious repercussions in the state. The administration headed by Sir C. P. Ramaswamy Aiyar adopted repressive measures to meet the situation. Under the circumstances it became all the more necessary for the royal house of Travancore to get the sympathy and support of Great Britain to maintain their position. The peculiar situation in which the state was placed and the special problems it had to face largely explain the profusion of loyalty shown by the ruler and the generous contributions made by him to the war effort.

Another reason that prompted the state to stand by Britain and contribute so liberally to the war effort was her vulnerability to attacks from the sea. Being a maritime state with a long coast line, she was naturally exposed to such attacks. Dependence on imported food and the export of commercial crops to sustain her economy made her position insecure in times of war. Such were the problems of a maritime state like Travancore and no wonder, of all the Indian states, she was most interested in contributing to Britain's war effort.

Sentiment also played its part in strengthening the bond between Travancore and the Paramount Power during this crucial

period. Ever since Martanda Varma gave his dying injunction to the heir apparent that the friendship and alliance between the state and the British Government must be maintained at all cost, the rulers of Travancore bound themselves by the closest ties to the British Power. True to the traditions of their illustrious house, which for a century and a half stood by the side of Great Britian as a staunch ally and a faithful friend, the rulers of Travancore responded magnificently to the call of the Empire in times of war and amply demonstrated their loyalty to the British crown by their words and their deeds.

The Problem of Two Besnagar Garuda Pillar Inscriptions

BY

B. C. SINHA

The successor of Vasumitra is called Bhadraka in the Bhāgavata Purāṇa, Ardraka and Odruka in the Viṣṇu, Andhraka in the Vāyu and Antaka in the Matsya Purāṇa.[1] Dr. K. P. Jayaswal identified him with Udaka, a name occuring in Pabhosa inscription, No. 904. He has given good reason for supposing that the original form, from which all these varieties are derived was Oduaka.[2] But we must recognise that an error has crept into the text of the Purānas, which as they stand assign either two or seven years to this king.[3] The Pabhosa epigraph has been translated thus: "By Asodhsena, the son of Gopali Vaihidari and maternal uncle of king Bahasatimitra, son of Gopali, a cave was caused to be made in the tenth year of Udaka for the use of the Kassapia Arhats." We learn from another Pabhosa inscription that Asadhasena belonged to the royal family of Ahichhatra, the capital of North Pāñcāla. Dr. Jayaswal held that Odraka was the paramount Sunga sovereign, while the family of Asadhosena was feudatory to the Sungas. The identification of Odraka with Udaka has no solid basis. Is it not possible that this Udaka might have been a ruler of Ahichhatra and Asadhasena was his near relative? Pabhosa inscription only says that Asadhasena belonged to the royal family of Ahichhatra. Dr. Barua[4] points out that in the absence of the word Rajno preceding Udaka, it is difficult to say at once whether Udaka is the personal name of a king, or the local name of a place, where the cave was excavated.

1. H. C. Raichoudhuri, *Political History of Ancient India*, p. 328.
2. *Cambridge History of India*, p. 469.
3. K. P. Jayaswal, *JBORS*, 1917, pp. 473-5.
4. *IHQ*, 1930, p. 23.

Sir John Marshall[5] on the other hand identified the so called fifth Sunga king with Kasiputra Bhagabhadra mentioned in a Garuda Pillar inscription found in the old city of Vidisa. Dr. Jayaswal identified Bhagabhadra with the ninth Sunga king Bhagavata of the Puranas. But this theory has to be given up in view of the discovery of another Besnagar Garuda Pillar inscription of the 12th year after the installation of Maharaja Bhagavata. It proves that there was at Vidisa, a king named Bhagavata apart from Kasiputra Bhagabhadra. In the absence of clear evidence connecting "Udaka" with Vidiśa, it cannot be confidently asserted that he belonged to the house of Agnimitra and Bhagavata."[6] In fact the so-called fifth, sixth and seventh Sunga monarchs were, Andhra rulers. The fourth Sunga king Vasumitra took up the life of ease and pleasure. The result was that the Sunga empire began to disintegrate. Bana tells us that he was killed by some Muladeva while enjoying a concert. Taking advantage of the murder of Vasumitra, Andhras occupied the throne at Pataliputra. Andhraka, Pulindaka and Ghosha, these three appear to be extraneous to the Sunga dynasty as their inclusion creates a chronological anomaly. The Puranas assign a total duration of 112 years to the Sunga dynasty. But if we add up the period of these three kings, the total comes to 120 years. By excluding their period of 8 years we arrive at the true figure of 112 years.

At the time of Andhra occupation of Pataliputra Bhagabhadra the local viceroy of Vidiśa maintained his position against the Andhras. He might have been a close relation of the Sungas. We further assume that he was appointed Viceroy of Vidisa, during the reign of Vasumitra. Vasumitra was ruling at Pataliputra and after his murder Bhagabhadra declared himself the king of Vidiśa.

But it has to be remembered that he always remained loyal to the Sunga family. In order to strengthen his position against the Andhras he sought friendly alliance with the Indo-Greeks. This alliance was in the interest of both the parties. We learn from Besnagar inscription of the reign of Bhagabhadra that Maharaja Antialkidas of Taxila sent his ambassador Heliodoros to Vidiśa

5. Sir John Marshall, *A Guide to Sanchi*, p. 11.
6. H. C. Raichoudhuri, *op. cit.*, p. 329.

when king Bhagabhadra was prospering in the fourteenth year of his reign. It was with the help of Bhagabhadra that the Sungas regained their position after 8 years of the Andhra rule. Vajramitra might have been the son of Vasumitra. Now there is no difficulty about the other Besnagar Garuda Pillar inscription of the twelfth year after the installation of Maharaja Bhagavata. He appears to be the ninth Sunga king according to the Puranic list, who had a long reign of 32 years.

Reviews

McCRINDLE'S ANCIENT INDIA, AS DESCRIBED BY MEGASTHENES AND ARRIAN, edited by Ramachandra Jain, Director, Institute of Bharatological Research, Sriganganagar, Rajasthan, published by Today & Tomorrow's Printers & Publishers, New Delhi, 1972, pp. LI + 263. Price Rs. 50/-

This book, a reprint of *McCrindle's Ancient India as described by Megasthenes and Arrian* (originally published in 1877) is now being republished with a conculturuum, appendices, notes, bibliography and index by the editor.

The editor mentions in the Preface that the available histories of Bhārata suffer from several defects. One of the defects he mentions is that "the Bhāratīya historians give undue weightage to the Vedic and the Puranic sources of the Bhāratīya history." (p. V). He now sets out in his conculturuum to correct the errors in the present histories of India, in relation to the period of Megasthenes. Some of the corrections he proposes may be summarised as follows:

(i) The sixteen Mahajanapadas were full-fledged jana republics, which after the first foreign 'Brahmaryan' conquest of Western Bhārata, became 'ganaised' or tribalised. The powerful centralised authority at the centre was developed to meet the extraneous onslaughts, keeping intact the republican pattern at the base.' (p. xi).

(ii) The matriarchal system prevailed in Bhārata before the introduction of the patriarchal system by the foreign Brahmaryans. (p. xix).

(iii) 'The great Shramanic hero' Ajātaśatru of the Nāga dynasty founded the city of Pāṭalīputra 'to suit his imperialistic ambitions newly introduced in Bhārata by Indra and his companions [of the Brahmaryans]' (p. xx).

(iv) The description of the Śramaṇic and Brāhmaṇic philosophy by Megasthenes 'categorically proves that the Shramanic

philosophy belonged to the pre-Brahmanic age and was much anterior to the rise of the Brahmanic philosophy and diffused its light to the Greekaryan gentiles and to the Brahmaryan gentiles too' (p. xxiii).

(v) The Uttarakuru region, located to the south of the circumpolar region and to the north of the Caspian and the Aral Seas, "was the Aryan cradle-land" (p. xxvii).

(vi) Candragupta Maurya was a powerful and glorious monarch of the Prācya people. The people living to the east of Ahisthala (modern Hastinapur) were known to the Brahmāryans as the Prācyas. "All the Prachyas were considered by the Brahmanas as Asuras, the non-Aryan Bharatiya people .... These Prachyas were anti-Brahmanical people" (pp. xxix-xxx).

(vii) D. C. Sircar and some earlier scholars have identified 'Taprobane' with Ceylon, but this seems clearly to be wrong. "Taprobane island was somewhere near the Patala island in the lower Sindh region" (p. xxxviii).

(viii) "The Prachya Bharata had been enjoying republican institutions even after their annihilation in western Bharata. When the Brahmaryan onslaughts increased on the east, the eastern republics changed their pattern. The whole republican pattern was kept intact .... Ajatashatru led the way of more political centralisation at the head, which Chandragupta efficiently perfected, keeping intact the living republican traditions" (p. xliv).

These and other corrections proposed by the editor are highly controversial and the correctness of some of them are dubious. To consider only two specimens —

(1) The editor's contention that the Sixteen Mahajanapadas were "full-fledged jana republics" is not correct. A number of them, e.g. Kōsala, Magadha, Avanti etc. were monarchies. He further contends that these Prācya republics developed a powerful centralised authority to meet the onslaughts of the foreign invaders (whom he calls the Brahmaryans), keeping intact the republican pattern at the base. The idea of a monarchy, keeping intact the republican base is a strange pattern of political development indeed!

(2) The editor disagrees with D. C. Sircar's identification of 'Taprobane' with Ceylon. In his opinion, "Taprobane island was somewhere near the Patala island in the lower Sindh region." This identification is clearly against its mention in the Girnar rock edict of Asoka as 'Taṁbapaṅṇī.' The Pāli word is obviously a derivative of the Ṣiṅhalese original 'Tāmbaravari' (the united stream) (cf. N. L. Dey): *The Geographical Dictionary of Ancient and Medieval India* (Oriental Reprint, 1971, 9. 203). Further clarification is obtained from Megasthenes himself, who describes the country as "more productive of gold and large pearls than India," and "abounds with wild beasts and elephants much larger than India breeds." (pp. 62–63). The editor's conjecture that it is 'somewhere near the Patala island' cannot meet these references. The dubious identification of its people, the 'Palaiogonai,' with 'Pāli–janas' (or the editor's 'Para–janas') cannot settle the issue, and hence the identification on its basis must remain a conjecture.

Besides the conculturuum and the Texts of Megasthenes and Arrian, there are six appendices, of which one is on historical personages and another on the historicity and age of Cāṇakya. The identification of several Indian personages is open to question. Regarding the historicity and the age of Cāṇakya, the editor states that "the Arthashastra .... could not have come in existence in the age of Chandragupta Maurya" (p. 237) and hence its authorship by Cāṇakya dubious. Regarding the role of Cāṇakya, the editor states that he was "a very small and inconspicuous collaborator of Chandragupta and hence, he found no recognition anywhere, not even in the Mauryan court" (p. 245). "The Arthashastra depicts the language, the society, the polity, the customs and manners, the economic system and thoughts of the Imperial Gupta age and not of the Maurya age" (p. 241). Even conceding that the Arthaśāstra was not written by Cāṇakya, nor in the period of Candragupta Maurya, its internal evidence does not conclusively prove that it was written during the period of the Imperial Guptas either.

The book also contains a bibliography, an index and an errata list. The errata list is however not exhaustive. The printing and get–up of the book are good.

A. P. Ibrahimkunju

SIR JADUNATH SARKAR BIRTH CENTENARY COMMEMORATION VOLUME, English Translation of *Tarikh i Dilkasha* (Memoirs of Bhimsen relating to Aurangzib's Deccan Campaigns)—Edited with notes and introduction by V. G. Khobrekar, Director of Archives & Archaeology, Government of Maharashtra. Published by the Department of Archives, Maharashtra, Bombay, January, 1972. Pp. 1-288, xiii, Price Rs. 5.25.

The book seeks to commemorate the birth centenary of Sir Jadunath Sarkar (born, 10 December, 1870). The Director of Archives & Archaeology, Maharashtra has earned the sincere gratitude of the scholarly world for his great service in publishing it. In a short but valuable Introduction he has highlighted the interesting details about the author's life, described the mss. of Bhimsen's work and summed up the narrative. The Education Minister of Maharashtra has written the foreword.

It is indeed a fitting tribute to Jadunath's scholarship. The choice of this book for the commemoration volume also has been singularly fortunate. During his long *sadhana* extending to nearly 67 years (1891–1958) he had ceaselessly endeavoured to ransack source materials of history from different parts of Asia and Europe and make them available to scholars. Some of them were translated by him and published during his lifetime but many others, though translated, did not see the light of the day. The present work not only includes such an unpublished translation of a part of the memoirs of Bhimsen made by him but supplements it with a translation of another part. Again, the major content of these memoirs covers the history and geography of Peninsular India and especially of the Marathas and their country. Jadunath had very intimate contacts with Maharashtra and regarded it as his second home, cherished a high opinion about the Maratha mind, society and people. He carried on extensive tours in villages, towns and forts of Maharashtra for his historical researches, almost exactly in the same manner as an army officer would do and as Bhimsen actually did. Further Jadunath had a very high opinion about Bhimsen's qualities as a historian: "The value of Bhimsen's history lies in his extensive and accurate personal observation and his position .... He is .... free from the worst defects of the official

histories of the Mughal Emperors. Bhimsen knew the truth and could afford to tell it. He has also given true sketches of the characters of various historical personages of the time and pointed out their defects .... For Deccan history in the late 17th century, he is invaluable."

The book is based on the mss. found in the India Office and the British Museum and hence is divided into two parts. Part I contains a translation made by the Maharashtra department of Archives from the photostat copy of *Tarikh i Dilkasha* preserved in India Office Library (mss. 94, ff. 1–104). It deals with the Mughal penetration to the Deccan up to the capture of Golkonda in 1687. This part has 33 chapters as follows: Chapter I. Invocations (pp. 1–2); Chapter II—Early History of Rao Dalpat Bundela (pp. 3–11); Chapter III—Aurangzeb's success in the War of Succession (pp. 12–23); Chapters IV–XXXIII dealing with the first 30 years of Aurangzeb's reign, Samvat 1714–43 or A.D. 1658–9 to 1687–88 (pp. 24–161). An abridged but partly incorrect translation of this part was published by Capt. Jonathan Scott, the Persian Secretary of Col. Popham in 1794 as 'Journal of a Boondelah Officer.' Translations in Marathi from this were made by Pandurang Narsimha Patwardhan in 1920 and Setu Madhav Rao Pagdi in 1963.

Part II contains the translation made by the late Sir Jadunath Sarkar from copy of *Nuskha i Dilkasha* preserved in British Museum (Mss. Or. 23 ff 95–158). It deals with the story of Mughal–Maratha struggle from 1687–88 up to Aurangzeb's death in 1707. This contains 20 chapters from 30th to 49th year of Aurangzeb's reign Samvat 1743–1762 (A.D. 1687–88 to 1706–07).

Of the few Hindu historians writing in Persian during the Mughal period Bhimsen Burhanpuri certainly occupies a very distinguished place. He has left enough material in his memoirs to enable his readers to know about his life, character, philosophy,—in brief as a man and as a writer. A Saksena kayastha of Uttar Pradesh, Bhimsen came to the Deccan in Mughal service along with his father, an accounts officer of artillery (*mushrif*), who settled in Burhanpur. At first he was his father's deputy, rising to an officer's post under Daud Khan and later as *mushrif* (1673–89) under Bahadur Khan, Governor of the Deccan. His uncle, Dianat Rai, was diwan of the Deccan. In 1689 Bhimsen became Secretary

of Rao Dalapat Bundela, the raja of Datia and the righthand man of Zulfiqar Khan. On the latter's death in 1707 he retired and wrote his memoirs in Persian (pp. 20, 22, 37, 38, 40, 63). He was an eyewitness of the events recorded here. He himself wrote his "impressions . . . consciously gained by experience or observation . . . without any omission or addition." Expecting that "its reading and its meaning will evoke attraction and pleasure," he named it *Dilkasha* (p. 5). His humility is reflected in his acknowledgment that he was able to produce this work owing to divine kindness, "when firmness of heart, consolidation of the inner-self, purity of deeds and improvements in general conditions, are not to be found." (p. 2). He hints at his philosophy of life and of history when he writes that by giving up his service and rank and living a retired life at Datia and Gwalior he "took the corner of isolation away from the society of men of wealth and fortune" so as "to keep his heart away from the chain of links of various relations which would enable me to have a firm collar of discarding this thing." (p. 2). Occasionally while writing his memoir he has made remarks on himself which are revealing. During his official career he "managed things in a worthy way and to the satisfaction of people . . . and did not consider gold as better than rubbish" and now at its end he prayed to God for "'recompense for my good deeds," and forgiveness for the bad ones. (p. 172). Even when suffering "from lack of resources" he had the strength to write that "courage looks all the more beautiful in the midst of poverty" (p. 223). A kind-hearted man, he used to love children (p. 60) and also enjoyed mirth. His love of nature and sense of beauty are also expressed at different places e.g., when he speaks of blossoming *champa* flowers in Bijapur (p. 166).

In some respects Bhimsen's style is comparable to that of contemporary Muslim writers. Though a Hindu he used the latter's terminology of abuse towards the Marathas and other Hindus, e.g., 'wretched infidels' (p. 71), 'condemned culprits' (p. 72), Shivaji's 'accursed place' of residence (p. 127), 'mischief mongers' (p. 134), 'luckless ones' (p. 173). He has also followed the Muslim tradition of tracing the genealogy of a person referred to (pp. 3, 8, 22, 56). His philosophic temper is also reflected in frequently interspersing his narrative, like other contemporary Muslim writers, with apt verses, e.g., 'It is bad . . . . to think oneself to be better than others.

The lesson should be learnt from the pupil of the eye which sees one and all but itself' (p. 1). 'The only end in this world is this that the name remained here after death' (p. 21); 'The beauty of character and manners is the ornament of this world and religion. It is supposed to be good if it is with a beggar but it becomes excellent when it is found in the King' (p. 40); 'None can complete the work of the world fully. Hence whatever you do let it be within your resources' (p. 59); 'To do good to the evil people is like doing harm to good people' (65); 'The heart of a sincere friend is like a mirror in which is reflected the entire world and thus there is no point in expressing a desire, because it is obvious to a friend' (p. 77); 'Don't give up hope at the time of hardship and trouble because the black cloud brings white water' (p. 84). Sometimes these verses are full of satire.

However, unlike many Persian writers and official historians Bhimsen does not write in ornate, verbose and rhetorical style. He writes in simple, business-like prose, and does not indulge in courtly flattery. Further though the chapters are arranged according to the regnal years, he does not give the *Hejira* dates like the Muslim writers but mentions Vikram *Samvat* years.

Bhimsen's memoirs are of engrossing interest on account of their varied content. While political and military affairs do get precedence, he being an officer of the Mughal empire, these are enriched by reference to other aspects—namely administrative details, military technique and art of war, and socio-economic life. What he gives is valuable primarily because he was an eye-witness and he had a good eye for details. Being in intimate contact with many high officials, he could get accurate information. Yet he could be independent in his remarks as he did not write for royal ears.

As regards political history even as regards wellknown episodes Bhimsen's account is different. He did not have a high opinion about Shivaji (p. 49) and considers him to be the aggressor in the Afzal Khan incident (pp. 16–17). Regarding Shivaji's visit to Agra (p. 48) Bhimsen's account is somewhat different. The route of his escape (pp. 48–51) agrees with that of Khafi Khan and so differs from the evidence gleaned from Dingal letters. The account of Purandar campaign 1665 (pp. 44–45) generally agrees with that

of the *Haft Anjuman*, except that the present work mentions 24 forts as against 23 of the *Haft Anjuman* and *Alamgirnamah*. Bhimsen has mentioned some facts not otherwise known, e.g. the appeal of the Bahmani Sultan Kalimullah to Babur against the usurpation of Barid (p. 220); the first Maratha raid into Malwa by Krishna Sawant (p. 216); and new details about Udairaj, Munshi of Jai Singh I (p. 53). He is the only contemporary writer to mention Rajaram's natural son Karna (p. 218).

Bhimsen's character sketches are excellent, being short, useful and marked by an independent spirit. He considers Mirza Raja Jai Singh to be 'unique' for his pleasant manners and 'excessive ways of generosity and benevolence,' high scholarship and knowledge of Persian and Turki (pp. 52–3). Curiously enough his opinion about Shivaji was not very high, though he has praised the latter's straightforwardness, qualities as a soldier and administrator, secretiveness, shrewdness and cunning (p. 127). His estimate of Aurangzeb shows his independence: "I have found the men of the world very greedy, so much so that an Emperor like Alamgir who is not want of anything' has been seized with such a longing and passion for taking forts that he personally runs about panting for some heaps of stone" (p. 223). "The Emperor... has given up attending to the happiness of his subjects. The *wazirs* and *umaras* have turned aside from giving good counsels. Therefore the condition of the country has become otherwise and it has reached such a ruin (that) the enemy are everywhere predominant and oppressive (but) nobody resists them" (p. 240). There are estimates also of many other personalities like Dilir Khan, Prince Muazzam, Mahabat Khan, Zulfiqar Subh Karan, Rao Karan, Sambhaji and Tarabai.

The book is valuable also for interesting sidelights on administration of the period (pp. 64, 100, 142)—the problems created by prolonged warfare, decline of administration (pp. 231–2), designations of various offices and the names of their holders, changes in staff, construction of public works like mosques (31), opening of sarais (61). We read of a novel administrative practice in those days, viz., supervisory control over officers (pp. 58–62). We have numerous references to problems of land revenue, prices

of articles, and causes of their rise (20, 31). We are told how during periods of wars and plunders by soldiers grain and provisions became scarce, prices rose.

From the numerous interesting sidelights thrown by the memoirs on military campaigns it is clear that Bhimsen had a full grasp of the contemporary art of war. His account shows how geography—terrain and climate–influenced war. The difficulties presented by hills, passes (pp. 94, 128), forests (p. 221), rains (pp. 215, 221–3), rivers (pp. 67, 124, 170), *nalahs* (p. 94) and the need of selecting a site for entrenchment (p. 248) are graphically mentioned while ravines and rivers were negotiated by ladders and bridges respectively (pp. 209, 150, 188). While praising the 'smart swordsmanship' of the Rajputs and the Afghans (p. 153), Bhimsen does not speak well of psychology of the Rohillas "utterly devoid of intelligence and commonsense" (p. 85) and the proud but rash Rajputs (pp. 196, 247). He, however, refers to the national sentiments of the Afghans of Bijapur coming to join their co–nationals at Naldurg (p. 110). We also get a vivid picture of Mughal and Maratha military organisation from Bhimsen's scattered observations. Narnol, Bundelkhand, Khandesh and the Deccan were spoken of as centres of recruitment (p. 34). He refers to his own promotion in spite of an anti–Hindu practice in the army that "the names of the Hindus were never recommended" (p. 83). He also refers to animals like horses and their branding, elephants (pp. 138, 189, 196, 234), camels and oxen (pp. 70, 187), of non–combatants including courtesans and prostitutes (p. 84), of arms, weapons and armour of the Mughals (p. 248), and of the Deccanis (p. 240). He speaks of rewards (pp. 49, 244), military accounts (p. 72), Mughal military intelligence and *dak chauki* (pp. 69, 80, 185, 212) and the efficacy of Maratha espionage (p. 36), of diplomatic and strategic service of the Mughals like *hajibs* and *vakils* (pp. 73, 89, 114, 150, 159). We are also told of special arms like Mughal artillery as well as of Bijapur artillery and use of gunpowder (pp. 34, 35, 39, 156, 157) in capturing Maratha forts. Not only do we have a long list of names of forts but good descriptions of many, e.g., Bidar and Parenda (pp. 13, 42), Malkol or Golkonda (p. 14), Ramgir (p. 15), Daulatabad (p. 15), Chakan (p. 30), Trimbak (pp. 11, 32), Elichpur or Berar (p. 33), Kondana (p. 39), Mahuli (p. 54), Ahiwant (pp. 55, 80), Ankai–Tankai (p. 78),

Mulher & Sulher (p. 79), Kanchan Manchan (p. 80), Junnar and Shivner (p. 87), Antur (p. 93), Naldurg (p. 110), Gulbarga (p. 113), Malkhed (p. 116), Bhupalgarh (p. 123), Ramsej (p. 137), Bijapur (pp. 156–8), Adoni (p. 166), Jinji (pp. 182, 206–10), Warangal (p. 197), Palamkota (p. 195), Wakinkhere (p. 249). We are also told of repairs of forts (p. 120), and of sieges of many hill forts. It is again significant that we are told of a large number of temple forts (p. 193).

Bhimsen discusses at length the problems of what constitutes logistics now a days, the problems of transporting accommodating and feeding the huge armies on the move (pp. 117, 127, 140, 142, 152, 156, 160, 244, 246, 253–254). Description of tents, *karkhanas* (p. 171), commissariat arrangements are given. Grain supply and scarcity thereof (pp. 116, 180, 187–190, 224, 241, 178, 239, 253) proved to be a very acute problem notwithstanding the itinerant *banjaras* or grain merchants. Again the threat of insecurity on the high ways was ever present. To cope with this arrangements were made for road guards (p. 175). Bodies of slain robbers were piled up to a small hillock (cf *chor minars*, p. 176). The use of drums (pp. 81, 130) and banners (p. 79) is also mentioned. Bhimbsen has not forgotten the role of the astrologer (p. 81) and the supernatural (p. 92) in the army.

Referring to strategy and tactics of the belligerents Bhimsen speaks of deception (diplomatic cunning, p. 172), surprise night attacks (pp. 30, 36, 80, 185), ambushes (p. 54), siege preparations (pp. 136, 237), mining (pp. 30, 222), scaling (pp. 120, 140–1, 208, raising mounds (p. 246), trenches (pp. 179, 183, 185, 241). We are told of Mughal battle order (p. 196). We learn that Mughal strategy under Aurangzeb was different from that under Akbar. "It was the strategy of Khan–i–Khanan Abdur Rahim to charge the largest division of the enemy, Khan–i–Dauran's plan of war was first to drive the enemy's smaller divisions back upon their main force and then to fight vigorously." On the other hand "the armies of Hyderabad, as has been conventional with them, stormed from all the four directions."

Bhimsen has dilated on the guerilla activities of the Deccani soldiers (of Bijapur and Golkonda, p. 228). of the Marathas (pp. 184, 229, 238, 251, 253, 255) and of the Berads (pp. 125, 198, 246, 247). We are told that Malik Ambar was "quite efficient in

performing the system of separation" and "holding the field from all the four sides" commonly known as *Bargi–giri* in the terminology of the Dakhani languages (pp. 9, 71). The dispersal methods of the Marathas (pp. 92–3), roving and predatory activities, (*ghanimi*) plunder of provisions by the Marathas are frequently referred to (pp. 107, 117, 120, 123, 130, 200, 216, 226, 244). The Berad guerrillas 'returned from the fight as quickly as the echo from the hill' i.e., they were familiar with modern 'hit and run' tactics (p. 246). Sometimes the Marathas and the Berads acted in concert (p. 256).

Bhimsen displays his critical powers in his analysis of the weaknesses of the Mughal army. He attributes Shivaji's success in spite of his numerical inferiority against the Mughals, to his military skill and accurate topographical information obtained through spies (p. 36). Speaking of the Mughals, he refers to large desertions of Bahelias (Mavles?) (pp. 173, 186). He pinpoints the discomfiture of the Mughals to the system of recruitment by their generals: "The immature generals, out of greed of money and lack of spirit, did not engage men of family and high breed, the sons and grandsons of soldiers. Instead of such men, they mounted their slaves and brought them to the field, whose only work was to flee and turn back." (p. 247). He also accuses the Mughal generals of making wilful delay and protracting operations (pp. 207–8). He has drawn an interesting comparison in the sysetm of food supply between the times of Shahjahan and Aurangzeb. Formerly grain for two years' consumption was provided for the Qandahar campaign but now there was utter failure of supply of grain (p. 255). Thus Bhimsen supports Napoleon's dictum that an army moves on its stomach.

Besides references to political, administrative and military affairs, Bhimsen gives many interesting details regarding socio–economic life of the people, which are generally not referred to in contemporary chronicles. He thus introduced something new in the prevailing conception of history. He may justly be classed as a social historian of the times. A few examples are noted below. In his description of the places and sites visited by him, he gives topographical and geographical details besides historical. Thus we get names of numerous rural and urban centres, of holy places and commercial centres, e.g., the city of Burhanpur

(pp. 5–7); history of the growth of the walled town of Aurangabad and description of the Deccan (pp. 7–10, 130–1), Ahmadnagar (pp. 75–6), holy places like Gulshanabad alias Nasik (pp. 32–34), Ellora (p. 33), Trimbak, Pravara Sangama (on the Godavari) (p. 242), Tuljapur, Jejuri, Tirupati (p. 200), Kanchi (p. 180), Ujjain, Hyderabad (151–2), Bijapur (p. 125), Madras (p. 191), Phulcherry (Pondicherry, 194). Bhimsen does not forget to refer to the sweet grapes of Mulher and Nasik and delicious figs of Junnar, water melons and sweet melons of Bahadurgad. At the same time Bhimsen regretfully noticed the decline of several cities of the Deccan (p. 245).

Social customs have been faithfully recorded, e.g., birth ceremonies and illuminations (p. 39), marriage ceremonies (p. 31), feasts and parties (pp. 31, 60, 118). Bhimsen mentions the *sati rite* approvingly (pp. 60, 129). He records a curious case in which the wife of a living Rajput was burnt alive at the desire of the husband (p. 99). Bhimsen has also mentioned assemblies of religious saints and mystics and the distribution of food in the function known as *bhandara* (p. 32). Nor has he forgotten to mention about the mausoleum of the famous Deccani saint Sayyid Gisu Daraj (p. 115). *Holi* festival was enjoyed by high Muslim nobles and officers like Bahadur Khan (p. 95). A very interesting light is thrown on Hindu Muslim relations by Bhimsen's reference to the temple of Khande Rao (pp. 235–6). The habit of drinking was fairly widespread among officers, both Hindu and Moslem, and Bhimsen records the death of his young relations due to this (pp. 172, 205). Bhimsen writes in a spirit of deep depression that "rich men in our times do not consider the lot of the poor. They sigh over their hoards .... Especially the high *umaras* and noblemen are in a wretched state, as they never think of the claims of the needy." (p. 242). This reference to class rift was made as Bhimsen thought rich man of his days had lost the earlier sense of generosity and charitable constructions of inns, wells, gardens and houses.

Bhimsen has left a graphic and forceful account of the sociological effects caused by prolonged warfare in the Deccan. He writes: "The general peace of the people was disturbed due to the presence of the soldiers at different points and places separately" (pp. 138, 150). How correct is this can easily be under-

stood even in our days! He has especially referred to the growth of a new 'tent generation', as soldiers sick of long separation summoned their families to the camp. Their whole life from the cradle to the grave was spent in the camp. Never seeing the face of the house they realised that "in this world there is not better (other) shelter than a tent' (p. 233).

In the midst of this black cloud of widespread desolation we read of a silver lining viz., the rehabilitation of a 'totally ruined' village named Abula (in Nasik area) by an erstwhile Maratha robber, Raghav by name (1703–4), (p. 238).

We even get interesting anthropological details. We get a vivid description of the *Ban–manush* or wild savages on the way between Karnul and Nandiyal (p. 179); of the food habits and dress of the "naked inhabitants" of the Madras east coast (pp. 193–4); of the *stri–raj* (or women's rule) in Maliwar (Malabar) where 'every man has 10 or 11 wives and also every wife 10 or 11 husbands'; and of the *Rajiwar* or Rajputs settled in the Karnatak said to be the descendants of Rajah Jaichand of Kanauj (p. 197).

We get a glimpse of the economic life of the people of the Deccan. There are frequent references to prices of articles at different places at different times. Once during Shaista Khan's regime, we are told that grain was very cheap at Poona. Two Shahjahani maunds of wheat could be had at a rupee, while there were special concessions for soldiers in Khandesh, Berar and Baglan and fodder did not cost more than 15 rupees (p. 31). Prices, of course, rose very high on account of campaigns and sieges, plunder, dacoity and insecurity. In war–devastated Telingana grain sold at only 12 seers a rupee as against two Shahjahani maunds before (p. 229). Prices rose very high in the imperial camp during the siege of Khelna (Vishalgad), (p. 233).

Among interesting economic products we read of paper or plank dress. In 1688–9 Shambhuji and his companions were made to wear *takhta* like offenders in Persia, (p. 169). Speaking of the famous carpet industry (*qalin* and *shatranj*) of Warrangal, Bhimsen speaks of the *qalin* as of the same quality as the *qalin* of Wilayat (i.e. Afghanistan and Iran) (p. 198). The Rajah of Ceylon, where elephants were found, did not molest the traders. The elephants of Malabar are said to be the best in the world (p. 196).

The notes and references appended by the editor are generally informative and useful. Printing and get-up are good. The price has been kept very low to the great credit of the Maharashtra government. This is in striking conformity to the late Jadunath's own idea that in our country books have to be cheap.

A few remarks may now be made about the sources and the bibliography. The Bibliothequc Nationale copy of Bhimsen's ms. referred to in the Introduction has not been utilised in the present work. It is not understood why Sir William Foster's book, *English Factories in India,* does not find a place in the bibliography, when that edited by Sir Charles Fawcett does. The metrical history *Aurangnamah* is not mentioned, though it throws much light on the War of Succession. All Persian sources used are in translation. Even no reference to Persian text is given except *Waqiat-i-Alamgiri.* The *Haft Anjuman* of Taleyar Khan, munshi of Mirza Rajah Jai Singh, has not been used. Even the reviewer's translation of its Benares ms. (*The Military despatches of a Seventeenth Century Indian General*) published nearly three years before this present work and his article on Punishment and Pardon of Ram Singh (*Journal of Indian History*), Brij Kishore's *Tara Bai and her Times* and S. N. Sen's *Shiva Chhatrapati* have not been mentioned in the Bibliography.

The reader notices a marked difference in the style between the translations in the two parts. Inconsistencies or mistakes have crept in at places. It is stated in the Introduction (p. xii) that Bhimsen's account ends with the battle of Jajau (June 1707). But the book really ends (p. 257) with Aurangzeb's death (20 February, 1707), It is not clear what is meant by "armies and the peoples". Certain terms have been left unexplained e.g., *Rasaṭ Kabṭi* (p. 176), *Karbhari* (p. 48).

Notwithstanding great care bestowed on the publication by the editor and his staff, the printers' devil has appeared. A few examples are noted below: Tuglak *for* Tughlaq (p. 41); Kalifa for Khalifa (p. 43); a bush *for* ambush (p. 54); 3 *for* 2 (p. 55n); mirza and Mir reconciled (?) (p. 64); got relieved his brother (p. 83); Sambat 1729 (1763–74) should be 1673–4 (p. 100); I and Sayyid Kabir (p. 128); shadow of Gods *for* God (p. 131), *nagara* for *naqqara* (p. 133); Prince *for* the Prince (p. 145); He (p. 146) is not clear as two persons are mentioned before (perhaps Khwaja

Shamsuddin); attacked upon *for* attacked (146); Khan-i-jahan *for* Jahan (173); Bakshi *for* Bakhshi (178), etc.

On the whole the work under review is a very valuable addition to the growing number of works on Medieval Indian History. Its chief merit lies in making this important source material of the seventeenth century available to scholars of this period in English.

J. N. SARKAR.

ŚRĪ VIṢṆUSAHASRANĀMABHĀṢYA of Satyasandha Yatiraja, edited by K. C. Kalkoti, Published by Agasthiar Book Depot, Tiruchirapalli-2, 1972, pp. 120. Rs. 2/-.

The *Viṣṇusahasranāmastotra* which forms part of the *Anuśāsanikaparva* of the *Mahābhārata* consists of hundred holy names of Lord Viṣṇu and is the most popular work recited by all devout Hindus. The meaning and significance of each one of these appellations, some of them apparently repetitions, are sought to be given by several Acāryas, and the earliest available work in this field is the *Bhāṣya* attributed to Ādi Śaṅkara, which naturally has an Advaitic leaning. The present work by Sri Satyasandhayatiraja of Uttaradi Mutt is a more elaborate exposition with a slight leaning towards the Dvaita Vedānta of Śrī Madhvācārya.

The commentary is elaborate and gives the roots and suffixes of every name and cites authority, particularly the basic works in the Madhva system. Several alternative explanations are given for many words. For instance, the simple word *paramātmā* is given as many as seven meanings among which are 'the soul which destroys enemies' (*paraḥ śatruḥ mīyate hiṁsyate yena*). '*Padmanābha*' in addition to 'he who has the lotus in the navel' is given the rather strained meaning 'he who shines before his devotees,' the word being split up as *padmanā* and *ābha*, and the first word being taken as standing for devotees. Some alternative readings are also seen, as for instance *viniyojayaḥ* for *vinayo jayah.*

The work is of great help in understanding what each appellation of Viṣṇu in the *Sahasranāma* stands for in the concept of God as the Supreme Being manifesting in the cosmic form.

S. VENKITASUBRAMONIA IYER

ORISSA UNDER THE EAST INDIA COMPANY, by Dr. K. M. Patra (Munshiram Manoharlal, New Delhi, pp. xix + 351, Rs. 42).

The rule of the East India Company over Orissa lasted for nearly fifty-five years, from 1805 to 1858. True, in 1765 Sir Robert Clive obtained the Diwani of Bengal, Bihar and Orissa from the Mughal Emperor Shah Alam II, but the Orissa of the Imperial grant was nothing more than the single district of Midnapore. It was only in 1803, in the course of the Second Anglo-Maratha war, that Lord Wellesley wrested the rest of the province from Raghuji Bhonsle of Nagpur.

Throughout the period of Company's rule and for many years thereafter, Orissa was included in the Bengal Presidency and it was from Calcutta that the administration of Orissa was superintended, directed and controlled. To this fact, the author, like most other Oriyas, would attribute many of the ills that beset the province until it realised its separate political identity in the present century.

Investigating, as it does, a period of transition from the Maratha to the British rule, a period during which the foundations of modern Orissan administration were laid, the work is of more than ordinary interest, especially as its fairly comprehensive documentation makes it an indispensable reference book for the study of a hitherto little-known aspect of Orissan history.

History to be meaningful has to be basically a study of change and of the reasons for it. It must be said to the credit of the author that he treats administrative history as the growth of the administrative system, and, since there is no growth without change, he brings out all the relevant administrative changes, indicating the arguments both for and against the existing administrative measures and practices and the proposed reforms, as revealed in the contemporary debate among the men who ruled Orissa.

The author's narrative unfolds a tale of progressive improvement in the various facets of administration that he has covered in this book. Therefore, the concluding words of his final summing up come as something of a shock, for they are largely out

of harmony with the findings which he records in the various chapters. This is what he says on the last page: "The period of the East India Company, instead of indicating any change for progress in the material condition of Orissa, left for the future a legacy of stagnation and economic deterioration." How would the author reconcile this sweeping generalisation with, for instance, his remark at the end of his survey of the history of the much-maligned salt monopoly under Company's rule a monopoly which was abolished four years after that rule was terminated that "the abolition of the salt monopoly gave a death blow to the commercial activities of the people of Orissa"?

J. P. DE SOUZA

HISTORY OF TIPU SULTAN: (Second and enlarged edition), by Mohibul Hasan, (Published by The World Press Private Ltd., Calcutta), 1972, pp. xvi + 442, Price Rs. 35/-.

The magnificent story of the meteoric rise and fall of a kingdom and the fidgets of its architects is skilfully narrated in this book by Mohibul Hasan. Giving in broad outline the impetuous and volcanic character of Haider Ali Khan, he closely analyses the high strung temper, rabid hate, wise policies and fanatical outbursts of his son in a vindicative vein. This account of Tipu Sultan, based on a variety of primary and secondary sources, can be considered as a study in motives and achievements of a highly complex personage. The author claims that he has made an attempt "to give an accurate picture of Tipu Sultan by disengaging his personality from masses of fictions and distortions which have gathered round him." (p. VIII). However it may be pointed out that the picture of Tipu thus salvaged appears to lack a burning personality. Political and religious expediency demanded of him certain absolute action which, from his own point of view, required no explanation or justification. In his attempt to do justice to Tipu, the author errs into justifying his misdeeds also. At that point his objectivity vanishes and he poses as an apologist of Tipu.

It is surprising and often sickening to see the author indulging in polemical exercises in the place where prudent analysis is expected, in a manner much like an impulsive vakil of Tipu Sultan,

producing witnesses who have perfected themselves in the art of perjury. An impartial observer of trends and events, ideas and movements of the period will find it difficult to accept many of the arguments presented here.

Prof. Hasan, in his anxiety to vindicate Tipu, accuses Rama Varma, the ruler of Travancore for constructing the 'Travancore Lines' and purchasing "Ayicotta and Cranganur from the Dutch knowing fully well that Tipu was also anxious to buy them." (pp. 154–5). If Tipu had the right to extend his territories, Rama Varma had no less a right to do so. Prof. Hasan says that Tipu wanted access to Palghat "both from the east and the west to be carefully guarded and for this purpose he was desirous of possessing himself of Cranganur" (p. 157). Defence of Palghat from Cranganore is a wild plan which a strategist like Tipu would never have contemplated because it is far removed from the Cranganore base.

What Tipu was interested in was the conquest of Travancore, to wreak vengeance against the intransigent ruler who disregarded the authority of his father. The arguments forwarded by the author to prove the contrary are puerile. For instance he says that the invasion was "strategically unsound" because "to approach the lines (Travancore Lines) from Cranganur a river had to be crossed." The same river running on the eastern boundary of Cranganore had to be crossed by Tipu to reach Palghat which is about seventy miles from that base; the distance to the Travancore boundary being less than two miles. That invasion of Travancore was the sole object of Tipu is clear from his endeavours to get hold of Ayicotta and Cranganore forts through the agency of Holland, the Governor of Madras, from the Raja of Travancore, even after their sale to him by the Dutch. (p. 162).

Even a pro-Tipu student of history will find it hard to agree with many of the findings of the author. Prof. Hasan shows little of the spark of historical objectivity in his rank denunciation of Rama Varma. Had he cared to remember that the Travancore Raja was not a vassal of Tipu, the unwarranted criticism could have been avoided.

Of all the chapters, the one with delicate sleight of hand is that dealing with state and religion. The author can feel com-

placent that he has done justice to his hero, but not to the subject matter, nor to the reader. By drawing on certain information and leaving others more important from the documents, he establishes the theory that Tipu was not a bigot but an enlightened ruler who raised Hindus to high positions in his Government, granted them complete freedom of worship, conferred grants on temples and Brahmins, gave money for the construction of images and on one occasion even ordered the building of a temple. "It is, therefore incredible" he says, "that a ruler who showed such tolerance and generosity who had such eclectic beliefs could ever have been guilty of religious persecutions of Hindus." (p. 364). The author is not mindful of the other positive evidences to prove the iconoclasm and bigotry of Tipu Sultan who established a reign of terror in Malabar. Through the length and breadth of littoral Malabar, hundreds of Hindu temples witnessed the defilement of their idols and demolition of their structures at the hands of Tipu and his soldiers. Their remains speak volumes on the intolerable acts of violence perpetrated by the invader. It is highly unethical on the part of a historian to ignore such living facts and pick up a few inconsequential pieces of evidences from unreliable quarters to establish the generosity and tolerance of Tipu. Harsh treatment of Hindus in Malabar is easily explained away by Prof. Hasan by saying that Tipu "did this not due to religious but to political motives. He regarded conversion as a form of punishment which he inflicted on such of his non-Muslim subjects as were guilty of repeated rebellion." (p. 362). Expansion of Islam was the real motive and the imputation of a political purpose is to hide it from unthinking readers.

That Tipu had strong aversion for non-Muslims was attested by the replacement of Hindu officials by Muslims in important situations under his dominion. This has been given as the main reason for the dimunition in the revenue collections under his reign because, as the Muslim historian Kirmani writes, the Muslim officials so appointed to posts requiring deep knowledge and great patience, could scarcely read and write. Tipu's contemporaries and his own eldest son testify to this misplaced love of the Sultan for Muslim officials. Still Prof. Hasan is eloquent on the favours Tipu bestowed on his Hindu subjects.

What we feel is that there were two contradictory traits in Tipu's character which made him a bigot and iconoclast as well as a tolerant benefactor at the same time or at different times. As periodic disorder and lucidity appear in lunacy, fits of fanatical outbursts might have alternated with moments of sober thinking and normal behaviour, in him. Hindus and their temples in Mysore fared better at Tipu's hands, when compared with their counterparts in Malabar. Similarly Muslims of Malabar enjoyed more benefits than those of Mysore. This dichotomy in the personality of Tipu calls for a detailed and close analysis.

On the whole, the book contains an appreciative but not reflective description of an attractive figure of modern Indian History. Very often it is distressing to see the bottom of objectivity giving way and impulsive assessments falling to ground. This produces oddly artificial results, making one feel that it is an uneven book with too much of hagiography about it. Lack of poise is evident in the distribution of topics. Of the 400 pages of the text, 329 are devoted to wars and conquests and the rest for the more important aspects of the rule like Administration and Economy, State and Religion and review and conclusions. The book suffers badly from the overburdening of details on military activities. Certain minor mistakes also can be detected in the body of the book. In the map to face page 194 Tellicherry is shown far to the north of Mangalore.

It would, however, be unfair to dismiss this book as not substantial or solid. All will agree that this absorbing biography of Tipu has no rival of proven merit in the field.

T. K. RAVINDRAN

INDIA'S SEARCH FOR NATIONAL IDENTITY, by Ainslie T. Embree (pp. xiv + 138 + v), published by Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 1st edition, 1972.

Indian patriots borrowed the concept of nationalism from the European countries in the nineteenth century and tried to foster a sense of unity and identity amongst Indians. The history of that search for national ideology has been admirably reviewed by

Prof. A. T. Embree in a slender volume. Details of events and citations from the leaders and historians have been avoided to a very large extent. More emphasis has been given to motivations and this factor accounts for a sustained interest in the book.

In the first two chapters it has been shown that during the period between 1880 and 1898 while the British rulers had centralized political power and introduced a single judicial system, there were many such factors which testify to a large extent the veracity of the opinion of Sir John Strachey about India in 1880. He wrote: "men of the Punjab, Bengal, North-Western Provinces and Madras, should ever feel they belonged to one great nation, is impossible." There were multiple vernacular newspapers and nationalist organisations. There could be little national identity when Hindus and Muslims differed not only in religion but also in response to Western education. The Indian National Congress, confined to the educated classes, and indifferent to urban people, was divided into two camps. Reconciliation between constitutionalism of the Liberals and resurgent Hindu nationalism of the Extremists could not take place till 1916. Similarly, the Muslims were divided into the Aligarh and Deoband schools on the propriety of approach to modernity. The third chapter deals with the period 1898–1917. The fourth is devoted to the emergence of Gandhi as the national leader (1918–1924). Though "not the father of the Indian nation" (p. 63), he harnessed the masses "for the first time to the aims of a nationalist organisation" (p. 76) at the time of the Non-Cooperation movement in 1921. But the search for national identity was not over even during the next twenty years because there were tensions between two interpretations—"the Gandhian insistence on social salvation through personal commitment as opposed to the policies of institutional participation" (p. 83). By 1940 it became clear that national identity could come only with the attainment of Indian independence. Throughout the book the conflict between secular nationalism and religious nationalism has been illustrated. It ends in 1947 when not one but two nations emerged. How pithy is Prof. Embree's last sentence of the last chapter, when he observes that "the final test of nationhood: the capacity to survive."

Few admirers of Gandhi have been able to justify his mistakes as has been done by the author in the fifth chapter of this book.

Gandhi abandoned the Civil Disobedience movement, launched by himself both in 1922 and 1934. He along with Nehru caused the failure of negotiations with the Muslim League. These were mistakes but they were right. Neither the *Charkha* nor the violation of the Salt laws was the correct medium for creation of a nationalist ideology and national policy. Yet it was necessary for Indian masses to have "some symbol that touched their daily lives." If the arguments of Jinnah and Iqbal in 1930 were not taken seriously or proposals for Congress–League Coalition ministries in provinces were rejected in 1937, Gandhi cannot be said to have blundered. How could unity come when Jinnah asserted that Hinduism and Islam were two distinct "social orders" (p. 102)?

The author has on many occasions charged a section of the British ruling class with obstruction of national identity. He accuses Churchill of concentrating on the Muslims which made genuine negotiations impossible at the time of Cripps' mission. But he has preferred to remain silent on the statements and policies of British rulers on certain other occasions. Nowhere has it been stated that the virus of communalism was injected by them. As early as April 14,1887, (Lord) Cross wrote to (Lord) Dufferin that "the interests of the Mahommedans must be considered." To whatever extent Prof. Embree's appreciation of Curzon be correct, it cannot be denied that the first partition of Bengal in 1905 was motivated less by administrative considerations than by the desire of weakening national identity, which was cherished by the Congress. Curzon wrote to Hamilton on November 18, 1900 that "one of my greatest ambitions while in India is to assist it (the Congress) to a peaceful demise." Further, it must be remembered that Muslims of Bengal did not make a proposal for that partition. Again, it is not enough to say that the Simon Commission brought new life to the nationalist movement (p. 96). In a book, the aim of which is quest of national identity, one would expect the incorporation of the following directive of Birkenhead, the Secretary of State for India, to Irwin, the Viceroy of India: "We have always relied on the non–boycotting Muslims, on the depressed community, on the business interests and to many others, to break, down the attitude of boycott."

Another significant omission in this work is the farsighted suggestion of vivisection of India by a few Hindu leaders long

before the demands made by Iqbal in 1930. Though Lajpat Rai wished to see an undivided India, in 1924 he suggested the partition of the Punjab and formation of four Muslim States comprising the North-West Province, Western Punjab, Sindh and Eastern Bengal. He observed "if there are compact Muslim communities in any other part of India sufficiently large to form a province, they should be similarly constituted. But it should be distinctly understood that this is not a United India. It means a clear partition of India into Muslim-India and a non-Muslim India" (Tribune, December 14, 1924). In 1928 at the All-Parties Conference Tej Bahadur Sapru pleaded for acceptance of Jinnah's demands that the Punjab and Bengal legislatures should have Muslims representation on the population basis for ten years and residuary powers vested in the provinces.

This reviewer is not certain if Prof. Embree thinks of Gandhi taking up the cause of Champaran peasants as an emissary of the Indian National Congress. If it is so, he is wrong. It is well known that though the Lucknow Congress of 1916 approved Resolution XI unanimously for appointment of a committee to enquire into the grievances of those peasants, no positive step was taken. It was due to the persuasion of Raj Kumar Shukla and Brajeshwar Prasad that Gandhi visited Champaran and he did it in a private capacity.

Possibly impelled by the necessity to be brief, the author has made a few sweeping observations. An example of such a tendency occurs in the following sentence: "The swadeshi movement and the boycott were concrete manifestations of an economic interpretation of modern Indian history that by this time was widely accepted by the nationalists" (p. 48). This is true from the Bengal school and some other Extremists. On the other hand some Moderate leaders like Pherozeshah Mehta and G. K. Gokhale favoured Swadeshism and remained hostile to boycott. Very few millowners like J. A. Wadia supported boycott. The general tone of the Western Indian Moderates and millowners can be discerned in the speech of D. E. Wacha, also Managing Agent for Morarjee Goculdas Spinning and Weaving Co. Ltd., at Bombay in 1908 about boycott as "the militant cant and mischievous shibboleths now in evidence in some utterly misguided quarters" (Speeches and Writings of D. E. Wacha, Madras, 1918, p. 145).

Not only in choosing the theme but also in narrating it critically in so few words, Prof. Enbree sets the much desired high standard of modern Indian historical writings. One gets a clear perception of hindrances to and success in formation of nationalist ideology. One cannot but praise the sagacity of Prof. Eugene Rice, Consulting Editor, and Messers Alfred A. Knopf, publisher, for incorporating such a brilliant and intensely absorbing work in a cheap paper-back edition.

B. P. Mazumdar

IMPERIAL SUNSET, Volume I, Britain's Liberal Empire, 1897–1921, by Max Beloff, Methuen & Co. Ltd., London' 1969, pp. xi + 387.

As the title indicates, the author proposes to deal in detail in several volumes the decline and fall of the British empire, the beginnings of which may undoubtedly be traced back to the period immediately following the Second World War. There was a time when the Englishmen were proud to think of their empire on which the sun never sets and of their navy which rules the waves. Both these claims were things of the past about the middle of this century. As a sign of this we find a class of English statesmen definitely thinking of a 'retreat from the empire' in order to form a group with the other nations of Europe, even at the sacrifice of the Commonwealth. Further, a class of English statesmen now realised that the loss of their empire was quite a natural event as the following statement of the author shows; "It would need a profound belief in Providence to make one refrain from wondering why a group of foggy islands off Europe's north-western shores, populated beyond the means of subsistence that the islands could provide, endowed with no great natural assets outside the coal-fields, should have become both the centre of a world empire and a possible arbiter of European rivalries. It might seem that so artificial a superiority was certain to prove as transient as the hegemonies that it had replaced." Though this pessimistic view was challenged by many, the impending collapse of the empire was in a way admitted even by the Conservative Prime Minister Harold Macmillan, who, in support of his proposal to apply for

the membership of the European Economic Community (Common Market), told the House of Commons on 31 July, 1961, that "the processes which gave birth to the nation states of Europe had been repeated all over the world. Fifteen years ago the movement spread through Asia .... Today the same thing is happening in Africa .... The wind of change is blowing through this continent and, whether we like it or not, this growth of national consciousness is a political fact." For a time Macmillan and the British Government sought to stem the tide by reorganisng the Commonwealth, but a section of British statesmen openly declared that it would be wiser to join the European Common Market even at the sacrifice of the empire, if necessary.

The volume under review presents before us, by way of a proper back-ground, the last glow of the British empire during the period 1897 to 1921, when it seemed to be at the height of its glory. He has described in great detail how the British empire passed through many crises, one after another, but always emerged triumphant. The initial discomfiture during the Boer War was effaced by the loyal support of the leaders of that country during the First World War. Similarly, inspite of discontent and political violence India gave her full support to the British during that war. But the author has referred to many facts to prove that "the position of Britain in 1921 was quite different in fact from what it appeared to be outwardly....The British position in the Victorian high noon had rested upon a combination of circumstances now fast disappearing .... It might seem that in 1921 the British role in the world had been triumphantly reasserted. But despite the illusion conveyed by the maps and tables the meridian had been passed, the final liquidation of Britain's world power — the Imperial Sunset — lay only fifty years ahead (p. 361).

Hitherto the British history has been written as a record of glory and triumph. The author has broken a new ground and gives the reader an insight into the modern history of Britain from an altogether new point of view. As such it is a welcome addition to the literature on English history. The author writes in a lucid style, gives evidence of wide reading and adds full reference to the sources. The printing and get-up are quite good.

R. C. Majumdar.

HISTORY OF THE INDIAN REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENT, by Manmathnath Gupta, Somaiya Publications, Bombay.

Unlike many other aspects of the modern Indian History the activities of Indian revolutionaries, both in India and abroad, have been covered exhaustively by the Indian scholars of modern Indian History — particularly during the last fifteen years or so. Mr. Manmathnath Gupta's contribution is quite different from the rest of the books on the subject in the sense that he was a participant, in different ways and at different times, in India's struggle for independence.

The book, *History of the Indian Revolutionary Movement,* as the author points out in introduction is a revised, uptodated edition of his earlier work in Hindi, *Bhartiya Krantikari Andolan Ka Itihas,* first published in 1939. Apart from using some German Foreign Office records, available in the National Archives of India, in its microfilm collection, not much evidence is there in the book of new and unexplored documents having been made use of — besides the German Foreign Office records have been made good use of by Dr. A. C. Bose in his book *Indian Revolutionaries Abroad,* published only last year. Mr. Gupta not being a professional historian, has kept documentary evidence in the book to the minimum.

Mr. Gupta has attempted to prove in this book that the non-violent movement under the Congress had exhausted itself by 1944, and it was the I.N.A. which delivered the *coup de grace* and compelled the British to quit India, as the British could no longer rely on the Indian army. He has also essayed to bring into focus the violent aspects of the 1942 movements, when attempts were made by the Indian revolutionaries to disrupt administration and assassinate Europeans connected with the oppressive administrative set-up of the British. Basing his argument on this analysis as also because of whole-sale arrests of the top Congress men in all parts of Northern India, he makes it amply and abundantly clear that, devoid of its top leadership, the Congress at the lower rung did not hesitate to indulge in acts of violence, letting loose the natural instinct of revenge against the tyranny of the British administration. In fact highlighting these facts considerably raises the stature of the top Congress men, who had kept the national movement non-violent, by and large, till then. One

wonders if these Congress leaders could succeed in keeping the 1942 movement non-violent!

There have been written many detailed and specialised books on different aspects of the Indian revolutionary movement but Mr. Gupta's book is very welcome, as it covers a period of about a hundred years in just two hundred and fifty pages. Rather the period 1907-1947 forms the subject matter of the book. Description of the part played by the people in South India is restricted to just three pages.

Apart from the mistakes in printing, and loose expression at places, the index is very incomplete. This is more obvious, as the book does not contain any biographical notes, neither at the end of the book nor in the foot-notes. One hopes that these shortcomings would be taken care of in the next edition of the book.

R. I. MALHOTRA

'INDIAN REVOLUTIONARIES ABROAD,' 1905-1922: In the Background of International Developments, by Arun Coomer Bose, Bharati Bhavan, Patna, 1971, Price Rs. 30, Pp. xv + 268.

Unlike many other aspects of modern Indian history, the acti vities of Indian revolutionaries abroad have been little covered by British or Western scholars of Modern Indian History. Dr. Bose has made an authentic, copiously documented, study of the activities of Indian revolutionaries in all parts of the world, for apart from tapping original source material here and abroad he took a lot of pain to interview some of the surviving old revolutionaries.

The book analyses, at the outset, the causes of discontent in India, and makes a through assessment of the reaction of educated Indians coming from middle class families, to the injustices of the British rule in India. The opportunities which the educated Indians got to travel abroad convinced them, as the author rightly points out, that 'Outside India, even in Britain, Indian revolutionaries could live and work with greater liberty, and many of them went abroad in search of greater safety and better opportunities'. These revolutionaries no doubt did get better opportunities to work, but their search for greater safety cut them off their roots in India, where their counterparts enjoyed neither

liberty nor safety, and the repressive measures of the British in India made it difficult for them to have any fruitful contact with Indian revolutionaries abroad.

It may be difficult to uphold the contention of Dr. Bose that the revolutionary activities of the Indians abroad gave them a distinct character of their own, distinct from that of their counterparts in India; for both at home and abroad the revolutionaries stood committed to propagate agitation against foreign rule, to subvert the British Administration in India, to militate against the British persecution of Indians, and to create public opinion in favour of Indian independence. In fact, this is clearly borne out by the graphic account (Dr. Bose has given) of the revolutionary activities of the Indians all over the world, be it in Germany, Turkey, England, U.S.A., Japan, or South East Asian countries.

It has been brought out very convincingly in the various chapters of the book that lack of co-ordination among the revolutionaries in different parts of the world, and, the lack of complete and solid support from any first rate power of consequence could not but frustrate the Indian revolutionaries abroad. But what is really significant, the author points out, is that despite this serious lack and repeated failures, the revolutionaries abroad kept the struggle going for more than two decades.

Dr. Bose has not cared to reason out why the activities of the Indian revolutionaries abroad more or less languished after the twenties of the present century. May be the involvement of the masses in the national struggle under Gandhiji's stewardship gave an entirely new political direction to the activities of Indian revolutionaries both in India and abroad. But then to have kept the flame of Independence struggle burning in foreign lands was enough proof of the resolute spirit and courage of the Indian revolutionaries abroad.

The presentation, could have been more effective had the author cared to avoid repetition of factual details. For example, the activities of Indian revolutionaries in U.S.A. listed and discussed in chapters II and IV, are more or less gone over again in chapter X. One hopes that mistakes in printing and loose expression, at places, would be taken care of in the next edition.

Drawing largely on primary sources available in India and Britain, this interesting book offers a great deal of welcome information about the activities of Indian revolutionaries abroad.

R. I. MALHOTRA

THE IDOLS OF KHAJURAHO, by Dr. Ramasray Avasti, Dept. of Ancient Indian History and Archaeology, University of Lucknow — Published by Oriental Publishing House, Gaya-kunj, Agra 2, 1967. Pp. 22 + 285 + 72 consist of 103 plates. Price: Rs. 70.

This is the revised text of a doctoral dissertation in Hindi accepted by the University of Lucknow in 1966. As some of the finest creations of man, several writers especially the lovers of art and architecture have been charmed by the sculptures which adorn the inner and outer walls of the temples of Khajuraho. Percy Brown, Stella Kramrisch, Krishnadeva, Sivarama Murthi and S. K. Saraswati in recent times and Cunnigham, Coomaraswamy and Ferguson much earlier, have bestowed paeans of praise on the admirable proportions of the various architectural numbers of Khajuraho temples.

Dr. Avasti in his present work has strictly confined his attention to the study of the idols of Gaṇapati, Viṣṇu, Sun, Navagrahās (Nine planets) and Eight Dikpālas found in Khajuraho temples including the archaeological museum there. A previous work on "Khajuraho sculptures and their significance" by Dr. (Smt.) Urmila Agarval, Ph.D. thesis, Agra University had included several Vaiṣṇva, Śaiva and Śākta idols of Khajuraho. Dr. Avasti has mainly concentrated on the iconographic details of the deities cited above. By way of an introduction to each item, he has traced the origin of the particular deity as reflected in Indian scriptures and literature. The characteristics of the icons of these deities as sanctioned in the texts of ancient iconography like Brihatsamhita, have also been pointed out by the writer. For example the different forms of Gaṇapati like Gaṇēṣwara, Gajānana, Lambōdara, Sūrpakarṇa, and Ēkadanta have been properly distinguished. Detailed information relating to the location and context of Gaṇapati and other idols in Khajuraho is also given in appendices.

The author suggests that the Khajuraho sculptors have shown originality by deviating much from the injunctions of the old iconographic texts. Novelties like sixty-four-handed Viṣṇu and the four-legged and seven-headed Siva are not prescribed in any of the old iconographic texts. He rightly points out that the artistic freedom shown by these sculptors had influenced later texts like Aparajita Pricha, Rupamandan and Devata Murti prakaran.

After the pioneer works of Gopinatha Rao, Krishna Sastri, and Prof. J. N. Banerjea, the need for detailed iconographic study of different centres in India has been felt by serious students of Indian sculpture. The present book is a laudable attempt in this direction. The book is also written in a pleasing style although there is preference for 'Sudh Hindi'.

This publication has all the attributes of research work including select bibliography, detailed index, appendices and representative plates. Patient scholarship and good craftsmanship have combined to produce a useful introduction to Khajuraho, the "illustrated dictionary of Indian iconography".

K. K. N. KURUP

GLORIOUS SAHIBS, by Michael Edwardes. Eyre & Spottiswoode, London, 1968, Pp. 248.

This book deals with the final phase of the growth of the British empire during the period between 1799 and 1819, but is written on a somewhat novel plan. The author describes the well-known events but lays special emphasis upon some distinguished personalities who made the greatest contribution to the building up of the British empire in India; namely, David Ochterlony, Charles Metcalfe, John Malcolm, and Mountstuart Elphinstone. The main object of the author is to show the difference between these servants of the East India Company and the later administrators of the Victorian Era, both in the spirit in which they worked and their outlook upon men and things in India. After describing the special work of each of these four in his own sphere in great details, he sums up the difference between them, who built the empire, and their successors on whom devolved the task of

preserving it. The former held that the British empire would be short-lived and Metcalfe wrote: "Empires grow old, decay and perish. Ours in India appears to have passed the brilliancy and vigour of youth and has reached a premature old age." They did not worry about abstract theories and their criterion was the test of reality. They knew they were superior to the Indians but they were neither arrogant nor smug. Material welfare of the peasants and their protection from such dangerous sophistications as English law were all that was needed—so thought these elder statesmen, unlike their successors who came out to India with a determination to raise her out of the misery which they believed was due to the heathen religion of the people. These, according to the author, were "Christian heroes of the Victorians" who wanted sweeping reforms in order to turn India into a sort of "brown Britain" while their predecessors sought to preserve as many old institutions as possible and to use them slowly to introduce reforms. The author concludes with the following observations: "They and the Victorian heroes shared a dislike for the debased Hinduism they saw around them, but unlike the latter, men like Malcolm and Elphinstone, Metcalfe and Ochterlony did not transmute their dislike into that hatred and contempt for everything Indian which was to poison relations between British and Indians until the end of the empire. The memory of it has not wholly disappeared today." The author regrets that while the Imperialists of the later age are remembered and their words are quoted "to condemn the living, it is perhaps worth remembering that there was once a conquest without real bitterness, that there were men who looked upon India with neither arrogance nor contempt, who were imperfect and frequently made mistakes, but who believed that even foreign dominion should be administered on a principle of humanity, not pride." Whether the author's clear-cut distinction between the old and the new may be accepted as a historical truth, at least without some qualification, may be doubted, but there is no doubt that he has presented the evolution of British rule in India in a fresh light which will be read with interest and perhaps provoke some rethinking on the part of the historians of British India.

The printing and get-up of the book are quite good.

R. C. MAJUMDAR

MINTS AND MINTING IN INDIA, by Upendra Thakur, published by Chowkhamba Publication, Varanasi, 1972; pages 192 (including Bibliography, pp. 164–74, and Index, pp. 175–92) with 6 Plates; Price Rs. 20.

The volume under review is a welcome addition to the meagre literature on Indian numismatics. It deals with some interesting aspects of early Indian currency and contains five chapters bearing the following titles — I. The Age of Barter and Exchange (pp.3–20), II. The First Coins (pp. 21–48), III. The State and the Coinage (pp. 49–96), IV. Symbols Vs. Mint-towns (pp. 97–145), and V. Economic Data from the Coins (pp. 146–63). Of these, Chapter I on 'The Age of Barter and Exchange' does not appear to have much to do directly with 'Mints and Minting'. At the top of odd-number pages between pp. 113 and 127, 'The State and the Coinage' is a misprint for 'Symbols Vs. Mint-Towns'. The article entitled 'The First Coins' (Chapter II) was contributed to a Seminar on Early Indian Indigenous Coins held at the Centre of Advanced Study in Ancient Indian History and Culture, Calcutta University, in 1970, under the title 'The First Coins: a Study in Growth and Evolution', and was incorporated in its proceedings edited with a few notes by the writer of the followng lines and published by the University of Calcutta (cf. *op. cit.*, pp. 21–47). It seems, however, that the article was printed off for the present volume before the proceedings of the Seminar reached Prof. Thakur. Thus, for e.g., we find that the ascription of *Varttika-kāra* Kātyāyana to the improbably early date of 600 B.C., to which we drew attention, is still there (p. 32).

We are grateful to Prof. Thakur for bringing together in the present volume the views of different scholars on particular topics and also for offering his own views in a number of cases. There are, however, cases in which the learned author appears to have depended on unsound and carelessly propounded views while there are others which require support or clarification. Prof. Thakur's attention may be drawn to a few such cases so that he may consider them while revising them for the second edition.

The author says, "The Greeks had issued silver coins as heavier as 263.5 grains in weight whereas the weight of their copper

coins goes upto 261 grains suggesting that the value of silver during this period was probably not much more than copper" (p. 158). We are sorry that the argument is not intelligible to us. If the Mughul emperors issued coins of the same weight in both gold and silver, how does the fact throw any light on the relative value of the two metals?

Again Prof. Thakur accepts the view that coins in general became rarer from the time of Harṣavardhana (606–47 A.D.) onwards, which points to the decline of trade and disappearance of urban life (pp. 161, 62). This is utterly opposed to all available evidence since there are not only numerous references to various types of coins in the epigraphic records of the period in question but besides innumerable unattributable coins, many issues can be definitely assigned to rulers reigning in the period in question. In this connection, one should not forget the facts (some of them also reiterated by Prof. Thakur) that coins once entering the Indian market remained in circulation for many centuries and that it was the traders and moneyers (and not the Government) that often determined whether fresh coins should be issued. Moreover cowrieshells and dummy pieces of metal were available for use if there was any shortage of real coins. We have the silver coins of Harṣavardhana Śīlāditya himself, and his Bengal contemporary Śaśāṅka issued gold coins, imitations of which were produced in East Bengal even about the eighth century A.D. Among the coins mentioned in inscriptions of the period concerned under identifiable names, we may refer to the Anjaneri (Nasik District, Maharashtra) plates of the eighth century A.D. speaking of the prevalence of silver coins of king Kṛṣṇa who belonged to the Early Kalacuri dynasty and flourished in the sixth century A.D. Such coins have been discovered in several sites of Western India. Then again, the Siyadoni (Jhansi District, U.P.) inscriptions speak of the *dramma* issued by Ādivarāha and Vigrahatuṅga or Vigrahapāla. The Adivarāhadrammas are the silver coins of the Pratīhāra king Bhoja I (c. 836–85 A.D.) surnamed Ādivarāha, and we have actually silver coins bearing the name Ādivarāha in the legend. Likewise we have silver coins bearing the name of Vigraha who must have flourished in the eighth or ninth century A.D. In many cases, we are told about the issue of a particular coin by a king, but have

failed to discover such issues. Thus Haribhadra's *Nemināhacariu* (1159 A.D.) speaks of the issue of coins bearing the figure of Lakṣmī from the *ṭankaśālā* or mint of Caulukya Mūlarāja I (961–96 A.D.); but no such coins are known to have been identified. Likewise, there is mention of coin-names which cannot be identified; thus a silver coin called Pañciyaka-dramma is mentioned in the Siyadoni inscriptions; but we have not been able to detect such coins among the old Indian issues of the medieval period. As regards foreign trade we may refer, among other facts, to Itsing's travels in merchants' vessels in the latter half of the seventh century A.D. as well as to the testimony of Ibn Khurdabeh (844–48 A.D.), Sulayman (851 A.D.) and many other Arabs.

It is not correct to speak of 'the sudden disappearance of silver money .... in Kuṣāṇa times' (pp. 157–58), when the Śaka Satraps of Western India had an extensive silver currency during the same age. Likewise, reference may be made to the highly improbable theory explaining the unpopularity of copper coins with the Guptas (pp. 160–61) by suggesting 'the growth of self-sufficient economic units which precluded the rise of coins by the rural peasantry rendering the use of money less important'. Unfortunately this theory was propounded without taking into consideration the extensive issue of copper coins imitated from Kuṣāṇa money and discovered in Orissa, Bengal, Bihar and U.P. mostly in Gupta times.

We have noticed a few cases of what looks like contradiction in Prof. Thakur's treatment of the various topics. Thus in respect of the Śātavāhanas, he says (p. 159), "despite their extensive kingdom, they were not economically well off" and again, "This indicates the flourishing trade of India by sea-route in Sātavāhana period." Indeed, it is well known that the great opulence of the Śātavāhana kings is abundantly proved by the Nānāghāṭ inscription recording the celebration of sacrifices and gifts made in that connection by the queen of Śātakarṇi I. Even the readable portions of the fragmentary record mention the gifts of more than 72,000 cows and 45,000 Kārṣāpaṇa coins besides villages, wagonfuls of paddy, clothes, horses, elephants, chariots, silver objects, etc. These Kārṣāpaṇas were silver punch-marked coins prevalent in the Śātavāhana kingdom.

We have drawn attention to a few cases from the last chapter of the book. There are not too many serious misprints; some of them noticed by us include 'Land-grants' for 'Land System' in the penultimate line of p. 171. We recommend the book to the students of Indian Numismatics.

D. C. SIRCAR.

INDIA AS SEEN IN THE BRIHATSAMHITA OF VARAHA MIHIRA, by Dr. Ajay Mitra Shastri, Motilal Banarsidass (1969), Pp. xxiv + 556 with twenty-one plates, Price Rs. 50/-

This book, a dissertation for the Ph.D. Degree, is a very pains-taking collection of data furnished by Varahamihira. As this great astronomer lived in the 5th-6th century A.D., these data throw very interesting light on a very obscure period of ancient Indian history. After an elaborate discussion of the date of Varahamihira the author accepts the current view that *Panchasiddhantika*, one of the major works of Varahamihira was probably composed in 505 A.D. He has also discussed the life and the chronological order of the major works of Varahamihira. After this introduction the author discusses in different chapters the information supplied by Varahamihira on sundry topics arranged according to subject-matter, the major heads under which the data are arranged are Geography, Religion, Social Life, Food and Drink, Economic Life, Arts, Trade and Industry, etc. Particular interest attaches to the last two chapters dealing with "the method of ascertaining future prospects of rainfall and crops" and "the art of exploring underground water-springs." Here the author, after referring to various texts on the subject of prediction of rainfall, observes: "they bear testimony to the great success achieved by our ancestors in this field of study (Meteorology)." He does not stop to examine the practical, not to speak of the scientific, value of the theories or recipes contained in these texts which would be looked upon by any educated man today as worthless, and almost ridiculous. This is an illustration, out of many, indicating a lack of critical sense on the part of the author, such as one would not expect in a thesis approved for the Ph.D. Degree. The real value

of the book is the laborious collection of materials scattered in Bṛhatsamhita and their presentation in a classified order. Although much of the information supplied by Varahamihira is known from other sources, the value of the data supplied by him is of great importance because of the fact that we know that they were true of a definite period of time, which cannot be said of data gathered from most other literary sources as their dates are unknown. Thus we are in a position to say that the valuable data, particularly in respect of social practices, religious ideas, art, industry, etc. mentioned by Varahamihira, existed as early as the 5th century A.D. or continued till that date. Thus the data collected by Dr. Mitra and arranged according to topics are bound to be of great value to the students of Indian history and Culture; for this reason we welcome this book as a valuable addition to the source materials of ancient Indian history.

R. C. MAJUMDAR

Our Exchanges

1. *Annals of the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute*, Poona.
2. *Brahma Vidya, The Adyar Library Bulletin*, Madras.
3. *Bulletin of the Archaeological Survey of India*, Delhi.
4. *Bulletin of the Institute of Historical Research*, London.
5. *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies*, London.
6. *Folklore*, Calcutta.
7. *Indian Archives*, Delhi.
8. *Indian Review*, Madras.
9. *India Quarterly*, New Delhi.
10. *Indo Asian Culture*, New Delhi.
11. *Journal of the Bihar Research Society*, Patna.
12. *Journal of the Bombay Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society*, Bombay.
13. *Journal of the Ganganatha Jha Research Institute*, Allahabad.
14. *Journal of the Oriental Institute*, Baroda.
15. *Journal of United Provinces Historical Society*, Lucknow.
16. *Political Scientist*, Ranchi.
17. *Studies in Islam*, New Delhi.
18. *University of Birmingham Historical Journal*, Birmingham.
19. *University of Ceylon Review*.
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(Continued from page 1)

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